p.5 American strategic competence is in decline.
p.6 In 1989, General John R. Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command at the time, argued for the return of uniformed strategists in his article,
"What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?" After succinctly defining the attributes of military strategists, General
Galvin suggested that key elements of their development included advanced schooling, operational experience, and lifelong
development.
p.7 Army strategists were essential to Allied victory [in World War II];
their contributions reflected the zenith of American operational and strategic art during this critical period in world history.
Unfortunately, this was an ascent that would too quickly decline.
p.8 A person could grow old collecting definitions of "strategy"
and "strategic." Theorists have made careers of trying to define these terms and explaining the inherent difficulties
of matching strategy with political objectives. Definitions range from Colin Gray's narrow view that strategy
is "the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy" to more inclusive definitions,
such as Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley's contention that strategy is "a process, a constant adaptation to shifting
conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate."
p.9 Army strategists provide a strategic perspective on complex
problems and help create national and regional strategic guidance. They are instrumental in the translation
of that guidance into actionable plans at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war.
p.10 Strategists build feedback mechanisms that enable iterative
reassessment and adjustment of plans in response to adaptive adversaries... within the context of a coherent strategy...
Strategists create and sustain actionable plans or recommendations that translate operational and institutional means into
desired end-states, with emphasis on campaign planning
p.11 Army strategists are specialty officers who concentrate in the general
application of strategy.
p.13 According to Galvin, "Rarely can the strategist in uniform
gain a complete understanding of military force in some theoretical way; an officer absorbs much of what he knows in the practical,
daily world of military units [in] the field." ...strategists continue their professional development, acquiring
a broad base of knowledge, while simultaneously gaining a deep understanding of national defense issues and processes. Strategists
proceed along no set path; rather, they benefit from a range of professional experiences
p.14-15 General Albert C. Wedemeyer, one of Eisenhower's key
war planners and the author of the comprehensive Victory Plan of 1941, suggests that the cumulative effect of education, experience,
and a curious mind placed him on firm strategic ground at the outset of World War II... Wedemeyer attended multiple
staff colleges and overseas assignments, even graduating from Germany's Kriegsakademie in 1938. Equally important, he
"continued the reading habits established in his youth.... It is to his reading, rather than to external influences, that
one must turn to understand the intellectual preparation that Albert Wedemeyer brought with him to his job on the general
staff in 1941." His career exemplifies how education and experience, complemented by lifelong learning, can
produce a masterful strategist.
