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The Transformation of War (van Creveld, 1991)

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The most radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz

TransformationOfWar.jpg

Since Clausewitz, war has been considered a rational extension of politics by nations seeking to advance their interests. Now, in this sweeping reassessment of the ends and means of war, Martin van Creveld advances a new understanding of what war is today, and for what that it's fought.

p.95 The conduct of war is usually known as strategy... Frontius recommended that the commander should fabricate favorable omens in order to raise his men's morale and inspire them with courage. [JLJ - strategy revolves around the question: will it work?]
 
p.96-97 Jomini, Venturius, and others argued that the theater of war could be represented by a huge, exceedingly complicated, chessboard... the art of the commander consisted of maneuvering his forces in such a way as to concentrate the largest number of men (or counters) at the decisive point... To Clausewitz... "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first in general and then at the decisive point."
 
p.100 Present-day military establishments all over the developed world typically concern themselves with all aspects of the force-creating process.
 
p.102 Creating the greatest war-making potential involved more than mobilizing all available resources: above all else, it was an exercise in meshing those resources with each other until they formed a single coherent whole.
 
p.104 The great twin obstacles to warlike force, according to Clausewitz, are uncertainty and friction. He might have added inflexibility, thus completing a trio that has bedeviled military forces since the beginning of time... they exist wherever and whenever war is waged... the quality of performance... is judged very largely by their ability to neutralize those influences.
 
p.105 The remaining elements that make up force are excellent equipment, good organization, tough training, strict discipline, and high morale.
 
p.109 The point where information enters the picture is also where we encounter the third great obstacle to force, namely uncertainty.
 
p.114 Another cardinal problem of strategy, whether in war or in football or in chess, is the question as to which objectives one's strength should be directed against, and in what order.
 
p.116 Strategy as presented so far consists of two basic elements; namely, creating force on the one hand, and using it against the opponent on the other.
 
p.118 strategy begins where force-building and competition end - at the point, to repeat, where we are faced with an intelligent opponent who does not passively accept our design, and who actively obstructs them even as he attempts to realize his own.
 
p.119 Strategy governs war... it also governs football, basketball, chess, and even many innocuous children's games... In war, the objective of strategy is to overcome force with force... The art of strategy... consists of employing strength against weakness... The opponent, however, is assumed to be intelligent and active. He will, if he can, identify the place where we intend to employ our strength and either bring up forces to oppose it or make his preparations in such a way as to cause our blow to strike empty air... The net result is a complex dynamic interaction between two opposing minds, one that is characteristic of strategy at all levels... my thought depends on his which in turn depends on mine... Each concentrates at place A even as he pretends to be at place B, making out as though he were planning to strike in direction C even while his real objective is D. Nor does the process end at this point. The really artistic touch is to make "truth" and "falsehood" change places at a moment's notice, tailoring their respective roles to the opponent's moves so as to counter his designs and exploit his mistakes.
 
p.119-120 At some point in the process, what was originally intended merely as a feint is transformed into the main thrust. What was originally meant as a main thrust is turned into a mere feint... the paradoxical logic of strategy reveals itself in full... It will fail, not in spite of having succeeded once but because its very success will probably put an intelligent opponent on his guard... A continuous dynamic interaction ensues... The advantages of the so-called indirect approach... represents one of the fundamental pillars on which all strategy rests.
 
p.165 What sets war apart, what makes it unique, is precisely the fact that it is the most dangerous activity of all, one that makes the remainder pale and for which no other can offer an adequate substitute. Wherever else we care to look, we find the opposition to be second-rate... Contests between humans that fall short of war are known as games... War causes human qualities, the best as well as the worst, to realize their full potential.
 
p.195 war represents perhaps the most imitative activity known to man. Strategy is interactive by definition; any attempt to defeat the enemy that involves outwitting and deceiving him must be preceded by an endeavor to understand him... Belligerents who were originally very dissimilar will come to resemble each other first in point of the methods that they use and then, gradually, other respects.
 
p.217 The logic of strategy itself requires that the opponent's motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war.
 
p.226 Most important of all, the essential principles of strategy will continue to be determined by its mutual, interactive character... The need to concentrate the greatest possible force and deliver a smashing blow at the decisive point will continue to clash with the need to outwit, mislead, deceive, and surprise the enemy. Victory, as always, will go to the side that best understands how to balance these two contradictory requirements, not just in the abstract but at a specific time, at a specific place, and against a specific enemy.

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