A Systemic Concept for Operational Design (Schmitt, 2006)

p.1-2 Commanders at all levels today face highly complex, dynamic and novel problem situations which they are called on to resolve... these situations are essentially unknowable: no amount of information collection or analysis will reveal objective truth or provide the ability to predict events with certitude. Despite the most careful observation, these situations maintain the ability to surprise. They change unpredictably over time. Enemies adopt and quickly adapt methods designed to negate perceived U.S. strengths and exploit perceived U.S. weaknesses... The relationships between causes and effects are dynamic and only vaguely discernible at best. At the same time, the implications of action are far-reaching, often well beyond the extent of a commander’s authority or understanding... Under these conditions, before they can begin to apply established techniques effectively, commanders must first be able to form an understanding of a situation on its own terms and conceive an approach for dealing with that situation uniquely. That is, they must first design. Design is the subject of this paper.

p.2-3 This paper argues that commanders should precede current planning procedures with an iterative, conversational design process based on systems thinking. This process is intended to build a systemic understanding of the situation such that a course of action emerges intuitively. Informed by an explicit design that provides a governing logic for the operation or campaign, subsequent planning can proceed more effectively. The underlying premise of this concept is that if we understand a problem well enough, a solution to the problem becomes self-evident.

Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system" - to incapacitate the enemy systemically. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as part of a cohesive whole. … Success depends not so much on the efficient performance of procedures and techniques, but on understanding the specific characteristics of the enemy system. … [T]he element of … local attrition is not merely to contribute to the overall wearing down of the entire enemy force, but to eliminate a key element which incapacitates the enemy systemically.

p.9-10 There is no definitive way to formulate a wicked problem. First of all, a problem does not exist objectively. What exists is a mess - a complex tangle of conditions - which only becomes a problem when someone decides that the conditions are unsatisfactory and require resolution... Any understanding of a wicked problem is an interpretation - a creation based on a particular perspective - rather than an objective truth. In this sense, a wicked problem cannot be known, but must be constructed - that is, the problem to be solved must be created out of the mess. Understanding a wicked problem is not a matter of capturing reality sufficiently correctly, but of constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in dealing with the reality.

p.10-11 We cannot understand a wicked problem without proposing a solution... Wicked problems have no "stopping rule." ... Wicked problems have better or worse solutions, not right or wrong ones... There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem... A solution that seems to achieve positive results initially could generate delayed negative consequences that outweigh any initial good that was achieved. One cannot judge the full consequences of a course of action until these waves of repercussions have run out, by which point it will long have become impossible to isolate individual causes and effects, since in the mean time numerous other events will have affected the situation... Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel... Wicked problems are interactively complex.

p.15 The way to deal with a complex operational situation is to carry out a heuristic operational design to provide a logical foundation for all planning and execution, and continuously to assess and revise the design over time in response to changes in the situation. As the design evolves, so too will plans and actions. In this way the organization can learn and operations can evolve toward greater effectiveness.

p.17 Design must be iterative because by nature complex operational situations defy comprehension and resolution in a single iteration. Such problems require designers to make repeated passes from different perspectives to see all the various factors and relationships and then to be able mentally to hold them together as an integrated whole. Each iteration is an opportunity to learn more about the situation and make incremental improvements to the design.

p.21 With Activities 3 and 4, designers cross into systems thinking, creating a systemic abstraction of the problem they have begun to identify in Activity 2. They distill the complex reality into conceptual terms. In Activity 3, the designers identify the object system and posit an essential definition for it. They decide what constitutes the system they intend to transform. In Activity 4, the central activity of the design process, the designers create a system model that provides a rational explanation of the problem, to include underlying causes of the problem and problem dynamics. The model explains what is defined in the essential definition. While the essential definition defines what the system is, the model establishes what the system does in order to satisfy that definition. It is important to keep in mind that Activity 4 is not an attempt to capture objective reality, since that is not knowable. There are no right or wrong conceptual models - only models that are more or less defensible, more or less useful in guiding actions to resolve the situation.

p.28 Continuous assessment is a fundamental element of design as envisioned in this concept. Continuous assessment is the mechanism that enables learning and adaptation to occur. Having created an initial design, the design team continuously tests it. There are two basic reasons for this. First, the designers will have gotten some things wrong, and mismatches will exist between the design and reality. This is inevitable given the nature of complex operational situations. Second, the situation will change. The changes may be only gradual, but even gradual changes accumulating over time will eventually create a qualitatively different situation requiring a new design. Recognizing shortcomings in the original design or qualitative changes in the situation requires continuous assessment.

To the extent that we face socially complex, wicked problems, we should design before we plan and execute. Design is essentially the process of rationally formulating the problem to be solved out of the mess that confronts us, and doing it in such a way that the logic for solving the problem emerges intuitively. We design by holding a conversational discourse among stakeholders during which an image of the problem and the solution emerges gradually through the collective intelligence of the group subjected to critical argument. During operational design, we think systemically - we imagine the problem as a system driven primarily by its own purpose, structure and processes, but also influenced by the broader environment within which it exists. We do this by developing, testing and modifying conceptual models hypothesized to explain the workings of the system in its environment. Because we cannot observe the physical causality that underlies the situation, we test our hypothesis heuristically through action. We observe the results of our action to see if they conform to the expectations of our design, and we redesign accordingly. In this way, design provides the basis for assessment and for adapting our operations to the situation through learning.