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How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (Alexander, 2002)

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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Winning With Indirect Methods, April 23, 2004
By  E. Gartman (Rockville, MD USA)
 
Noted Military Historian Bevin Alexander's latest effort represents an expansion of BH Liddell Hart's work. In his classic text on strategy, Liddell Hart differentiates between direct and indirect methods of warfare, and finds the latter to be by far the more successful approach. Liddell Hart does not examine different types of indirect action, however, and this is where Alexander's work comes in. Alexander begins with the premise that frontal assaults against fortified positions should never be attempted. Attacks should always come from the side or rear. This has the advantage of striking the enemy where they are weaker, and perhaps more importantly, it throws them off psychologically, disorienting, and frightening them. Alexander lists thirteen such variations on these same ideas, such as encirclement, holding in one place and striking another, creating diversions, cutting of the enemy's retreat, etc. Each method receives its own chapter, accompanied by several historical examples of the successful execution of the tactic, usually taken from as many different eras as possible. Of particular note are the examples taken from Stonewall Jackson's campaigns, a subject on which Alexander is one of the leading authorities. In writing this work it seems clear that Alexander is trying to place himself in line with the classics of military theory: Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart. Only time will tell whether or not he achieves this lofty goal. In the meantime there is little doubt that this fascinating and well-written work should be closely examined military strategists, historians, and armchair generals.

p.2 The specific ancient rule the terrorists followed was to avoid the enemy's strength and strike at weakness.
 
p.8 Whatever form warfare takes in the future, it will involve the application of strategy and tactics, the twin divisions of warfare that have existed from the start.
 
p.8-9 Strategy and tactics must be designed to take advantage of the wisdom embodied in the rules... The commander must evaluate every new situation with great care, and then choose the rule or rules he must employ to achieve success. The rules of war relate to specific problems as they arise, and are not general rules always to be applied in all situations.
 
p.16 commanders who can see their tasks as part of a larger goal or objective and who can cooperate with other detached elements will be successful.
 
p.23 The rule of war that is most relevant to the current war on terrorism is the maxim to exploit an enemy's weaknesses, while nullifying his strength.
 
p.180 One of the potentially most decisive rules of war is to press straight into an enemy's vitals, and destroy the means by which he can resist.
 
p.324 deception must rely, in most cases, on confusing or blocking an enemy's perception of what is happening.
 
p.329 While all great ideas are simple, the gift of Napoleon and other military geniuses is to see the obvious when others do not.

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