p.7 True wisdom in strategy must be practical because strategy is a practical
subject. Much of what appears to be wise and indeed is prudent as high theory is unhelpful to the
poor warrior who actually has to do strategy, tactically and operationally.
p.8 [Clausewitz and Jomini] "the best strategy is always to be very strong;
first in general, and then at the decisive point."
p.8 My key argument is organized around three reasons why it is difficult
to do strategy well:
- its very nature, which endures through time and in all contexts
- the multiplicity and sheer variety of sources of friction
- it is planned for contexts that literally have not occurred and might not
occur; the future has not happened.
p.8 strategy can fail because it may apply the wrong solutions
to incorrectly framed questions because guesses about the future were not correct.
p.8 Samuel Griffith... was a scholar of Chinese military theory from Sun Tzu
to Mao. He once observed that "there are no mechanical panaceas"
p.9 Progress in modern strategic performance has not been achieved exclusively
through science and technology.
p.9 To tackle the fog and friction of strategy and war is not akin
to exploring unknown terrain... The map of fog and friction is a living, dynamic one that reorganizes itself to frustrate
the intrepid explorer.
p.9 strategy is neither policy nor armed combat; rather it is the bridge
between them.
p.10 strategy is perilously complex by its very nature. Every element or dimension
can impact all others.
p.10 The strategist has to be expert in using the threat or use of
force for policy ends, not in thinking up desirable policy ends or in fighting skillfully.
p.10 because strategy embraces all aspects of the military instrument... the
maximum possible number of things can go wrong... In the world of strategists... there is simply much more scope for error.
p.10 Practicing strategists must make decisions regardless of the uncertainty.
p.12 For strategic success:
- forces must be internally coherent, which is to say competently joint
- be of a quantity and provide a strategic effect scaled to the tasks
set by high policy
- be employed coercively in pursuit of military objectives that fit
political goals.
p.12 Competence cannot offset folly along the means-ends axis of strategy...
remember that to succeed in strategy you do not have to be distinguished or even particularly competent. All that is required
is performing well enough to beat an enemy.
