p.9 As Clausewitz wrote, nations employ
force to ‘compel our enemy to do our will’. This key principle of On War remains valid today
p.9 Writing on the Falklands War, during which Britain applied with great
skill a maritime strategy that enabled it to win back those islands from Argentina, J A Robertson concluded that
‘all wars are decided finally by a soldier on the ground with a gun in his hand, exercising control over the
land in dispute’. [JLJ - paraphrasing J.C. Wylie]
p.20 According to LED 3-0, influence is achieved on COGs [centers of gravity] primarily
through dislocating and/or disrupting them. Of the types of dislocation called for, the one with the most
predictable effect, and the one that can most reliably be achieved, is physical dislocation... it does not
rely upon an enemy decision for effect... is brought about by manoeuvring one's forces into positions from which they
can effectively engage the enemy but from which the enemy cannot effectively engage them.
p.21 Physical dislocation can be achieved in two main ways.
First, it can be achieved through superior operational mobility. Simply moving against a small portion of the enemy’s
forces with a larger portion of one’s own—faster than the enemy can manoeuvre counterattacking forces to negate
that deployment—will achieve physical dislocation. Second, it can be achieved through some enabling element,
such as intellectual dislocation. For example, deceiving the enemy with a feint will possibly result in a corresponding
physical dislocation of the enemy’s reserve. However, relying upon some enabling effect, such as intellectual dislocation,
would of course result in physical dislocation becoming equally problematic, as its achievement is then dependent upon something
that is itself inherently unreliable... Regardless of its inherent predictability or reliability, physically dislocating
the enemy is the most reliable way to achieve superiority in mass and firepower at
the critical point as it is the only way to achieve relative overmatch that is not dependent upon
the enemy’s cooperation.
p.22 it remains highly likely that Australia will face at
least numerical parity in forces with high operational mobility. Accordingly,
Australian forces will not be able to reliably achieve physical dislocation of the enemy and subsequent overmatch
at critical points because the enemy will be able to respond to Australian manoeuvres with at least equal speed. Any physical
dislocation achieved will be temporary at best and is likely to be met with an adequate defensive response before the advantage
can be exploited.
In these circumstances, physical dislocation can only
be achieved by operating quicker than the enemy can react intellectually (‘getting inside their OODA loop’).
p.56 Ultimately for Army it is about effectiveness...
In summary, if Army is to remain the best small Army in the world then it needs to be able to demonstrate
its ability to adapt, prepare, sustain and excel as a component of a future ADF and regionally dominant amphibious
capability.
p.64-65 Moyse, an RAN officer, highlights the importance
of maritime Joint manoeuvre in the context of Australia’s geostrategic circumstances. However, he also posits
that Australia’s maritime strategy, as set out in the Defence 2000 White Paper, actually describes
a ‘sea denial’ strategy; whereas for him the missing ingredient is rather ‘sea control’ (comprised
of sea assertion and power projection).
p.72 Power projection in and from the maritime environment,
including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or
to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces.
