p.38 This
paper asks what kind of social science we – scholars, policy makers, administrators – should and should not promote
in democratic societies, and how we may hold social scientists accountable to deliver what we ask them for.
My argument follows three main steps:
1. We should
avoid social sciences that pretend to emulate natural science by producing cumulative and predictive theory. The
natural science approach simply does not work in the social sciences. No predictive theories have been arrived at in social
science, despite centuries of trying. This approach is a wasteful dead-end.
2. We should promote
social sciences that are strong where natural science is weak – that is, in reflexive analysis and deliberation about
values and interests aimed at praxis, which are essential to social and economic development in society. We should promote
value rationality over epistemic rationality, in order to arrive at social science that matters.
3. Policy makers and
administrators should reward such praxis-oriented social science, and they should penalise social science that has no social
and practical import, including social science which vainly tries to emulate natural science. This would be accountability
that matters.
p.39 To sum up the differences: The epistemic or natural science model sees social scientists and social science
professionals as technocrats who – through their insight into social theories and laws – may provide society with
solutions to its social ills. The phronetic model sees social scientists and social science professionals as analysts
who produce food for thought for the ongoing process of public deliberation, participation, and decision making.
p.39 The underlying issue is that being scientistic does not amount to being scientific. Regardless of how much we let mathematical and statistical
modelling dominate the social sciences, they are unlikely to become scientific in the natural sciences sense. This is so because
the phenomena modelled are social, and thus “answer back” in ways natural phenomena do not.
p.41 phronetic social science explicitly sees itself as not having a privileged position from which the final truth can be told and further discussion
arrested.
p.41 the attempts of social science to become “real”, epistemic science draw attention and resources
away from those areas where social sciences could make an impact, and toward areas where they do not, never have,
and probably never will, obtain any significance as Kuhnian normal and predictive sciences.
p.42 Two scenarios may be outlined for the future of social science... The second scenario replaces scientism with phronesis. Here the purpose
of social science is not to develop epistemic theory, but to contribute to society’s practical rationality by elucidating
where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according to different sets of values and interests. The goal of
the phronetic approach becomes contributing to society’s capacity for value-rational deliberation and action...
If we want more phronesis in social science, we need to do three things:
• First,
we must drop all pretence, however indirect, of emulating the relative success of the natural sciences in producing
cumulative and predictive theory, for their approach simply does not work in social science.
• Second,
we must address problems that matter to groups in the local, national, and global communities in which we live,
and we must do it in ways that matter; we must focus on issues of context, values, and power, as advocated by great social
scientists from Aristotle to Machiavelli to Max Weber.
•
Finally, we must effectively and dialogically communicate the results of our research to our fellow citizens and carefully
listen to their feedback.
