Copyright (c) 2012 John L. Jerz

Staff Organization and Operations (Department of the Army, 1997)
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Field Manual 101-5
 
 
"This publication is the Army's capstone manual for staff organization and operations of major tactical and major tactical support commands at corps level and below. Field Manual (FM) 101-5 describes basic doctrine of the roles, relationships, organization, and responsibilities of staffs in the United States (US) Army... FM 101-5 is the Army's doctrinal source for the military decision-making process, the doctrinal approach to decision making that helps the commander and his staff examine a situation and reach logical decisions."

1-3 The primary product the staff produces for the commander, and for subordinate commanders, is understanding, or situational awareness. True understanding should be the basis for information provided to commanders to make decisions. Formal staff processes provide two types of information associated with understanding and decision making. All other staff activities are secondary. The first is situational awareness information, which creates an understanding of the situation as the basis for making a decision. Simply, it is understanding oneself, the enemy, and the terrain or environment.
 
1-3 Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of his current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state, and then visualizes the sequence of activities that will move his force from its current state to the end state. In short, it provides the key to where and how the commander can best lead and motivate soldiers, and see the battlefield, his own forces, the enemy, and the end state.
  It is critical to mission accomplishment that commanders have the ability to visualize the battlefield.
 
5-16  The War-Gaming Process
Course of action analysis is conducted using war gaming. The war game is a disciplined process, with rules and steps, that attempts to visualize the flow of a battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the area of operations. It relies heavily on a doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. War gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with tactical possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War gaming is the most valuable step during COA analysis and comparison and should be allocated more time than any other step. However, the commander or CofS (XO) must determine at this point how much time he can commit to the wargaming process, and ensure this time line is followed.
 
During the war game, the staff takes a COA and begins to develop a detailed plan, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. War gaming tests a COA or improves a developed COA. The commander and his staff may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.
 
The General Rules of War Gaming
War gamers need to- ...
  • Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident.
  • Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the COA. If a COA fails any of these tests during the war game, they must reject it.
5-17 The G2 (S2) [JLJ - assistant chief of staff, Intelligence] role-plays the enemy commander. He develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COA, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. He captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction and corresponding friendly enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to win the war game for the enemy, he ensures that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA.
 
5-18 Select the War-Game Method. There are three recommended techniques—the belt, the avenue-in-depth, and the box. Each one considers the area of interest and all enemy forces affecting the outcome of the operations. The techniques can be used separately or in combination, or the staff can devise one of its own.
 
5-22 During war gaming, the commander and staff try to foresee the dynamics of a battle’s action, reaction, and counteraction.
 
5-23 During the war game, the commander can modify the COA based on how things develop.
 
5-24 The actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates the staff reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. The most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA.
 
5-30 Course of Action Development... The commander and selected staff save additional time by conducting a hasty war game once the COAs are developed. The hasty war game allows the commander to determine if he favors one or more COAs out of several proposed. It develops and matures one or more COAs prior to the formal war game.
 
5-30 Course of Action Analysis
The commander and staff must war-game the COAs to ensure all elements are fully integrated and synchronized. An early decision to limit the number of COAs war-gamed, or to develop only one COA, saves the greatest amount of time in this process. When wargaming the COAs, it is best to do so against all feasible enemy courses of action. However, the commander can save additional time by having the staff war-game against a smaller number of enemy COAs.
 
5-30 The staff should use the box technique, focusing on the most critical event first, such as actions at the objective or the engagement area. If time permits, the staff war-games other critical events or boxes as well. The commander and staff must identify and prioritize the critical events they want analyzed. These critical events can be identified by analyzing essential tasks. The staff war-games as many critical events as possible in the allotted amount of time.
 
6-1 During execution of the order resulting from the decision process, the commander and staff must constantly assess where they are in the ongoing operation against what they thought would happen in the war game, to include available resources, and estimate the force’s posture for future operations. Rapidly changing time-space relationships, especially as they affect key actions, and the acquisition of new or changed information require staff officers to continually update their estimates. They continue to assess the operation as assumptions either become facts or are proved false. They are constantly on the lookout for unexpected opportunities to exploit success and for the events that will trigger branches and sequels. Finally, they must be looking for changes in conditions that will result in new or significantly altered missions and thus cause the decisionmaking process to start again. This is the value of the orders process.

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