p.98-99 [Napoleon quoted] "The principles of war are the same as
those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and
the rest is nothing."...illumination comes from the actual campaign in which Bonaparte put this maxim into execution.
It clearly suggests that what he really meant was not "point", but "joint" - and that at this stage of his career he was too
firmly imbued with the idea of economy of force to waste his limited strength in battering at the enemy's strong point. A
joint, however, is both vital and vulnerable.
p.105-106 In 1805, Napoleon's army of 200,000 men was assembled at Boulogne, menacing a descent on the English
coast, when it was suddenly directed by forced marches to the Rhine. It is still uncertain whether Napoleon seriously
intended a direct invasion of England, or whether his threat was merely the first move in his indirect approach to Austria.
Probably, he was acting on [military strategist] Bourcet's principle of "a plan with branches" [in which an army, by aiming at multiple targets, forces the enemy to divide his forces,
thus making the enemy unable to defend them all].
p.187 Like those "jackets" which used to be applied in American jails to refractory prisoners, as the [naval]
blockade [of Germany during WWI] was progressively tightened so did it first cramp the prisoner's movement and then stifle
his breathing, while the tighter it became and the longer it continued the less became of the prisoner's power of resistance,
and the more demoralizing the sense of constriction.
Helplessness induces hopelessness, and history attests that loss of hope, not loss of lives,
is what decides the issue of war.
p.188-189 The blockade may be classified as a grand strategy of indirect approach to which no effective
resistance was possible and of a type which incurred no risk except in its slowness of effect.
p.204 the balance between victory and defeat turns on mental impressions and only indirectly on physical
blows.
p.320 Moltke [Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke (October 26, 1800 –
April 24, 1891)] reached a clearer, and wiser definition in terming strategy "the practical adaptation of the means placed
at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in view".
p.321 We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as - "the art
of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy". For strategy is concerned not merely with
the movement of forces - as its role is often defined - but with the effect.
p.322 Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and co-ordination
of the ends and the means. The end must be proportioned to the total means, and the means used in gaining each
intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the value and the needs of that intermediate end
p.323 Strategy has not to overcome resistance... Its purpose is to diminish
the possibility of resistance
p.324 For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to
bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances.
p.327-328 it is usually necessary for the dislocating move to be preceded by a move, or moves, which can
best be defined by the term 'distract' in its literal sense of 'to draw asunder'. The purpose of this 'distraction' is to
deprive the enemy of his freedom of action... it should cause a distension of his forces or their diversion to unprofitable
ends, so that they are too widely distributed, and too committed elsewhere, to have the power of interfering with one's own
decisively intended move... The loss of his freedom of action is the sequel to the loss of his freedom of conception.
p.328 It would have been more exact, and more lucid, to say that an army should always be so distributed
that its parts can aid each other and combine to produce the maximum possible concentration of force at one place,
while the minimum force necessary is used elsewhere to prepare the success of the concentration.
p.329 Superior weight at the intended decisive point does not suffice unless that point cannot be reinforced
in time by the opponent.
p.329 Effective concentration can only be obtained when the opposing forces are dispersed;
and, usually, in order to ensure this, one's own forces must be widely distributed. Thus, by an outward paradox,
true concentration is the product of dispersion.
p.330 The absence of an alternative is contrary to the very nature of war.
p.330 To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's power to frustrate it;
the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances
met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line
which offers alternate objectives. For thereby you put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma, which goes far to
assure the gaining of at least one objective
p.330 A plan, like a tree, must have branches - if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt
to prove a barren pole.
p.334 This brief chapter is an attempt to epitomize, from the history of war, a few truths of experience
which seem so universal, and so fundamental, as to be termed axioms.
p.334 The principles of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word - "concentration".
But for truth this needs to be amplified as the "concentration of strength against weakness". And for any real value
it needs to be explained that the concentration of strength against weakness depends on the dispersion of your opponent's
strength, which in turn is produced by a distribution of your own that gives the appearance, and partial effect of
dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion, your concentration - such is the sequence, and each is a sequel.
True concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion.
p.335-336 1. Adjust your end to your means... the beginning of military wisdom is a sense of what is
possible.. 2. Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances... in considering possible objectives
weigh their possibility of attainment with their service to the object if attained... 3. Choose the line (or course) of least
expectation... 4. Exploit the line of least resistance... 5. Take a line of operation which offers alternate objectives...
Alternative objectives allow you to keep the opportunity of gaining an
objective... 6. Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible - adaptable to circumstances...
The essential truth underlying these maxims is that, for success, two major problems must be solved - dislocation
and exploitation. One precedes and one follows the actual blow - which in comparison is
a simple act. You cannot hit the enemy with effect unless you have first created the opportunity; you cannot make
that effect decisive unless you exploit the second opportunity that comes before he can recover.
p.353 The object in war is to attain a better peace - even if only from your own point of view.
p.356 The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand, and the less it will cost you.
p.384 [Letter from Major General Eric Dorman-Smith to B.H.L. Hart] Critical readers of your book will find
in it no ritual formulae for success - instead they will discover a key to a method of approach to the solution of
the problems of war on all planes of action, and that key is "obliquity"... The object of obliquity is to find the
chink in the armour, the mental armour at that. One's object is the psychological disruption of the opposing command,
and the yardstick of success is the degree of freedom of action one enjoys at the end of the process.
To this end one seeks all possible means of keeping the enemy guessing, hence the value of alternate objectives... The
way of the indirect approach is assuredly the way to win wars.
p.387 "The whole secret of the art of war lies in the ability to become master of the lines of communication."
[Napoleon]
p.387 The true aim [of the strategist] is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation
so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.
p.388 A few more words on maintenance-of-aim. The aim must be single, but the method of achieving
it, if we want to be sure of maintaining it, must comprise alternatives - for otherwise the failure of one
method will immediately bring about failure in achieving the aim.
