Introduction, p.33-34
[French military strategist] Bourcet recommended that generals spread
out their attacking forces into two or more advancing columns that could reunite quickly when necessary but take lines threatening
multiple or alternative objectives which the enemy had to defend, thus forcing him to divide his strength and prevent his
concentration. If the enemy blocked one line of approach, the general could instantly develop another to serve the
same purpose. Union General Sherman used this method in his march through Georgia and and the Carolinas in 1864-65. His widely
separated columns threatened two or more objectives, forcing the Confederates to divide their forces to defend all---and therefore
were unable to defend any. This forced the Rebels in most cases to abandon their weakly held positions without battle.
...Napoleon also owed much to another eighteenth-century French
theorist, the Comte de Guibert, who preached mobility to concentrate superior strength against a point of enemy weakness
and to maneuver against the flank or rear of the enemy. Using great mobility, Napoleon maneuvered his waving net,
stretched wide over a large region. This greatly confused his foes, unable to fathom Napoleon's real purpose. They
usually spread out their own forces, hoping to counter these mystifying movements. Napoleon then quickly coalesced
his separate columns to destroy a single enemy force before it could be reinforced or he descended with his army
as a "grouped whole" on the enemy's rear.
The most deadly of Napoleon's strategic methods was this manoeuvre sur
les derri�res. His method embodied the injunction of Sun Tzu: march unexpectedly away from the enemy's main strength
and concentrate one's own strength against an enemy point that is weak, yet vital or important to the enemy. The art
of war is to create this strength at the point of weakness.
Napoleon added another element by frequently
seizing a terrain feature in the rear, like a mountain range, defile or a river, where he established a strategic barrage
or barrier which prevented the enemy from retreating or getting supplies and reinforcements. Among others, he achieved victory
with strategic barrages in the Marengo campaign in Italy in 1800 and in the Ulm campaign leading up to his victory at Austerlitz
in 1805. By the time of the American Civil War it no longer was necessary to seize a terrain feature. Armies were relying
on railroads for their supplies and new troops. A strategic barrage could be established merely by blocking a railway line
in the enemy's rear. General Grant did this at Jackson, Mississippi, in 1863 and thereby isolated the Confederate forces at
Vicksburg. This led to the surrender of the city, opening of the Mississippi river to Union boats and loss of the trans-Mississippi
states to the Confederacy.
p.97-98 Bourcet advanced the idea of a "plan with branches": dividing an army into several
dispersed columns and marching them on a number of separate targets... Bourcet taught that since it was impossible
for an enemy to be in strength everywhere, a commander who divided his forces could mislead the enemy, making him believe
the main effort was coming at some point other than the actual objective. The strategy would force the enemy to abandon
his own plans and either disperse his troops to meet the new threats or, in concentrating to defend his main point, weaken
secondary targets. Therefore, a commander could gain at least one and perhaps more of his objectives, provided his
columns remained close enough so two or more could combine quickly to overwhelm an objective weakened by the enemy's division
of his own forces.
Guibert wanted to establish a more mobile form of warfare by dividing an army into
permanent divisions, each of which could march in a separate column, along a separate route. Wide dispersal would
confuse the enemy and permit a commander to strike where he found the best opportunity.
p.104 This first step by Bonaparte [in the Italian campaign of 1796-97] demonstrated a principle he enunciated
somewhat later but always tried to follow: "The nature of strategy consists of always having, even with a weaker army,
more forces at the point of attack or at the point where one is being attacked than the enemy."
p.121 Bonaparte understood that wars are won much the same way as boxing matches are won. While
hitting, the boxer must also guard himself. To strike effectively, the boxer must catch his opponent off guard. For
the general, this means he must disperse his forces in order to force the enemy to disperse his own. Yet, as Bourcet had taught,
he had to be able to reassemble his army at a selected point before the enemy could do so. This became Bonaparte's
aim throughout his military career and was the secret of his success: hitting while preventing the enemy from hitting him.
p.133 Brigadier General John D. Imboden quotes [American Civil War General
Thomas J. "Stonewall"] Jackson as saying there are two things a commander should never lose sight of: "Always mystify,
mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up the pursuit so long
as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken and can then be destroyed
by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl
your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every
time and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail and repeated victory will make it invincible"
