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A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action (Thelen, Smith, 1996)

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Review
"A radical departure from most of current cognitive development theory.... Nativists, structuralists, empiricists and social constructivists will disagree with different parts of this book. Yet this landmark volume is essential reading for all of them."
-- Annette Karmiloff-Smith and Mark H. Johnson, Nature

Product Description
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action presents a comprehensive and detailed theory of early human development based on the principles of dynamic systems theory. Beginning with their own research in motor, perceptual, and cognitive development, Thelen and Smith raise fundamental questions about prevailing assumptions in the field. They propose a new theory of the development of cognition and action, unifying recent advances in dynamic systems theory with current research in neuroscience and neural development. In particular, they show how by processes of exploration and selection, multimodal experiences form the bases for self-organizing perception-action categories.

Thelen and Smith offer a radical alternative to current cognitive theory, both in their emphasis on dynamic representation and in their focus on processes of change. Among the first attempt to apply complexity theory to psychology, they suggest reinterpretations of several classic issues in early cognitive development.

The book is divided into three sections. The first discusses the nature of developmental processes in general terms, the second covers dynamic principles in process and mechanism, and the third looks at how a dynamic theory can be applied to enduring puzzles of development.

p.222 knowledge is inextricably tied up with action. Movement is not incidental to learning, but part of the perceptual package that is the basis of categorization and recategorization... In our dynamic systems view, knowledge does not just have its origins in the specifics of the here and now. It is always of a piece with both the present and past because knowledge is a trajectory of activity that depends on both the past and the current.
 
p.244 Our view of knowledge as dynamic activity... an intelligent dynamic system is one that is always on the move and that lives on the edge of multiple attractors.
 
p.323-324 We deal with our perceptions and actions in terms of fluid, dynamic, contextual categories, patterns of organization, which form the very grist for our engagement of meaning... meaning in the most abstract sense cannot be separated from action. Meaning has its origins in actions and is made manifest - created - in real time and through activity.
   One of the important sources of embodied meaning is our generalized experience of physical containment. As Johnson writes:
Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of our bodily experience. We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc). From the beginning, we experience constant physical containment in our surroundings (those things that envelop us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. We manipulate objects, placing them in containers (cups, boxes, cans, bags, etc.). In each of these cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal organizations. In other words, there are typical schemata for physical containment. ([Mark] Johnson, [The Body in the Mind] 1987, p.21)
   Johnson goes on to show how these schemata pervade our thinking and language, how in the abstract metaphorical sense, we understand the world through the physical relations of containment.
 
p.324 We must control forces to move our bodies through space. Indeed all our causal relations with our environment require some sort of forceful interaction, as we act on objects or they act upon us. As Johnson says, "Since our experience is held together by forceful interactions, our web of meanings is connected by the structure of such activity" (p.42)

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