[Fichte: Foundations of Natural Right, Neuhouser, 2000]
p.3 The character of rationality consists in the fact that that which acts and that which is acted upon
are one and the same
p.4-5 In acting, the rational being does not become conscious of its acting... The I becomes conscious only
of what emerges for it in this acting and through this acting (simply and solely through this acting); and this is
the object of consciousness... There is no other thing that exists for a rational being... it follows that there is no other
thing at all. [JLJ - for Fichte, consciousness is the contemplation of emerging events as a being acts.]
p.5 "what exists, exists through the I's acting (through productive imagination, in particular)"
p.6 As has been said, prior to what emerges from an instance of acting, the acting itself
and the determinate way of acting cannot be perceived... there are only objects and no concepts: the concept disappears in
the object and coincides with it.
p.9 What is contained first and foremost in the concept of freedom is nothing but the capacity to construct,
through absolute spontaneity, concepts of our possible efficacy; and the only thing that rational beings ascribe to one another
with necessity is this bare capacity.
p.23 As soon as we hear of the I as active, we do not hesitate to imagine a substratum* that is supposed
to contain this activity as a bare capacity... which we construct in response to the demand to think the I.
p.23 The I is not something that has capacities, it is not a capacity at all, but rather is active;
it is what it does, and when it does nothing, it is nothing... The I itself makes the object through its acting; the form
of its acting is itself the object, and there is no other object to think of.
p.23 To grasp oneself in this identity of acting and being acted upon (not just in the acting, not just
in the being acted upon, but in the identity of both), and to catch oneself in the act, so to speak, is to comprehend
the pure I and to achieve the viewpoint of all transcendental philosophy.
p.34 Insofar as the influence upon the subject... is something that is sensed, it is a limitation
of the I... but there is no limitation without something that does the limiting... something outside itself as the
determining ground of this influence; this external something is the something that is sensed... this influence is a determinate
influence... what characteristics must belong to it, if it is to be the ground of this determinate influence? ...The influence
upon the subject was understood as a summons to the subject to exercise its free efficacy, and - everything depends on this
- it could not be understood any other way; indeed it would not be understood at all, it it were not understood in just
this way. [JLJ - Fichte teaches that external factors which limit a person show up as a determinate influence in the
perceptions of the senses. Regardless of these perceptions, influences and constraints, we still have our free will to
act as we choose.]
p.70 a capacity is nothing but an ideal concept, and it would be an empty thought to ascribe to such a capacity
the exclusive predicate of reality - efficacy - without assuming that the capacity was realized... First of all, the most
difficult point: how can something exercise any efficacy by means of its mere existence in space, without any motion?
p.70 my body is my body only insofar as it is put into motion by my will; otherwise, it is only
a mass of matter. It is active as my body only insofar as I am active through it.
*Substratum: An opinion on substance (the stuff the universe is made of), particularly
held by Locke, that substance was that which had no properties itself, but lay underneath properties, like solidity, heat,
colour, etc, and supported them. The substratum of a table, for example, supports its colour, solidity and shape.
[Fichte, Robert Adamson, 1881]
p.171-172 Productive imagination it is which wins for us definite things from the "void and formless infinite."
All reality is for us through imagination... The product of imagination, the representation (Vorstellung), is at
once objective... and subjective... A thing, logically regarded, is but a complex of relations envisaged in imagination -
i.e., represented or definitely embodied.
p.173 All sensation is accompanied by the feeling of... constraint or necessity. This feeling of compulsion...
is an essential element in the belief in external reality.
p.177 The union of pure and objective activity in the Ego would explain the Anstoss or opposition
upon which all cognition depends... If the Ego is to unite both, it must be an infinite activity which is at the same time,
though not in the same sense, finite; it must be an infinite striving. Striving implies opposition, for without obstacle,
without impediment, there is only boundless activity. [JLJ - this is a central concept for game theory. Our machine must have
an infinite striving as its core activity. It must strive to search along the lines of play suggested by the critical and
vital diagnostic indicators, seeking to improve the weakest, creating resilient positions, and checking to see if an imbalanced
situation (as determined by these indicators) can later be balanced out so as to achieve a sustainable advantage. Interesting.
Perhaps no one has thought of this, and this work dates from 1881.]
p.185 Nature - i.e., our nature - as a system of tendencies, has, therefore, one supreme end, satisfaction
of desire, pleasure or enjoyment. The Ego, however, is not merely nature, but consciousness of self
p.193 Not knowledge only, but action, is the end of existence. The restless striving after a reality which
is not given in thought, has significance only in reference to the active, energetic power by which self endeavors to mould
the world to its own purposes.
p.194 From necessity of action proceeds the consciousness of the actual world; and not the reverse way
p.201 The Ego is only conscious of its activity, in so far as that activity is limited or opposed.
There thus lie in the consciousness of the Ego the three elements, - feeling of impulse or striving, intuition of activity,
and the representation of the obstacle to activity, a representation which is the work of the productive imagination. [JLJ
- very interesting. Sounds like a plan for constructing an agent for artificial intelligence.]
p.201 The essence of the external thing is force, and it is the thought of force as lying behind the specific
modes of feeling which we call sensations, that gives to the object of perception its qualification as an external, real fact.
[The Science of Knowledge, Fichte, Peter Heath and John Lachs, 1970, 1982]
[JLJ - I can't for the life of me determine whether it is reality that is complicated, that it is Fichte
himself who is complicated, or that I am just a shallow person and should stick to reading tabloids and celebrity gossip.
Fichte is full of deep thoughts about the nature of reality that demand an open mind and a careful attention to the details
of his difficult philosophy. Fichte has 2 introductions, one to those who do not have a pre-formed philosophy and a second
one dedicated to those who read his ideas with pre-formed opinions. Perhaps our world is truly complicated and complex, and
that if we want to understand it we better be prepared for more than simple explanations.]
p.19 we understand only mechanical action, and it is absolutely impossible for us to think of any other
p.22 the intellect's assumed laws of operation themselves constitute a system... the intellect gives its
laws to itself in the course of its operation; and this legislation itself occurs through a higher necessary action
p.78 The relationship between free beings is interaction through freedom, and not causality through mechanically
operative force.
p.233 without a striving, no object at all is possible.
p.238 there is a striving on the part of the self, which is such only insofar as it encounters resistance
p.252 Everything that strives has force... The striving, insofar as it is such, necessarily possesses its
determinate quantity as an activity... The striving is not limited by itself... Every striving must therefore be
limited by a force opposed to that of the striving itself. This opposing force must equally have the character of a striving...
Unless it did so, it would have no point of contact with its opponent.
p.253-255 A) The self's striving is posited as such. 1. It is posited in general, as something, by the general
law of reflection; not, therefore, as activity... but as something fixed and stable. 2. It is posited as a striving.
Striving aspires to causality... a self-productive striving that is fixed, determinate and definite in character is known
as a drive... B) The self's striving cannot be posited unless a counterstriving of the not-self [JLJ - everything
outside of the self] is posited... C) The equilibrium between the two must be posited... The two together yield the manifestation
of a compulsion, or inability. An inability entails a) a continuance of striving... b) limitation of real activity... c) that
the limiting factor should lie... not in me but outside me; for otherwise there would be not striving... The inability, as
maintained in the self, is called a feeling... this restriction necessarily presupposes a drive to push on further. What wills nothing
further, requires nothing further, reaches no further, is - for itself of course - not restricted... Feeling is entirely
subjective. To explain it, indeed - though this is an act of theorizing - we require a limiting factor. [JLJ
- Fichte is outlining his theory how the self strives - there is a drive that bumps up against something external to the self
that limits the self and produces in the self, as a result, a feeling.]
