p.3 First, what is strategy? ... Strategy treats the totality of war, embracing war as
a whole and, especially, its directing principles.
p.4 For [Austrian] Archduke Charles [1771-1847], "Strategy is the science of war. It sketches plans,
it includes and determines the course of military enterprise; it is, properly speaking, the science of the generals in chief."
Marshal Marmont thought that strategy was "the part of the art of war that applies to the overall movement of armies."
6. Bernhardi gives the following complete and satisfying formula: "Strategy is the art of leading
troops to combat in the decisive direction and in the most favorable conditions."
p.6-7 Captain de Vaisseau Darrieus extends this concept to naval war. "Strategy," he says, "evokes the idea
of preparation for which the end is battle, and tactics the execution of battle." Let us finally note that Admiral Mahan placed
the separation between strategy and tactics at the point and the moment when the opposing forces enter into combat.
p.7-8 For Sechi "...strategy is the mind that thinks, logistics and tactics the arms that act."
p.8 For [Captain Laurent] "One means by strategy everything that addresses the conception and general conduct
of operations. One means by tactics everything involved in execution."
p.17 To achieve its ends, strategy calls upon two elements - principles upon which to base its conceptions
and methods for their execution. The principles of strategy form a collection of evident truths derived from the
experience
p.21 Is strategy an art or a science? ... The simple principles that govern strategy are not chains but
flexible guides leaving free play to the creative imagination and to the human spirit in situations that are themselves enormously
variable.
p.23 Strategy, like all human activity and art itself, rests on theory. If inspiration and imagination
reign there, they acknowledge the principles that form their underlying technique. The theory of strategy can be
learned.
p.56 Of course, one constantly seeks to increase this minimum advantage by extending local control
and making temporary control more permanent.
p.56 Particular actions require control over specific regions at specific times, while
the rest does not matter.
p.58 In the air much more than at sea, local and temporary control is the key. This is
sufficient, after all, because it implies control of essential communications and has vital consequences for operations.
p.67 our primary aim in both peace and war ought to be to bring our fleet to its maximum effectiveness,
and the primary objective of our wartime operations ought to be to destroy the enemy's fleet by combat or at least to paralyze
it so as to obtain mastery of the sea.
p.70 Mastery of the sea, which plays a preponderant role in the development of every naval war, can only
be attained by two means: blockade of the enemy forces in their ports or their annihilation in battle.
p.101 Strategic manoeuvre is a key element in the conduct of operations. It is
a method used by strategy to improve the conditions of the struggle, to multiply the return on her efforts, and to
obtain the greatest results
p.102 to manoeuvre is to move intelligently in order to create a favorable situation...
Strategic manoeuvre happens any way but naturally.
p.110 Manoeuvre is an essentially intellectual factor that transforms a physical situation...
Movement is the primary element of manoeuvre. In our definition, manoeuvre is to
"move intelligently."
p.111 One must act with speed, which is a function not only of the celerity that
the forces are able to sustain in the course of a prolonged strategic action but also a function of the activity
that one employs in the operations and of the care that one exercises to avoid unjustified and careless halts.
p.112 Security is one of the essential bases, one of the necessary conditions of freedom of action.
p.113-114 Security is only one of a multitude of necessary conditions for freedom of action.
To have freedom of action, the principle force must not be hampered by demands foreign to its own actions and to the
operation in progress... There are manoeuvres that one cannot attempt... and that will fail if these elementary
factors are lacking.
p.114-115 It is necessary to have one's forces united, as we have said before, in a flexible disposition
permitting easy response to the unforeseen... one must at least be able to predict when they [the enemy] will move.
Thus, security demands intelligence... Among the various procedures and methods that contribute
to the achievement of secrecy is the shapeless character of the initial disposition of forces, which ought to reveal
nothing of the chosen plan and keep the enemy in a state of uncertainty and ignorance.
p.117 it is with battle in mind that one must arrange the compromise to which one yields under the
pressures of contradictory needs. In sum, there is no manoeuvre without battle at the end, immediate
or deferred. Every manoeuvre that fails to respect this obligation is empty and without value.
p.119 It is necessary to provide every ship with appropriate protection, even and especially
the offensive vessels because they cannot deliver blows unless they can first absorb them.
Protection represents security, always the foundation of freedom of action, which is itself understood in this case
as the possibility of practicing the offensive.
p.120 we have supposed above that at the outbreak of hostilities the two parties will disperse their forces
in order to cover their various and scattered interests and to attack those of the enemy. The imagined manoeuvre
consists consequently of a struggle to create from this dispersed disposition a situation superior to the enemy's at the point
(the principle objective) where one seeks the decision. It is the division of forces that makes manoeuvre possible.
p.120-121 How can one obtain the advantage over the enemy forces at which every manoeuver
aims, especially is our force is inferior to the enemy's? ... There is no solution other than to recreate dispersion,
working to substitute it for the initial concentration... By means of diversions one makes the enemy detach from his
principal body of forces larger than those that one has oneself devoted to these operations so as to improve one's relative
position in the struggle between the two main forces and to attack with chance of success. One will also have to
focus the decisive effort not against the main force itself but against contingents that one manages to detach from it. In
this way one will put out of action either the whole or a part of the enemy's principle force, depending on the circumstances...
it appears to be the only manoeuvre solution to this difficult case... To manoeuvre it is necessary
to know how to disperse, but to disperse less than the enemy. In other words, one must create and maintain an enemy
dispersion greater than one's own.
p.125-126 In such circumstances, whether created by one's own manoeuvre or in consequence of an
enemy counter-initiative, there is a kind of shifting, at least for the moment, of the objectives and of the theaters.
The principal objective superimposes itself temporarily on a secondary objective. The principal theater comes to be confounded
briefly with a secondary theater.
Such are some of the theoretical considerations that one can offer on the subject of strategic manoeuvre.
p.137-138 The objective of genuine manoeuvre would have been to create a favorable relationship
between the main British and German fleets.
p.141 von Ingenohl envisioned using manoeuvre to achieve a favorable ratio between the
main forces of the German and British fleets. Still shapeless, sketchy, and lacking a program for implementation, the
new concept nevertheless constituted an immense improvement over the preceding strategic vacuum.
p.148 Manoeuvre is, above all, a question of security. Intelligence [espionage], which the Germans
so sorely lacked, is indispensable.
p.156 [German Vice Admiral] Scheer advocated "a constant and methodical pressure on the enemy" so as to
force him to "send against us forces that we can attack."
p.171-172 manoeuvre demands security. One must have, if not absolute security, at least sufficient
intelligence concerning all enemy units.
p.292,294 The situation is infinitely less bright in Indochina. Unlike Africa, Indochina
is terribly far from France. Marseille is only 400 nautical miles from Algiers but 7,300 from Saigon. There is no reason to
believe that we will have the strength to achieve or even dispute command over this interminable expanse of sea. In
most wartime scenarios we risk being unable to sustain our colony and seeing it succumb since it will not be able to defend
itself.
Additionally, Indochina is exposed to its own particular dangers. Not only will it be threatened
more or less seriously if wee should find ourselves engaged in a European war... but it also faces local dangers that have
singularly grown in the last quarter of a century... Events of 1926-1927, when we hastily reinforced Tonkin, led us to understand
then that the future defense of Indochina against China was perhaps as illusory as was that against Japan.
p.302 the essential characteristic of every manoeuvre is precisely to determine a principal
objective or a principal theater and to concentrate there exclusively at the expense of the secondary
objectives or secondary theaters.
p.305 Paradoxically, it is infinitely simpler to install oneself in a country than
to withdraw from it after years have passed and woven between it and the present state a web of material and moral
interests. One clutches the country in question as if holding a lobster by the pincers. This is the tragic
side of our situation.
p.315 the principal merit of the offensive, that which justifies it and which raises it
above the defensive, is its potential to achieve a positive result, and particularly the positive result
that really counts, the decision of the war.
p.318 the only real offensive, the only one that can attain complete results, is that which strives to put
the enemy fleet out of action.
p.326 The offensive requires at least minimum of intelligence about the enemy, that one
knows where he is likely to be and have a general idea of his movements... one needs some information.
p.328 The commander's art lies in discerning and profiting from the favorable moment.
p.330 Everything rests on means and methods, and both of these change with time.
p.336-337 except given a very rare superabundance of means, it is impossible to be superior
at the chosen point without being weaker, and therefore on the defensive, elsewhere. Embedded in the concepts of
strategic manoeuvre and the economy of force is the idea of a local defense even within a resolutely offensive plan.
Moreover, the defensive is frequently mixed with the offensive in time as well as space. The evolution of the situation
can force an erstwhile attacker to the defensive even though he conducts his campaign with the intention of taking
the offensive as soon as possible so as to arrive at a decision.
p.338 Direct protection, though defensive in itself, confers upon the offensive an indispensable
freedom of action. It represents security, without which one cannot envision the offensive. Thus, the offensive
is not exclusive of the defensive but demands its participation in every area.
p.340,343 Britain's Admiral Colomb... was still more explicit. "A fleet in being, even defeated, even reduced
and shut up behind unmarked sand banks was sufficiently powerful virtually to paralyze on sea as well as land
the action of an apparently victorious fleet."... [JLJ - Castex now criticizes this proposed defensive theory] The concept
has never impressed those who chose to act in spite of the fleet in being, who had the means and knew how to use them.
p.344-345 The side whose inferiority on the surface condemns him to the defensive ought always,
in spite of his unfavorable situation, to try to be as active and aggressive as possible. His fleet ought to remember
that mere existence does not suffice to convey the title of "fleet in being" and that, to have an effect on events, it
must give proof of life. Thus, it must act to impose its will to the extent that its means allow. It must take as
much initiative as possible, even if nothing decisive results... According to Rustow, "For the defensive to be as strong as
possible, an offensive idea must govern all preparations."
The defender's goal... will be to oppose a decision... this means preventing the
enemy from peacefully enjoying the domination of communications. It means leaving that domination in suspense, in
dispute, through operations the keep the adversary from gaining definitive control of the situation.
p.345 The idea of manoeuvre consists, in essence, of avoiding a decisive battle while unceasingly
harassing the enemy by limited offensives wherever and whenever one finds a favorable opportunity.... The... defensive
ought to have a constant will to counterattack, always seeking and exploiting the minor offensive but knowing to abstain in
unfavorable conditions.
Above all, this strategy demands mobility; its law is movement... Counteroffensives
are aimed at manageable fractions of the enemy fleet or against his communications... In principle, anything is good
that in any way harms the adversary militarily, materially, economically, or psychologically.
p.345-346 Action against communications... can pay a big dividend, not only directly but also in contributing
to manoeuvre by causing the enemy to disperse his resources in the attempt to protect himself everywhere. The
disruption of the enemy dispositions, the division of his forces, and the immobilization of some of them may perhaps provide
a favorable occasion for manoeuvre against the enemy fleet. Anything that weakens his fleet is of great importance.
p.357 The object of maritime operations is to acquire or at least to dispute the mastery of the
sea, that is, the control of the essential surface communications. The goal, the raison d'etre, the final
end of naval war is communications - to reserve them for oneself and deny them to the enemy, if possible,
or, at least, not to be entirely excluded by the enemy from their use.
p.361 Just as the war of communications and the war between fleets coexist, there is also an intimate
relationship, characterized by manoeuvre, between the elements that prosecute these two wars and between the actions
of these elements. If the side that attacks communications at the same time adopts an actively offensive
attitude for his fleet, the enemy will be fixed in place. Lacking the resources to parry the blow, he will only be
able to devote minor naval and air resources to defend communications
p.361 Raids against properly chosen points can force the enemy to divert major forces to meet them, thus
dispersing his resources and improving conditions for action by the main fleet. In this form, the attack on communications
can usefully contribute to the strategic manoeuvre of the fleet.
p.363 Let us recall that in both of the distinct domains in which manoeuvre operates - in the attack on
and in the defense of communications - it is necessary to be unceasingly imaginative. One must be creative... and remain mentally
flexible... From the clear imperative of integrating the activities of the fleet with those of the forces assigned
to the war of communications, in other words, from the essential unity of the two forms of manoeuvre, it
results that the two must be coordinated. Though separate forms of war, they must be viewed as part of a system
of operations.
p.374 In the Times of 15 July 1914, Admiral Sir Percy Scott affirmed that "in war, everything is barbarous.
Is the end not to destroy the enemy? To achieve it, one ought to attack his most vulnerable point..."
p.395 achievement of mastery of the sea, acquisition and domination of maritime communications,
however offensive they may be from the naval point of view, are only defensive actions within the framework of the
war as a whole.
p.397 one should meditate upon Bernhardi's admirable definition of strategy as "the
art of leading troops to combat in the decisive direction and in the most favorable conditions."
p.427 one must keep the permanent problems in view and prepare to focus in their direction when they again
impose themselves.
