Acknowledgements - System of Citation - Introduction ix-xxi

ix Peirce was correct when he declared "no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds"

xiv Peirce's prose... He himself claimed: "One of the most extreme and most lamentable of my incapacities is my incapacity for linguistic expression"

xiv Peirce acknowledged that visual diagrams constituted his "natural language of self-communion"

xiv to think in any manner... is to participate in a process analogous to the give-and-take of conversation... late in his life, he [Peirce] wrote: "It cannot be too often repeated that all thought is dialogue" ... he did not hesitate to repeat this assertion countless times.

xvi it is all too easy for those who have studied intensively the writings of Peirce to get so caught up in his "system" that they come to see it as a place in which to dwell rather than a point from which to proceed.

xvi Peirce thought that the most unpardonable intellectual sin was to block the road of inquiry

xvii If there is any value to what Peirce has written, it resides in the power of these writings to open fields of inquiry and, once having opened these fields, to offer assistance on how to cultivate the areas... As Peirce himself noted, his writings are "meant for people who want to find out; and people who want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner, thank God!"

xix Perice's general theory of signs, insofar as it is a normative account of reasoning, entails a commonsensical understanding of human agency... for Peirce... actors... are continuously defining themselves through their give-and-take relationships with both the natural world and each other.

xxi The hope underlying this book is to show that Peirce's study of signs is powerful in a way that has been little appreciated.

Chapter One: Is Peirce's Theory of Signs Truly General? 1-25

p.1 it is in terms of semiosis (i.e., sign-activity) that Peirce attempts to explain both mind and selfhood.

p.2 how ideas attain clarity... In an unpublished manuscript, Peirce wrote "scientific conceptions [and, it is crucial to note here, he intended semiotic as a science of signs] have first become clear in debates. And this is an important truth" (MS 586).

p.4 A sign not only stands for something, it stands to someone - to some mind.

p.5 Around 1897, Peirce formulated what is almost assuredly his most frequently quoted definition: "A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity."

p.7-8 For Singer, the most sufficiently generalized definition of sign is found in the writing of Justus Buchler. According to Buchler... A sign is "a means of further judgement" (Buchler 1955, 156) or "an instrument fostering judgement" (Buchler 1955, 157). Hence, the key to a truly general theory of signs is an understanding of judgement. We are judging whenever "we are actively responding to some complex, selectively discriminating it and dealing with it in a way that embodies an appraisive attitude or stance" (B. Singer 1987, p. 97). "In judging, we take a position toward the complexes we deal with; we treat them selectively and differentially" (B. Singer 1987, p. 98)... classes of judgement point to the three interactive fields of human "doing": saying, acting, and making.

p.8 Singer reinterprets Peirce's notion of interpretant in light of Buchler's theory of judgement. Thus, for her, an interpretant is "a judgement - active, exhibitive, or assertive - that is called for by a sign" (1987, p. 100). [JLJ - this is a missing link to how a machine can "play" a game of strategy. By telling the machine specifically what the important signs are, and specifically what to do next when it "finds" such a sign in the environment - by itself, or accompanied by other signs of greater or lesser importance - we have the appearance of the machine "making a judgement" or "deciding". In reality, it is just following instructions to look for certain signs, then following more instructions on what to do next. It is just following a set of instructions, but judgement has been deconstructed. Perhaps we have gone one step further, as suggested by Singer - we have performed an interpretation. I have ordered a book with Singer's 1987 article "Signs, Interpretations, and the Social World" in it - stay tuned for further review March 7, 2015.]

p.8 A truly general theory of signs cannot be a theory of simply representative signs. There is more to semiosis then representation, as the examples of imperative commands, musical notes, and connectives indicate. This demands that we revise or reject  the notion of object as an essential part of the semiotic triad (sign-object-interpretant). Singer, following Buchler (1955, 155-57), suggests that we jettison this notion and replace it with the concept of interpretation, thus preserving the essential triadic structure of semiosis but altering the list of the elements of this structure (sign-interpretant-interpretation). [JLJ - ok, so "artificial" intelligence "works" because a programmer tells the machine specifically what the signs are, how to look for them, and specifically how to interpret them in "deciding" what to do next. The "sign" is a condensed "judgement", which is produced when the machine executes code. The machine did not develop these signs, determine how to look for them, or develop the corresponding interpretations of what to do next, on its own. With this deconstruction, I would like to see how anyone can still claim that a machine "plays" a game of strategy, although with fine distinction, it can be "programmed" to look for, interpret and respond to richly-detailed signs, with the results of such efforts (in a competition) being either inept, poor, adequate, surprisingly good, or excellent - depending on the skill of the programmer.]

p.12 [Peirce] All that we know or think is known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to analyze it... a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign 

p.16 Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it‎

p.19 there is no need to replace Peirce's definitional triad of sign-object-interpretant with Singer's triad of sign-interpretant-interpretation... in light of Singer's suggested alternative (an alternative that makes interpretation a part of semiosis), it is reasonable to ask: How does interpretation fit into my revision of Peirce's definition of semiosis?

p.19 The activity whereby a sign is generated he [Peirce] called utterance; and the activity whereby an interpretant is grasped as such he called interpretation. All "signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter" (4.551). To speak of a quasi-utterer in this context simply means a source from which a sign springs, while to speak of a quasi-interpreter here signifies a form into which a sign grows. There is not anything 'mental' about either this quasi-utterer or this quasi-interpreter. Peirce insists: "Thought [i.e., the development of signs] is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shape, etc. of objects are really there" (ibid.).

p.19 Peirce sometimes speaks as though the essential function of the dynamic object is utterance, the production of a process of semiosis... The function of the dynamic object is not to generate but to constrain a series of interpretants.

p.23 we can interpret, in the spirit of pragmaticism, the definition of signs as anything that has roots and bears fruits; so interpreted, it means we must cultivate those dispositions that enable us to regard anything whatsoever as an invitation for interpretation, as an opening for inquiry. That is, this definition of signs defines how we ought to orient ourselves to our world. More specifically, the "cash value" of Peirce's general theory of signs is (at least in part) the felt need for the self-critical and self-controlled cultivation of ever more flexible and refined habits of inquiry and interpretation.

Chapter Two: Semiosis and Subjectivity 27-48

p.27 In the final chapter of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke introduces "the doctrine of signs,"... The Essay is devoted to "inventing a new way of knowing - by means of ideas" (Locke 1690 [1959], vol. 2, lviii). However, Locke does not appear to realize that if the doctrine of signs is taken seriously, then the newly discovered way of ideas must be supplanted by the merely potential theory of signs (Deely 1987)... in granting priority to signs over ideas it shifts the focus from what occurs within a finite, individual consciousness to what occurs between social beings within a common framework of experience and action

p.30 For Eco, there is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in any theory of signs; semiotics, thus, must simply accept that the incredibly vast range of genuinely semiotic phenomena defines only one part of reality, not the whole of it. Not all things are actually signs, though anything can potentially be made to stand for something else and, thereby, be given an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane" (1976, 48). "Every time there is a correlation of this kind, recognized by a human society, there is a sign" (ibid.). Even so, countless phenomena have little or nothing to do with such conventional correlations; they thus fall outside the scope of semiotics.

p.31 Semiosis is an action involving the cooperation of three subjects - a sign, its object, and its interpretant... Peirce's definition of 'semiosis'... does not demand, as a part of a sign's definition, the qualities of being intentionally emitted and artificially produced.

p.32 For Eco, the way we ought to understand Morris's definition of the sign (something interpreted or, more accurately, interpretable by an interpreter) is in terms of "the possible interpretation by a possible interpreter"

p.32 Eco proposes the following definition; A sign is "everything that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else" ...for Eco, ordinary objects attain semiotic status - things participate in semiosis - essentially because of a coded correlation between signifier and signified.

p.33 For Eco... nothing is intrinsically a sign... Signs are made by us by means of the application or creation of a code... According to Peirce, signs are part of the very fabric of reality. They are, in some sense... there in reality, independent of our conventions and our consciousness.

p.33 As Eco puts it: "If semiotics is a theory, then it should be a theory that permits a continuous critical intervention in semiotic phenomena. Since people speak, to explain why and how they speak cannot help but determine their future way of speaking..."

p.35 At the point where sign gives rise to interpretant and a first interpretant to a second, "there begins a process of unlimited semiosis, which, paradoxical as it may be, is the only guarantee for the foundation of a semiotic system capable of checking itself entirely by its own means" (1976, 68). Precisely because semiosis is unlimited - that is, because the series of interpretants potentially stretches to infinity - the system of signs can become self-critical and self-corrective. [JLJ - important concept for game theory]

Moreover, among the various kinds of interpretants to which any concrete case of semiosis is likely to give rise is what Peirce calls the 'energetic interpretant', action arising precisely as the response to our interpretation of a sign.

p.35 In Eco's own words,

The system of systems of codes... leads men to act upon the world; and this action continuously converts itself into new signs, giving rise to new semiotic systems. The Peirce notion of interpretant takes into account, not only the synchronic structure of semiotic systems, but also the diachronic destructurization and restucturization of those systems. (1979, 195) [JLJ - synchronic, diachronic - static, dynamic]

p.40 All activities of the mind are forms of semiosis; yet not all of these activities are visible to the subject in whom they are taking place.

p.45 Among the deepest interests of Peirce appear to be an understanding of science, a detailed understanding that goes to the deepest roots of this human activity. He developed his theory of signs almost always with an eye to explaining some fundamental aspect of scientific inquiry.

p.47 The signs are there, if only we can decipher them.

Chapter Three: The Relevance of Peirce's Semiotics to Psychology 49-60

p.52 The standards of certainty must be different in different sciences

p.55 We do not begin any complex endeavor with an infallible grasp of our true purpose; rather we become clear about our purpose (if at all) only in the course of our endeavor.

p.55 The essential characteristic of mind is purposiveness: "mind does not act blindly, but pursues purposes" [JLJ - yes, but there must be a special kind of purposiveness when the way to a goal is blocked.]

p.57 When the organism actually or even just imaginatively is thwarted in the realization of a purpose, consciousness ordinarily becomes heightened; consciousness, in effect, sounds an alarm informing the organism that its actions are at odds with its purposes.

p.58 The organism is the means through which the self is able to address and be addressed by some other.

Chapter Four: Peirce's Account of the Self: A Developmental Perspective 61-98

p.68 "whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation which serves as a sign"

p.70 In the early stages of human development... at this stage, there is no distinction between appearance and reality: What appears to the child is real for the child, regardless of the manner of appearance.

p.77 A sign cut off from its future interpretants is a sign denied the possibility of realizing its essence; that is, the possibility of being a sign.

p.81 for Peirce, "an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it might react, or have reacted, against my will" (3.613). This defines 'individual' in the strictest sense; so defined, the individual only exists here and now - that is, during the duration of its reaction against some other.

p.82 Peirce maintained that the "existence of things consists in their regular behavior"

p.85 the mind can never be reduced to the body, though it does require some kind of embodiment (Ransdell 1986, 6). And the kind of embodiment may have a profound influence on the development of semiosis, the definitive activity of mental agents. Peirce did not think that semiosis is necessarily connected with a nervous system or even a biological organism: "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (4.551; 1906).

p.86 My interpretation is that it is not something within the human organism but the human organism itself as it has been transformed by the practice of signs that exerts control.

p.87 Peirce... insisted that a sign cannot be reduced to its embodiments... Nonetheless, in order for a sign actually to function as such, it requires some form of embodiment.

p.87 For Peirce, both the mind and the self are instances of semiosis.

p.88 According to Peirce... the sort of mind that can evolve into a self must possess the capacities to feel, to act, and to learn... "To learn is to acquire a habit"

p.89 homo sapiens are learning animals par excellence.

p.89 Peirce wrote, "a mind may, with advantage, be roughly defined as a sign-creator in connection with a reaction-machine" ...The reaction-machine designates that aspect of a mindful agent which is most subject to unswerving regularity, whereas the sign-creator indicates that aspect which is most open to novel variations.

p.90 Elsewhere he [Peirce] wrote: "When I speak of a man's Real Self, or true Nature, I mean the very Springs of Action in him which mean how he would act" ...These springs of action are nothing other than habits; these habits... constitute the innermost core of the individual self.

p.90-91 [Peirce] Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is 'saying to himself,' that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. It is these two things alone that render it possible for you - but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense - to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt.

p.91-92 (a) it is of the essence of the self to be oriented toward the future; (b) the personal self as a living reality represents a developmental teleology, a pursuit of purposes in which genuinely novel purposes emerge;  (c) during any moment of its life, the self is first and foremost a process in which some species of meaning is evolving.

p.93 When one thinks, it is the critical self that the innovative self is trying to persuade. The former represents the habits of the person, while the latter represents a challenge to these habits.

p.93-94 Without any reference to Peirce, DeWitt Parker drew a distinction between the matrix self and focal selves. A "focal self is an event, coming and going, one of a series of events flashing in and out of existence" (1941, 43). The matrix self is the background against which focal selves operate; it is (as its name implies) a womb out of which these transitory selves emerge. "There is but one self: the focal self and the matrix self are only two aspects of a single fact. The matrix self is a layer of deeper significance that continues and endures from one ongoing activity to another, but it cannot exist unless there is a focal activity that carries it on" (Parker 1941, 45).

p.95-96 The self can only realize itself by exerting control over itself; and it can only exert control over itself by committing itself to ideals, since "self-control depends upon comparison of what is done with an ideal admirable per se, without any ulterior reason"

Chapter Five: Inwardness and Autonomy 99-118

p.107-108 Peirce understood pragmaticism to be "a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but of only what I call 'intellectual concepts,' that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning facts may hinge" (5.467). Concepts in this sense are those signs essential to the communication or discovery of knowledge. In connection with pragmaticism, Peirce investigated the question: What is the ultimate logical interpretant of such an intellectual concept. The result of his investigation was that a 'habit-change' constitutes such an interpretant. Because a habit can result from a sign and because, by virtue of its generality, it partakes somewhat of a nature of a sign, it can serve as the logical interpretant of an intellectual concept; and because the formation of a habit truly marks a terminus in any process of semiosis, it ideally serves as the ultimate (logical) interpretant of an intellectual concept

p.108 let me offer here a preliminary summary of Peirce's overall view of the human mind. The three key elements in this view are semiosis (the activity of a sign), habit (disposition to act in a certain way in certain circumstances), and autonomy of self-control (the capacity of a person to regulate his or her conduct in light of norms and ultimate ideals).

p.108 a rational mind is one in which habits grow out of signs as the interpretants of these signs, and in turn, self-control grows out of a hierarchy of habits; however, once this self-control emerges, the possibility arises of having some processes of semiosis and some formations of habit grow out of self-control. Indeed for Peirce, it is precisely such a possibility of self-control that distinguishes a mind as rational. 

p.110 for Peirce, inference is essentially an interpretation of signs. Any agent capable of engaging in acts of interpretation (be these instinctual or learned, automatic or autonomous) possesses, by virtue of this capacity, a cognitive mind. As we have seen, a rational mind is simply a cognitive mind that is capable of controlling some of its acts of inference and, as a result of the exercise of this capacity, capable of controlling the formation of some of its habits.

p.112 According to Peirce, any finite mind capable of evolving into an autonomous agent possesses three distinct powers.

The first of these is composed of powers of feelings; or say, of consciousness, or of being, or becoming, aware of anything... The second consists of powers of action... The third power consists of powers of taking habits, which, by the meaning of the word includes getting rid of them

p.113 for Peirce, the human mind is an incredibly complex and hierarchically ordered network of habits, some of these habits being due to the exertions of the mind itself... in the course of one's life, one's mind is molded not only by the brute force of experience but also by the gentle musings of the mind.

p.113 If we take the metaphysical bandages off our eyes, we see that signs are the very fabric of the world and not a characteristic that humans impose upon the world. [JLJ - an interpretation. To a human, the reading of signs and the asking and answering of "what is that and what does that mean?" shapes the loop of how to "go on". Signs are invented by habit and experience, then interpreted in order to determine how to "go on".]

p.115 Self control operates by inhibiting us from acting in an outward, "fanciful" manner. In short, the inhibition of physical behavior creates the possibility of inward action.

p.117 the principal function of internal reflection... resides in engaging in an inner dialogue - indeed, in an inner drama - and in judging the outcome of that dialogue or drama.

p.117 Our inner musings influence in both subtle and obvious ways our outward doings; habits are the mechanisms by which these musings influence these doings.