The Social Self (Mead, 1913)

The Social Self (Mead, 1913)

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10, (1913): 374-380.

Read at the Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, March, 1913

JLJ - You need to read more Mead. When the human mind decides what to do next, it must model the interacting social objects, of which it is a part, and what might happen in various scenarios. The human mind creates an object, the "me", which represents itself in this interacting world.

p.374 the self can not appear in consciousness as an "I," ...it is always an object, i.e., a "me"

p.375 the stuff that goes to make up the "me" whom the "I" addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action of the "I." If the "I" speaks, the "me" hears. If the "I" strikes, the "me" feels the blow. Here again the "me" consciousness is of the same character as that which arises from the action of the other upon him. That is, it is only as the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he acts towards others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, and only as he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is affected by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.

p.375 The "I" of introspection is the self which enters into social relations with other selves... And the "me" of introspection is the same "me" that is the object of the social conduct of others.

p.376 Where we are intensely preoccupied with the objective world, this accompanying awareness [JLJ - from earlier, 'that running current of awareness of what we do which is distinguishable from the consciousness of the field of stimulation, whether that field be without or within'] disappears.

p.377 It is also to be noted that this response to the social conduct of the self may be in the role of another... to be aware of another self as a self implies that we have played his role or that of another with whose type we identify him for purposes of intercourse. The inner response to our reaction to others is therefore as varied as is our social environment.

p.378 As a mere organization of habit the self is not self-conscious... When, however, an essential problem appears, there is some disintegration in this organization, and different tendencies appear in reflective thought as different voices in conflict with each other.

p.379 Where, however, the problem is objectively considered, although the conflict is a social one, it should not resolve itself into a struggle between selves, but into such a reconstruction of the situation that different and enlarged and more adequate personalities may emerge. A tension should be centered on the objective social field.