p.360 We begin the discussion of collective mind by following the lead of Ryle (1949) and developing the concept of mind as a disposition to act with heed.
p.361 mind is actualized in patterns of behavior that can range from stupid to intelligent
p.361 Heed is not itself a behavior but it refers to the way behaviors... are assembled... the behaviors patterned into the action... suggest to the observer qualities such as "noticing, taking care, attending, applying one's mind, concentrating, putting one's heart into something, thinking what one is doing, alertness, interest, intentness, studying, and trying" (Ryle, 1949: 136). These inferences, based on the style of the action, are called "heed concepts" and support the conclusion that the behaviors were combined intelligently rather than stupidly.
p.364 dispositions toward heed are expressed in actions that construct interrelating.
p.365 We assume, as Follett (1924: 146-153) did, that mind begins with actions, which we refer to here as contributions. The contributions of any one individual begin to actualize collective mind to the degree that heedful representation and heedful subordination define those contributions. A heedful contribution enacts collective mind as it begins to converge with, supplement, assist, and become defined in relation to the imagined requirements of joint action presumed to flow from some social activity system... The collective mind is "located" in the process of interrelating.
p.367 Asch (1952: 257) described the relationship between the individual and the group as the only part-whole relation in nature "that depends on recapitulation of the structure of the whole in the part." The same point is made by Morgan (1986) and Hutchins (1990: 211), using the more recent imagery of holograms: System capacities that are relevant for the functioning of the whole are built into its parts. In each of these renderings, social processes are the prior resources from which individual mind, self, and action are fashioned (Mead, 1934: 191-192). This means that collective mind precedes the individual mind and that heedful interrelating foreshadows heedful contributing.
p.368 Narrative skills (Bruner, 1986; Weick and Browning, 1986; Orr, 1990) are important for collective mind because stories organize know-how, tacit knowledge, nuance, sequence, multiple causation, means-end relations, and consequences into a memorable plot.
p.373 People can't be careful unless they take account of others and unless others do the same... To act with care, people have to envision their contributions in the context of requirements for joint action... Care is not cultivated apart from action. It is expressed in action and through action. Thus people can't be careful, they are careful (or careless). The care is in the action.
p.374 We conclude from our analysis that carrier operations are a struggle for alertness and that the concept of heedful interrelating helps capture this struggle.
p.374 We focused on heed (understood as dispositions to act with attentiveness, alertness, and care), conduct (understood as behavior that takes into account the expectations of others), and mind (understood as integration of feeling, thinking, and willing).
p.376 high-efficiency organizations have simpler minds than do high-reliability organizations.
p.377 A smart system does the right thing regardless of its structure and regardless of whether the environment is stable or turbulent.