p.116 Behaviorism, with an accent on the last syllable, is not the scientific study of behavior but a philosophy of science concerned with the subject matter and methods of psychology.

p.121 An organism learns to react discriminatively to the world around it under certain contingencies of reinforcement.

p.122 Copies of the real world projected into the body could compose the experience which we directly know.

p.123 At some point the organism must do more than create duplicates. It must see, hear, smell, and so on, as forms of action rather than of reproduction. It must do some of the things it is differentially reinforced for doing when it learns to respond discriminatively. The sooner the pattern of the external world disappears after impinging on the organism, the sooner the organism may get on with these other functions... The need for something beyond, and quite different from, copying is not widely understood.

p.124 We usually acquire the behavior when we are under appropriate visual stimulation, but it does not follow that the thing seen must be present when we see that we are seeing it. The contingencies arranged by the verbal environment may set up self-descriptive responses describing the behavior of seeing even when the thing seen is not present.
 If seeing does not require the presence of things seen, we need not be concerned about certain mental processes said to be involved in the construction of such things

p.124 Instead of assuming that we begin with a tendency to recognize such an object once it is found, it is simpler to assume that we begin with a tendency to see it.

p.125 The heart of the behavioristic position on conscious experience may be summed up in this way: Seeing does not imply something seen. We acquire the behavior of seeing under stimulation from actual objects, but it may occur in the absence of these objects under control of other variables. [JLJ - how ignorant I was, to think that seeing actually implies something seen. I am just now as I write this, unconvincing myself that writing involves something written, and that thinking involves something thought.]

p.128 Cognitive theories stop at way stations where the mental action is usually somewhat more complex than identification.

p.131 There is also still a need for behaviorism in the social sciences, where psychology has long been used for explanatory purposes.

p.132 In its extension to the social sciences... behaviorism means more than a commitment to objective measurement. No entity or process which has any useful explanatory force is to be rejected on the ground that it is subjective or mental. The data which have made it important must, however, be studied and formulated in effective ways. The assignment is well within the scope of an experimental analysis of behavior, which thus offers a promising alternative to a commitment to pure description on the one hand and an appeal to mentalistic theories on the other. [JLJ - typical behavioristic ranting, that all mentalism can be reduced to a study of behavior.]