p.4 being criticized is a form of being taken seriously.

p.10 During their deployment, armies are confronted with dangers, cunning enemies, unexpected changes, and a general level of uncertainty. The obvious implication is that armies need to be able to deal with complexity, or dynamic complexity as it will be labeled in this study... This study focuses on the organizing problems that result from the problem of dealing with dynamic complexity.

p.12 Within organizational studies, dynamic complexity is regarded as one of the most fundamental problems organizations are confronted with.

p.12 Dynamic complexity refers to a problematic environment that organizations are confronted with. Its indeterminate nature is the environment's main problematic characteristic. The organization's environment is not an object with an underlying 'true' and 'fixed' structure that can be revealed by analysis. At the same time, however, the environment confronts the organization with a necessity to act. The environment is not a mere object for observation but the area in which the organization should accomplish its goals... the environment becomes problematic because of the necessity to act.

p.13 The organization needs to find out 'what is going on' in order to be able to deal with the problems it is confronted with. In the rest of this study organizing activities and 'dealing with dynamic complexity' are considered to be synonymous. All in all, dynamic complexity confronts an organization with a control problem.

p.13 Senge (1992, p. 71) distinguished between detail complexity and dynamic complexity. Dynamic complexity refers to situations in which 'cause and effect are subtle, and where the effects over time of interventions are not obvious'.

p.13 mathematical problems can be complex but these are problems for which there is only one correct solution. The complexity of mathematical problems belongs therefore to the detail kind. When the solution is found, the problem is solved. The particular kind of complexity this study is interested in continues to exist after a - for the moment - workable solution has been found (Weick, 1979).

p.13 dynamic complexity is considered a fundamental problem for organizations that are challenged by the chaos of war. Fundamental means that it provides a problem that in principle cannot be overcome, although organizations can be prepared for it in better and worse ways.

p.17 the development of an analytical framework is one of the main activities in this study. An analytical framework is a construction of theoretical ingredients to tackle specific questions.

p.17 According to the interpretation in this study, a 'logic of hypotheses' is central in this model: systems deal with the demands of a dynamically complex environment by acting to deal with immediate challenges and subsequently by developing 'workable' hypotheses about the nature of the environment.

p.17 [Weick] 'if the environment is dynamically complex it is impossible to know and understand everything in advance, therefore you need to be able to doubt your existing insights.'

p.17 'Doubt' is described here as an abstract function necessary for dealing with dynamic complexity... if organizations want to organize doubt, they need to develop a process of meaningful argumentation... 'if the ability to doubt is of crucial importance for organizations dealing with dynamic complexity, organizations need to organize their ability to doubt'.

p.18 this study challenges what are often considered as obvious truths in the military organization.

p.21 In 1995 a research project was started at the [Dutch] Military Academy entitled... Leadership in Circumstances of Crisis... This study is part of the research project. [JLJ - Leadership in Crisis Conditions is another translation. From Wikipedia, the Royal Military Academy (Dutch: Koninklijke Militaire Academie or KMA) is the service academy for the Dutch Army and the Dutch Air Force. Located in Breda, the Netherlands, the KMA has trained future officers since 1828.]

p.25 Potential danger is, therefore, a continuous stressor for operational units.

p.28 Different kinds of rules help to create a workable level of certainty (Weick, 1979). However, due to the elementary nature of dynamic complexity, rules cannot transform all uncertainties into certainties.

p.28 dealing with dynamic complexity necessitates thinking instead of rule-following

p.29 if the environment necessitates thinking, then operators should be able to think.

p.32 1. How can a system deal with dynamic complexity in the best possible way?
2. How can the organization of doubt be observed in the cases?

p.43 Central to the data analysis of this study is the idea of exploration... The objects of study... are explored to find clues about the ability of the Army to deploy units that can deal with dynamic complexity.

p.46 The claim that hypotheses are important to 'conquer' the unknown is not uncommon in science and, indeed, philosophy. This idea was central to the thinking of the 'founding father' of Pragmatism, C.S. Peirce.

p.48 a map is only useful when it leaves out certain elements, e.g. when it sensibly reduces complexity.

p.48 Van Boxsel (1999), also reasoning from a map-making example, stated that in order to be successful, every structure must anticipate its own shortcomings.

p.49 A pro-theoretical strategy states that the explication of theory, i.e. the definition of essential concepts and how they are related, should come before empirical study (Christis, 1998). This strategy is used as a way to make sense of complex reality. The analytical framework should inform where to look for available material and how to relate the information in the various boxes.

p.49 Abduction is the type of inference that can be used to describe this process of exploration.

p.51 According to Cunningham (1998, pp. 833-834), abduction is the appropriate method for making sense of new (or unknown) situations... According to Bateson (2002, p. 134) abduction is rather important because: '(...), all thought would be totally impossible in a universe in which abduction was not expectable.'

p.53 What the analytical framework claims is that organizational systems with particular design characteristics are better at dealing with dynamic complexity than others... The idea of normative claims developed in this study is that the chances of dealing successfully with dynamic complexity are greater when one operates according to this philosophy. The analytical framework reflects, in other words, on the potential of operational units to deal with dynamic complexity.

p.57 Dynamic complexity was roughly defined as a problem which occurs when organizations are confronted with an environment that is problematic. Its indeterminate nature was considered to be the environment's main problematic characteristic. The environment furthermore confronts the organizational system with a necessity to act, while at the same time the best way to act is unclear.

p.59 'Dealing with dynamic complexity is more than rule following' is one of the most important conclusions of the first chapter.

p.60 The next section will show that Giddens account of structuration theory in my opinion avoids a simple distinction and indeed appears to emphasize co-evolution of agency and structure.

p.60 Essentially, Giddens claims that structures are created by the (joint) activities of agents and - the same time - the activities of human agents are constituted by existing structures.

p.61 According to the notion of duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize.

p.61-62 [Becker, 2005] the relation between structure and action in theories of social practices is equivalent to the relation between operations and structure in systems theories. Structures are structures only insofar as they function as structures... Luhmann perceives the relationship of structure and "agency" (operations) as "one of mutual enabling".

p.62 As early as 1971 Von Bertalanffy remarked that: 'System-theoretical approaches include general systems theory (in the narrower sense), cybernetics, theory of automata, control theory, information theory, set, graph, and network theory, relational mathematics, game and decision theory, computerization and simulation, and so on' (1971, p. 30).

p.62 I want to argue that systems theory provides organizational studies a diversity of tools that can be used to tackle a diversity of problems.

p.63 Von Bertalanffy (1971, p. 24) emphasized that systems thinking had emerged as an alternative to the paradigm of classical science, which explained complex phenomena in terms of isolated elements and unidirectional causal relations. Instead, systems theory proposed to focus on the organization of the elements in order to explain complex phenomena (Von Bertalanffy, 1971, p. 25; presumably on the basis of an Aristotelian dictum). Rapoport (1968) identified the crucial elements of systems thinking as:

- 'something consisting of a set of entities

- among which a set of relation is specified, so that

- deductions are possible from such relations to others or from the relations among the entities to the behavior or the history of the system'

p.63-64 classical approaches were considered to be too much orientated to the 'static' properties of systems in order to be able to account for phenomena like variability and change.

p.64 Open systems are typically not just located in an environment; they entertain a dynamic relationship with this environment

p.64 adaptation presupposes a strategic selection of relevant information from the environment and a strategic change of the internal composition of the system... Systems apparently can deal with change and the unknown if they are somewhat equipped to recognize and therefore anticipate the unknown.

p.66 Systems are 'organized complexity'

p.67 the essential problem of dealing with dynamic complexity becomes the way in which such units can be open to the problematic environment in order to be able to adapt strategically to these conditions. This issue is therefore the cornerstone in modeling the problem of dealing with dynamic complexity... In this study, dynamic complexity has been roughly defined by identifying an abstract structure... The abstract structure emphasizes an organizational system that is confronted with a problematic environment and a necessity to deal with this environment.

p.68 Of course, systems show interesting signs of stability, but that does not mean that they are essentially orientated to stability.

p.70 Applied to organizational theory, a quotation from Karl Weick illustrates the nature of a problematic reality (1979, p. 6): 'The basic raw material on which organizations operate are informational inputs that are ambiguous, uncertain, equivocal.'

p.71 Equivocality is the phenomenon of multiple meaning.

p.71 Dynamic complexity is therefore the result from the interaction of purposeful behavior of a system in an uncertain ambiguous, equivocal but reactive environment.

p.72 In a way, dealing with dynamic complexity involves making increasingly better guesses while absolute certainty is not available.

p.73 The informational input of organizations is such that it cannot be transferred into certainty... organizations are never finished thinking... in more complex situations only theories that are less complex are workable and sustainable. In absolutely chaotic (0%) situations no theory is workable.

p.73 Karl Weick, as can be understood by the following quotation, made the same point [JLJ - see above quote]. 'The greater the perceived amount of equivocality present in the input, the fewer the number of rules used to compose the process. Conversely, the smaller the perceived amount of equivocality in the input, the greater number of rules used to assemble a process....' (italics in original; Weick, 1979,p.114).

p.74 Sense-making is an essential process in dealing with complexity

p.74 One could say that sense-discrediting is a process that is as important as the process of sense-making (Weick, 1979), because it functions as a balancing force. Dealing with dynamic complexity demands therefore rather paradoxical qualities of operators: systems confronted with a dynamically complex environment need to be able to develop intelligent ideas about that environment (sense-making) but at the same time need to be able to criticize their ideas (sense-discrediting).

p.75 action is an important informer for systems. In fact, action provides the system with a stream of data that is necessary for the development of further insight... Acting and thinking are therefore closely related if a system is dealing with dynamic complexity. Actions necessitate thinking (otherwise actions would be based on blind guesses), and thinking necessitates action (given their hypothetical nature, the theories need experimentation).

p.75 there is no perfect way of dealing with dynamic complexity... systems that are prepared to act and are able to make sense of their experiences and are able to discredit their existing insights are better able to deal with dynamic complexity than others.

p.77 an organization that is confronted with dynamic complexity should advance beyond the level of mere guessing... To act neither on the basis of guesses nor on the basis of absolute certainty is to act on the basis of hypotheses. Meaningful action can therefore be described 'as acting on the basis of hypotheses', which implies acting on the basis of fallible, partial, and preliminary knowledge of the environment.

p.77 [it] is typical of dynamically complex environments that deduction is not possible.

p.78 The model that will be used to describe the dynamic between system and environment is the so-called 'organizing model' that Karl Weick explicated in The social psychology of organizing (1979). For the purposes of this study, one could also name it the 'self-organizing model'... It assumes that a system deals with dynamic complexity by using hypotheses; it describes how a system engaged in a dynamically complex environment develops hypotheses... It explains how a system can deal with dynamic complexity in the best possible way.

p.78 In Weick's thinking, organizing is synonymous with 'dealing with dynamic complexity'.

p.78 hypotheses about the nature of a situation help to narrow the range of possibilities.

p.80 Selection. Enactment provides 'edited' raw material. Selection involves the imposition of various structures on enacted equivocal displays in an attempt to reduce their equivocality. Or, to use Weick's words: it generates answers to the question of 'what is going on there?' (1979, p. 175). The selection process makes the world more orderly, if not fully unequivocal (that is, in the mind of the organizing system)... In an equivocal environment it is not sensible to entertain an unequivocal scheme of interpretation. The process of selection is therefore Janus-faced: one needs a reasonable degree of unequivocality in order to be able to act meaningfully. Too much unequivocality can make one blind to the complexity of the environment.

p.81 The dynamic of the model can be described as follows. A system deals with the dynamic complexities of its environment (ecological change) by acting to meet the demands of the environment (enactment) and by developing insight into the nature of the environment on the basis of these actions (selection, retention)... dynamic complexity is dealt with by using hypotheses... and it is therefore considered to be a model that describes how hypotheses are developed (results of actions influence the development of hypotheses). That means that Weick's model is interpreted here as a model that assumes abduction as the dominant logic in dealing with dynamic complexity.

p.81 in an environment that is equivocal, ambiguous and uncertain, a system's existing knowledge is not sufficient. This means that it needs to possess a 'certain openness' towards the environment. The openness of a system is, in the first place, established by its actions and the resulting experiences. In the second place, the openness of a system is established by its ability to discredit what it already knows, i.e. doing something intelligent with new information

p.81 The process of dealing with dynamic complexity is very much depicted as an imperfect process by the organizing model. Weick's depiction shows a system that - through a process of developing insight - tries to get a grip on an environment. If a system would not attempt this, one could not say that it was acting sensibly.

p.81 present insights are always limited and are unaware of future developments.

p.82 One crucial feature of the organizing model is that knowledge and action are conceptualized as being interwoven. According to the organizing model, knowledge does not come into existence by means of abstract reflection on the nature of things, but is influenced by previous action. Both knowledge and action are necessary for self-organization... Changes are the reason attention is triggered and the process of organizing begins (Weick, 1979, p. 130). Consequently, meaning is retrospective, or actions precedes thought (Weick, 1979, p. 194). In later stages of the model, previous moments of sense-making influence subsequent action. This subsequent action provides the occasion for further sense-making. Knowledge and action then become interwoven. In new situations... there is no previous direct experience to base actions on. In such cases, enactments may be based on... rules of thumb or perhaps primitive instincts... Subsequently, self-organization makes more self-organization possible

p.82 [footnote] when dealing with dynamic complexity or when engaging in organizing activities, acting and thinking are interdependent... an organization can become alienated from the environment by not acting.

p.83 One particular important feature of Weick's organizing model is the position attributed to contradiction in the body of hypotheses. The hypotheses represent the system's knowledge about the environment. One can imagine that the knowledge of a system becomes increasingly elaborate in a dynamically complex environment. In order to appreciate the complex patterns in the theories, the concept of 'theories of action' is interesting. This is a concept that is introduced by Hedberg (1981, pp. 7-8): 'Theories of action (...) are for organizations what cognitive structures are for individuals. They filter and interpret signals from the environment and tie stimuli to responses. They are metalevel systems that supervise the identification of stimuli and the assembling of responses.' The substance of these theories of action consists of cause maps. Hedberg (1981, p. 7): 'To identify stimuli properly and to select adequate responses, organizations map their environments and infer what causal relationships operate in their environment. These maps constitute theories of action which organizations elaborate and refine as new situations are encountered.'

p.83 As a system develops more insight, it has an increasingly sophisticated reservoir from which to develop hypotheses. The theories of action help the operational units to understand the unfamiliar from the perspective of the familiar. In other words, the theories help units to develop a workable level of certainty, which is the object of organizing... theories of action... help the operators to rise beyond the guessing stage and therefore beyond the stage of random action. Thus they help units to act meaningfully... theories of action... do not consist of unequivocal elements that can be distinguished on the basis of clear definitions... theories of action consist of an indeterminate body of hypotheses that even displays contradictory elements

p.83 To recapitulate Ashby's law of requisite variety (1969), the contents of the system (the theories of action) mirror the complexity in the environment. So a contradictory environment provides a contradictory content of the theories. A contradictory body of theories in a contradictory environment provides units with better adaptability.

p.84 The interesting part of the theories of action is their lack of systemization... this study claims that the nature of dynamic complexity is such that one cannot deal with dynamic complexity using a closed system of rules. This inevitably means that theories will lack systemization; the non-systematic ideas are considered helpful to make sense of a non-systematic environment.

p.85 The organizational system is portrayed by Weick as an entity that wrestles to understand (making sense of) its actions ('enactments') that are reactions to environmental contingencies

p.85 The elements of the organizational system in Weick's organizing model are 'ideas', or 'mental models' that provide the system with a perspective on the environment (they are the contingency the system exploits). Furthermore, according to Weick, a system is necessarily orientated to reduction of complexity (finding a 'workable level of certainty'), while at the same time this reduction of complexity becomes problematic

p.85 Weick's model can be understood as a description of how order (structure) develops out of chaos. A system learns to act meaningfully first by acting (Bavelas' experiment: making random guesses) and then by developing theories about the nature of a situation and the actions of a system (i.e. meaning is retrospective). Furthermore, Weick's model gives indications about how intelligence should deal with order (the normative element) and emphasizes the importance of chaos to break through rigid world views ('chaotic action is preferable to orderly inaction' Weick, 1979, p. 245).

p.86 Weick (1979, pp. 3-4): 'Organizing is like a grammar in the sense that it is a systematic account of some rules and conventions by which sets of interlocked behaviors are assembled to form social processes that are intelligible to actors. It is also a grammar in the sense that it consists of rules for forming variables and causal linkages into meaningful structures (later called cause maps) that summarize the recent experience of the people who are organized. The grammar consist of recipes for getting things done when one person alone can't do them and recipes for interpreting what has been done.'

p.86 in Weick's model structures are produced and reproduced in interaction. Essentially, therefore, the organizing model describes a process of structuration. 'Structure' in Weick's organizing model is therefore a structure of ideas, influenced by action and subsequently influencing action.

p.88 Weick's organizing model is appreciated in this study as a sophisticated model that clarifies important aspects of the process of dealing with dynamic complexity.

p.88 Because this study aims to answer the question 'How can a system deal with dynamic complexity in the best possible way?', I will aim to draw normative conclusions. My argument will be that there are normative elements available in the organizing model, although Weick himself did not discuss these as such (i.e. as a normative implication). Essentially I will claim that the process of 'doubt' fulfills this normative function. Because my research question implies a 'design-issue' which is not available in Weick's thinking, I aim to extent Weick's thinking on the topic of doubt, in order to establish an account on 'organizing doubt'.

p.90 As a result of the nature of dynamic complexity, operational units are confronted with problems for which no standards exist, or at least to which no existing standards can be applied automatically without thinking. A process of organizing is started out of necessity.

p.90 one should simultaneously trust and distrust one's previous insights.

p.91 Doubt, as it is conceptualized in this study, is the essence of self-organization. Doubt is crucial for self-organization because it represents the ability of the system to deal with its knowledge of the environment. It captures the ability to develop meaningful ideas about the environment, while staying critical of these ideas.

p.92 when things are clear, you should doubt those things; when they are unclear you should treat them as if they're clear... [JLJ - I think I am starting to get this.. no wait, I am not, no wait, I think I am] Dynamic complexity confronts operators with the necessity to act without being able to thoroughly analyze the situations from all possible angles. Acting on the basis of hypotheses implies that one acts in the face of doubt... if one wants to retain one's adaptability, one should be able to discredit one's existing insights...what organizations need in changing times, namely, curiosity, openness and complex sensing.

p.92 Dynamic complexity is necessarily dealt with by using hypotheses; doubt reminds the system of the inherent risks of hypotheses. [JLJ - note to self, put this in current paper] ...The ability to doubt implies the ability to choose.

p.93 doubt is a process that should be organized within the operational units.

p.98 meaningful action has been defined as lying between the extremes of perfect rules and no rules at all... In the intermediate situation, on the edge of chaos, it is at the same time important to construct rules (in order to develop a body of hypothetical knowledge) and to break rules (in order to deal with change and unknown situations). It is exactly on this edge of chaos where thinking is necessary.

p.99 The dynamic of human thinking is exactly what rhetorical psychology tries to capture.
 The central concept of rhetorical psychology is argumentation. It will be argued that argumentation can serve as a description of the content of the function of doubt.

p.100 Argumentation is therefore situated in a context in which the nature of reality is problematic. The maxim of Protagoras suggests that an 'unarguable rightness and wrongness' (Billig's words) cannot be established because critical challenges are always possible. Logic demands a level of certainty that is not to be found in everyday affairs. Due to the lack of certainty in everyday affairs there is a difference of opinion.

p.101 Billig (1996) characterized the argumentative momentum by describing two dimensions: criticism and justification (p. 117). If someone makes a claim or advocates a certain point of view, he is expected to find arguments for his position... Criticism and justification are the dimensions that capture the argumentative momentum.

p.101 In the logic of Weick's model one could say that the process of justification discovers reasons behind enactments. Weick also noticed the structuring effect of justification: 'Justifications are socially acceptable reasons people give themselves for choosing something in public that is irrevocable. As these reasons accumulate into patterns of affirmation, restriction, and permission, they guide people and enable them to judge others and justify themselves to those others. Sets of justifications should form coherent and workable systems of interpretation that create a culture' (2001, p. 78).

p.104 dealing with information is not a matter of simple rule following (putting it in the appropriate category) but a matter of potential controversy... human thinking is fundamentally a dynamic and infinite process... because of the ever-present tension between categorization and particularization.

p.106 Dealing with dynamic complexity can be characterized by the logic of abduction: actions are based on hypotheses.

p.106 Weick's organizing model can be understood as an abduction-model with a normative element added. This normative element is the capability of doubting.

p.106 A system should have the ability to discredit its current insights.

p.109 Billig's concept of argumentation can be interpreted as a description of the content of the process of doubt. It is therefore claimed that the organization of doubt can be equaled with the organization of argumentation... all organizations organize their argumentation process.

p.111 well-organized argumentation is orientated to the crucial issues at hand... because operational units are confronted with dynamic complexity they should be arguers as well as actors

p.111 well-organized argumentation is relevant

p.113 this study agrees with De Sitter (2000), who claimed that human resources cannot be managed, but should be mobilized.

p.115 Myerson portrayed Habermas as a thinker who is part of a larger stream of thinkers that he called 'dialogic rationalism' (p. 7).

p.117 In conditions that are dynamically complex it is dangerous to try to pin down the meaning of things. That is the reason Weick underlined the importance of doubt and contradictions.

p.118 It is the difficulty of acting in a dynamically complex environment that makes argumentation important (Van der Vlist, 1981).

p.118 Argumentation is not a goal in itself; argumentation should support dealing with dynamic complexity.

p.118 Units should be prepared to think, but they should be prepared to be surprised as well. Acting in environments that are dynamically complex implies that units should be prepared to act while knowing that their knowledge of the environment is limited (Van der Vlist, 1981). This is the fundamental insight to this study.

p.121 Accidents can, according to Perrow, be perceived as normal given the nature of the systems in which they occur.

p.121 What makes a system 'interactively complex' is the key question, whether or not interactions between parts are expected or not. In a complex system a failure in one part of the system influences the functioning of another part in an unanticipated way (Perrow, 1999, pp.72-73).

p.121 Coupling refers to the dimension which ranges from loose coupling to tight coupling. This dimension characterizes whether the system is resilient, i.e. whether it is capable of recovering from incidents. Perrow (1999, p. 92) put it thus: 'Loosely coupled systems, whether for good or ill, can incorporate shocks and failures and pressures for change without destabilization. Tightly coupled systems will respond more quickly to these perturbations, but the response may be disastrous.'

p.123 The insight which theorists like Perrow, Snook and De Sitter point to is that division of labor leads to structural complexity, making both insight and control for operators, i.e. their ability to act and to think meaningfully, more problematic... A complex organizational network undermines insight.

p.124 The hologram is used as a metaphor to formulate the necessary qualities of self-organizing units. Morgan (1997, pp. 100-101): 'The metaphor of the hologram invites us to think of systems where qualities of the whole are enfolded in all the parts so that the system has an ability to self-organize and regenerate itself on a continuous basis...'

p.127 [Morgan] The central idea here is that if a system is to have the freedom to evolve it must possess a certain degree of space or autonomy that allows appropriate innovation to occur. This seems to be stating the obvious. But the reality is that in many organizations the reverse occurs because management has a tendency to overdefine and overcontrol instead of just focusing on the critical variables that need to be specified, leaving the others to find their own form

p.128-129 Systems confronted with a dynamically complex environment need the ability to doubt in order to deal with the challenges of that environment in the best possible way.

p.129 An organizational system confronted with dynamic complexity knows it can be surprised. It furthermore knows that it is very difficult to design an organization in advance... One can imagine that the ability to restructure is important for organizations that are engaged in dynamically complex circumstances...The army should aim to create organizations in which the organizational structure itself can become object of argumentation (Kuipers & Kramer, 2002a).

p.131 Weick (1993, p. 634): 'Contextual rationality is sensitive to the fact that social actors need to create and maintain intersubjectively binding normative structures that sustain and enrich their relations. Thus, organizations become important because they can provide meaning and order in the face of environments that impose ill-defined, contradictory demands.'

p.131 Weick aims to describe the kind of organization that is resilient... Such an organization has, also according to Weick, holographic qualities (1993, p. 640): '(...) in the manner of a holograph, each person can reconstitute the group and assume whatever role is vacated, pick up the activities, and run a credible version of the role.' [JLJ - more than that, each member should be able to cross-check the work performed by other members, raising an alarm when such work is ineffective, of low quality, or deficient in other ways, ultimately members should be able to substitute for each other, provide each other with insights, and perhaps be able to replace their peers in an emergency or on scheduled rotation.]

p.133 Adding the deficiency is adding that element in the control of a self-organizing unit without which it cannot function.

p.135 [Hosking & Morely] If a group is to perform skillfully it is important that there is constructive competition between different points of view.

p.138 Argumentation is considered necessary in order to enable a process of self-organization.

p.168 As has become clear in the previous discussions, there are different signs of internal double-loop learning (double-loop learning within operational units) in the Logtbat case: developing tricks to beat roadblocks and plundering mobs.

p.169 Discussing 'what if' scenarios can be seen as a clear sign that doubt was stimulated within units. If units have various scenarios in the back of their minds they are prepared for various situations.

p.169 this study is located in the context of discovery. The consequence of this is that the results of the analyses in this study are considered to be hypotheses. The hypotheses resulting from the case studies are orientated to the self-organizing potential of operational units

p.211 A crucial sign that the doctrine is based on a limited conception of dynamic complexity is the fact that the concepts of doubt and double-loop learning are absent. In the view of this study both concepts are essential because the environment can surprise the organization. Sense-discrediting and double-loop learning both represent a way in which the organizational system can be open to the environment.

p.212 Dynamic complexity makes it impossible to specify in advance the kind of information one needs because the environment is largely unknown. Furthermore, because of the equivocality of the environment more information will not resolve dynamic complexity. Merely gathering information is a form of single-loop learning.

p.213 The nature of dynamic complexity is therefore such that dialogue and argumentation are necessary on the operational, the tactical, and the strategic level

p.216 The real problem for the Army is therefore the acceptance that they are confronted with dynamically complex environments.

p.231 The nature of crisis operations demands that operational units are broadly orientated rather than specialized.