p.217-218 From the social practices viewpoint, everyday strategy practices are discernible patterns of actions arising from habituated tendencies and internalized dispositions rather than from deliberate, purposeful goal-setting initiatives. We term this epistemological stance 'post-processual'. Such a post-processual world-view offers a revised understanding of strategy emergence that has profound explanatory implications for the strategy-as-practice movement.
p.218 Strategy researchers have become increasingly interested in getting into the 'bowels' of strategy-making.
p.219-220 the term post-processual is developed here as a reference point for a view of practices, which deem events, individuals and doings to be manifest instantiations of practice-complexes; ontological priority is accorded to an immanent logic of practice rather than to actors and agents. For us, it is this immanent logic emerging through practice which constitutes what we mean by strategy. As such, a genuine practice-based theory of strategy emergence must put these practice complexes as the centre of theoretical analysis.
p.221 In seeking to capture the dynamic and evolving qualities of human conduct in organized settings the process perspective is underpinned by the premise that it is the basic strengths of everyday operations that drive strategy process and emergence (Whittington, 2001).
p.226 For practice theorists it is the internalized practices or schemata of action (or what Bourdieu, 1990, calls habitus) that are the real 'authors' of everyday coping action.
p.230-231 In seeking to formulate the primacy of unconscious background practices over the deliberate, conscious intentional agent, Heidegger developed the distinction between two possible modes of existential engagement with the world, which he called dwelling and building (Heidegger, 1971; see also Chia, 2004; Chia & Holt, 2006) and emphasized the primacy of the former over the latter. Dwelling involves an intimate encounter, a bring-in-the-world that suggests immediate unreflective familiarity, habit and custom... Heidegger believed that it is through this everyday dwelling activity that we achieve some form of intelligibility and not through having ideas and mental images as Descartes presupposed and Husserl upheld (Dreyfus, 1991a).
p.232 it is the unconsciously acquired practice-complexes that generate the possibilities for strategy, not so much individual consciousness and intentionality... Practices orient and educate our attention, and shape our dispositions. We understand what it means to be human and how to act, not by having mental images or representations but through being socialized, often unconsciously, into certain social practices.
p.233 Practices... form the background of skilled coping capabilities that enable us to act appropriately, but not necessarily consciously in specific cultural contexts. Most of human action takes place through this form of mindless practical coping and it is only when a breakdown of coping occurs that we then become aware of the cognitive boundaries between the actor and the object of action.