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p.7 Warning does not arise from a compilation of possible or potential facts or indications, however useful these may be.
p.9 It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of exhaustive research for warning.
p.13 Policymakers must recognize that warning cannot be issued with absolute certainty, even under the best of circumstances, but will always be an assessment of probabilities.
p.15 Warning Produces a Conviction That Results in Action
p.16 Regardless of how intelligence and policy function in relation to one another... the important thing in the end is that appropriate action is taken, when needed, to protect the interests of... security... Without this, the warning function of intelligence will have failed no matter how brilliant the collection and analytical effort may have been.
p.17 Why then, is the Chinese intervention in Korea universally regarded as a great intelligence failure which contributed to a near military disaster? It is because no action was taken on any of this intelligence or judgments, because no orders were issued to halt the precipitate advance of U.S. and Allied forces toward the Yalu [river].
p.30 There are perhaps four basic filing or compiling problems that the indications analyst should be prepared to deal with. They are; (1) extracting raw data or information of potential indications significance; (2) compiling the highlights of such data into a readily usable form by topic or area; (3) coping with the sudden but short-term crisis; and (4) maintaining long-term warning or indication files.
p.32 There is seemingly very little difference between indications analysis and the process of developing intelligence judgments in any other field of intelligence; so, why study indications analysis?
p.35 it must be presumed that far more is under way than is discernible to us
p.37 Warning intelligence must deal not only with that which is obvious but with that which is obscure.
p.39 No factor is more important for warning than objectivity in the analysis of the data and a realistic appreciation of the situation as it actually is.
p.41 The warning analyst usually does not have the luxury of time, of further collection and analysis, of deferring his judgment "until all the evidence is in."
p.46 Experience suggests that experts in their fields are not necessarily the most likely to recognize and accept changes or new types of data.
p.86 The perception of what the adversary is thinking and how important the current issue is to him is fundamental to our ability to understand what he will do.
p.87 Objective perception of the adversary's attitudes and the ability to look at things from his point of view are crucial to warning
p.120 "The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive and wrong." ...the best stratagem is the one that generates a set of warning signals susceptible to alternative, or better yet, optional interpretations, where the intended solution is implausible in terms of the victim's prior experience and knowledge while the false solution (or solutions) is plausible.
p.133 The ultimate function of warning intelligence is to come to an assessment of the enemy's most probable course of action, to provide a judgment for the policymaker of the intentions of the adversary.
p.162 Nothing is going to remove the uncertainty of the warning problem.
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