VII This book is essentially about the logic and rhetoric of organizing as reality-constituting social practices. It is particularly concerned with examining the logical and rhetorical strategies deployed in the production of organizational texts and their consequent effects on our understanding of organization.

VII-VIII Postmodern thinking, with its radical questioning of the logical categories of thought shaping the discourse on organization, offers a more promising way of rethinking organization and consequently the intellectual role of organizational analysis. Postmodern thinking is a 'weak' form of thinking which orients us towards insistently moving 'upstream', away from the dominant concerns of mainstream organizational theory, to an exploration of... micro-practices which collectively create stabilized effects that through time come to be construed as unproblematic states or entities. These entities and/or states include 'knowledge', 'truth', 'the individual', 'the organization', 'its strategy' and even 'theories of organization'.

p.2 downstream thinking... Traces of past patterns of thought constrain and help shape the possibilities of future ways of thinking. They serve as powerful formative influences in the academic production of knowledge... It shifts our intellectual focus onto the discreteness, unity, identity, and permanence of different aspects of our phenomenal experiences by deliberately marginalising and hence silencing competing accounts that threaten the integrity of such priorities. Challenges to the generally held axioms and truths of a particular community of inquirers are thereby systematically delegitimized.

p.2-3 The fundamental epistemological stance of downstream thinking is representationalism; the belief that theories are attempts by the intellectual elites of society to accurately describe and represent reality as it is in itself. When this accurate mirroring is achieved, theories are then deemed to be true and hence carry the full weight of scientific authority along with them. Univocality of assertion and, hence, universality of application is arrived at by systematically undermining and 'killing off' competing views much in the same way military strategists maneuver to first isolate and then pick off opposing forces. Thus, we can see that what at one level appears to be the dispassionate presentation of an objective 'fact' of the world may, upon reexamination, be construed as the site of contestation in which the 'reason of the stronger' has prevailed.

p.3 Downstream thinking is inextricably linked to foundationalism; the dominant predisposition since the Enlightenment to ground all our knowledge claims in irrefutable facts of the world... For downstream thinkers the fundamental question which beset all intellectual inquiry is that of how best to overcome the problem of gaining access to an unmediated reality. Once this task is satisfactorily accomplished 'facts' can be called upon to 'speak for themselves'. Thus, the question of 'methodology' features preeminently in such forms of academic research. Facts are thought to be given and 'out there' awaiting our discovery. Operating in a downstream mode leads us away from the conditions of production of truth claims to the consequences of such claims. This has the curious effect of reinforcing the 'solidity' of such assertions making them seem even less controversial.

p.5 Downstream thinking takes as given the pre-existence of an already constituted world that we subsequently apprehend. Social and material objects, attributes and events exist prior to any attempts to linguistically represent them.

p.7-8 In short, postmodernism is another name for what we have called 'upstream thinking', an intellectual predisposition rather than an alternative perspective.

p.10-11 What postmodern (or upstream) thinking calls for is a radical revamping of the whole structure of understanding in the field of study, away from the concerns of mainstream organization theorists, to one which privileges an emergent and processual view of the organizing process and its associated representational practices. Postmodernism is better thought of as an intellectual reaction which seeks to avoid the problems endemic to representational forms of knowledge.

p.12 For Eastern thinkers, dismantling and emptying themselves of conceptual categories is what draws them nearer to understanding the subliminal aspects of their lived experiences. This is only achievable by thinking 'upstream'.

p.13 'By itself, a given statement is neither a fact nor a fiction; it is made so by others, later on.' (Latour 1987: 25). Facts and 'bodies of established knowledge' are products or 'outcomes' of primary social organizing processes rather than the result of an accurate matching of words with things and events in the world. When we make the claim the 'organizations are consciously coordinated purposeful social entities', what we are saying is that a particular conventionalized way of thinking has been established which has created for itself a legitimate object of study. This view is shared and hence upheld by a community of inquirers whose efforts serve to further enhance the facticity of 'organizations' as social entities.

p.14 From the constructionist/pragmatist point of view, facts are not true because they correspond to the world. Rather they become true because we believe in them and unquestionably use them repeatedly 'as if they were true'. Such repeated usage in turn helps initial beliefs gain credibility and to thereby be accorded the status of 'truth'. Likewise, knowledge is not a matter of 'getting things right', but of acquiring habits of action which enables us to cope effectively with our reality. Acquiring 'knowledge' is the name we give to our experience of becoming competent actors within a social collective. Consequently, science, as a human activity, is not about the search for transcendental truths but is better understood as legitimized social practices reflecting the consent and solidarity of a community of inquirers. We call a human activity 'scientific' not because it is able to make privileged claims about how the world is, but because it exhibits a higher degree of agreement among its community of inquirers than for example in literary criticism.

p.15 from a construnctionist/pragmatist perspective... Knowledge, truth, and reality ultimately depend on plausibility within a social community and not on any transcendental Reason or materially grounded connections... The order we perceive in the world is, for Kant, a product of our minds rather than a natural order 'out there'.

p.17 Theories of organization are better understood as products of 'disciplined imagination' (Weick, 1989). They are self-justifying 'intelligible narratives' rather than attempts at making transcendental truth claims.

p.17 upstream thinking or the intellectual strategy of deconstruction insists on moving even further upstream by problematizing the explanations proffered by constructionists/pragmatists.

p.18 Norms are in effect produced through acts of exclusion and since deconstruction or upstream thinking is centrally concerned with how these processes of exclusion operate

p.18 all forms of knowledge are essentially conventional and conventions arise because of organizing practices which work to marginalise 'undesirable' thinking and to normalize thought. Knowledge therefore is an outcome, a product of organizational processes that hide the violence necessary for its emergence as an operating principle.

p.25 Organization theories are academic products produced within the context of socially legitimized public institutions which are themselves effects of primary organizing processes. They are, therefore, first and foremost socially 'organized' bodies of knowledge claims.

p.26 In other words, the organization of what constitutes legitimate knowledge itself has a substantial bearing on the theoretical trajectory of contemporary organization studies.

p.26-27 In modern times, science is generally held in high esteem. It is still widely accepted that science and the scientific approach it propagates, holds the key to revealing hidden truths about our natural and social world which are not immediately grasped by the 'unscientific' mind.

p.29 the goal of any scientific process is, therefore, to systematically observe and carefully document the phenomenon being studied and then to provide a rational explanation for the regularities observed... In this way, it is believed, our understanding of the world around us can be significantly enhanced. Plausible explanations are achieved through the construction of theories... and propositions

p.31 As Bhaskar (1989) rightly reminds us, 'realism is not a theory of knowledge or of truth, but of 'being' (1989: 13). By 'being' Bhaskar means here a set of assumptions about the nature of reality (i.e., an ontological question)... Thus, 'every theory of scientific knowledge must logically presuppose a theory of what the world is like for knowledge, under the descriptions given it by theory, to be possible.' (Bhaskar 1989: 13).

p.49 positivists reject the existence of theoretical entities, insisting that such concepts are part of the metaphysical baggage which modern science can well do without... positivists... their claim that empirical verification provides the surest form of knowledge is, itself, based upon a particular view of knowledge which is not empirically verifiable... Despite its widespread influence positivism remains unable to epistemologically justify the status of its knowledge claims.

p.51 for the realist, the possibility always arises that generative mechanisms may be unobserved or even unobservable but be nonetheless 'real' in an ontological sense. This leads to the ontological being-realist scheme of things in which unobservable theoretical entities are considered as being objectively existing 'out there' just like physical observable entities. Theory, therefore, for the realist becomes the means for 'describing the relations between the unobservable causal mechanisms (or structures) and their (observable) effects' (Layder 1990: 13).

p.51 This legitimizing of theoretical entities enables scientific knowledge to be construed beyond the immediate restrictions of the human senses. As Layder rightly points out, the positing of the existence of theoretical entities 'also decrees that the realm of theory be broadened out beyond the given sensorily apprehended world' (Layder 1990: 13).

p.52 Bhaskar in A Realist Theory of Science, defines realism as the view that:

Things exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only know them under particular descriptions... Science is the systematic attempt to express in thought the structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of thought. (Bhaskar 1978: 250, quoted in Outhwaite 1987: 20)

p.52 the task of realists is to see science 'as a human activity that aims at discovering, by a mixture of experimentation and theoretical reasoning the entities, structures and mechanisms (visible or invisible) that exist and operate in the world' (Outhwaite 1983: 322). From Bhaskar's position therefore, it is possible to claim that not only can events occur without being experienced, but also that unobservable causal mechanisms can actually neutralize each other in such a way that no event is observed to occur. However, this, in no way, denies the existence of such causal mechanisms. For example, an object placed on a table is said to experience the force of gravity, but it remains at rest because of the resistance offered by the table itself. Thus, two very 'real' forces exist, but because they counteract one another, no change of any sort is observed. Bhaskar's realism is therefore a realism which emphasizes the real existence of oftentimes unseen and unseeable causal mechanisms such as deep structural regularities which inhibit thought and constrain human behavior to the detriment of societal good.

p.57 In Layder's own view:

To argue for a relative independence (of social structure) is simply to argue that macro structures have properties which enable them to constrain, as well as facilitate, human action from "outside" as well as from within. Constraints and facilities do not simply exist in the minds of human actors; they are most crucially, socially generated and socially located resources which are drawn into agent's activities from external cultural "funds". (Layder 1990: 23, emphasis added)

p.63 Sandelands and Drazin, in an interesting discussion of the language of organization theory, maintained that 'an objection must be raised to words that name no entity or process whatsoever' [JLJ - ok, I would like to see a useful theory that must resort to such words. Show me a practical use for it]

p.63 Theories are not pure descriptions of reality, but interpretations of our experience of it.

p.72 'there is nothing outside of the text' (Derrida 1976: 158). What Derrida appears to be alluding to is not that there is nothing outside of language, but nothing outside of it. There is no thingness about the material or social world except when comprehended through the codifying structures of language. [JLJ - I disagree. 'Thingness' results from a trial or ordeal of being. The human mind quickly and of necessity dispenses with perceptions which cannot be codified in schemas which relate to immediate problems of the trials and efforts underway in the struggle to 'be'. The rest, perhaps are worthy of discussion through language.]

p.82 Weick (1989) moves away from a traditional view of organizational research as a descriptive function to the notion of research activities as a form of 'disciplined imagination'.

p.92 Like Hacking (1983), Latour advocates intervening and experimenting with the unknown concrete world rather than either attempting to represent it or to become caught up in the prison-house of a priori categories... Throw-away explanations are the essence of reflexive intellectual practices because the belief in the existence of an enduring framework within which things fit and hence can be wholly explained is the hallmark of a non-reflexive science.

p.99 it is, in fact, indeterminacy and not determinacy that characterizes the human condition... the human agent is 'faced with a condition of irreducible indeterminacy and it is this endless and unstoppable demurrage which postmodern thought explicitly recognizes and places in the vanguard of its endeavours' (Cooper and Burrell 1988: 98).

p.111 For Rorty, what we call knowledge is not a question of 'getting things right' but a matter of 'acquiring habits of action for coping with reality' (Rorty 1991: 1). These habits of action are what we call 'beliefs' and the process of enquiry is nothing more than a matter of continually reweaving such webs of belief into more acceptable forms rather than the straightforward application of pre-specified criteria to a particular case.

p.111 each interpretive community has its own internalized logic which governs the acceptability of particular habits of thought and action... On this view, assertions come to be accepted as true, not because they are accurate representations of an external reality, but because they function as economizing aids that enable the individual and collectivity to cope with their specific set of local circumstances.

p.149 In Chapter 4, I explored a postmodern style of thinking which entails the radical questioning of conventional institutionalized categories of knowledge characterizing the modernist/representationalist discourse. Postmodern thinking epitomizes the insistence of moving inexorably upstream so as to problematize self-evident (black-boxed) evocative terms such as 'reality', 'truth', 'knowledge', 'representation' and 'organization' with a view to situating these terms differently and to thereby reveal their constitutive nature in shaping modernist discourse.

p.150 we need to begin to think of 'organizations' not as 'things' whose properties such as unity, identity, permanence and structure can be explored and described, but rather as loosely emergent sets of organizing rules which orient interactional behavior in particular ways within a social collectivity. In short, the study of organization should involve the study of the emergence of organization rather than the relatively static features displayed of this constitutive process. It is this 'upstream' attitude towards organizational inquiry which is adopted here on.

p.150 That our organizational world is a product of acts of will and representation is the inspiration behind the works of such writers as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century.

p.171 [Fenollosa] Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting points of actions, cross-sections cut through actions, snapshots

p.171 [Fenollosa] Relations are more real and more important than the things which they relate.

p.179 The fact that we are not aware of the influence of writing on our thoughts shows that we have in fact interiorized the technology of writing so deeply that we are often unable to recognize its presence and its pervasive influence on our thinking processes.

p.191 It should be by now clear that upstream deconstructive thinking requires a thought style that is entirely at odds with modernist representational thinking. Moving upstream involves the vigilant uncovering and subsequent dismantling of the key conceptual oppositions which serve to sustain the project of logocentrism in Western thought.

p.199 as Freud (1975) has pointed out, it is the unconscious which is the primary source from which our consciousness arises.

p.201 For March, ambiguities in decision-making relate to, issues about preferences, the question of relevance, the influence of history, and the question of interpretation.

p.203 March... [contends] that ambiguity is not just a fact of life, but a 'normatively attractive state' of affairs. This is because each of these [four irresolvable] ambiguities [discussed earlier] have positive consequences. For example, ambiguities about preferences enable 'goals' to develop through experience while ambiguity about interpretation allows communication to 'evoke more than a communicator knows' (March 1988: 15).

p.207 Contrary to commonly held views, decision-making is not so much about 'choice' or 'change' or even 'action events'. Rather, it is an ontological gesture, a bringing forth of a reality to the exclusion of other possible realities. It is the arbitrary and 'violent' separating of that which is deemed to be significant from that which therefrom is perceived as 'given' and hence insignificant. To think to substitute the concept of decision by 'action' or 'change' or even 'interpretation' is to fail to appreciate that decisional acts are essentially expressions of the 'taxonomic urge' to organize and structure human experiences and to thereby render them thinkable.

p.218 when we begin to think of 'truth' as the 'well held collective fictional beliefs of a particular community', or 'reality' as an 'effect' created by the human practice of representing, or organizations as reified 'outcomes' of primary organizing processes, we also begin to open up new avenues for reconceptualizing organization and organizational analysis.