p.3-4 Realists argue for an understanding of the relationship between social structures and human agency
that is based on a transformational conception of social activity... they advance an understanding of the
social as essentially consisting in or depending upon relations... the existence of social structure is
a necessary condition for any human activity. Society provides the means, media, rules and resources for everything we do...the existence of society is a transcendentally necessary condition for any intentional act at all... The
social world is reproduced or transformed in daily life.
p.4 All social structures... depend upon or presuppose social relations... The relations
into which people enter... are themselves structures. And it is to these structures of social relations
that realism directs our attention - both as the explanatory key to understanding social events and trends and as
the focus of social activity aimed at the [transformation of events].
p.4 Society then is the ensemble of positioned practices and networked interrelationships which individuals never
create but in their practical activity always presuppose, and in doing so everywhere reproduce or transform... for
critical realism the social world, being itself a social product, is seen as essentially subject
to the possibility of transformation. Hence it is intrinsically dynamic
p.5 The world cannot be rationally changed unless it is adequately interpreted.
p.6 The structures which agents reproduce or transform in their activity are also structures of power which may involve
alienation, domination and oppression
p.10 realism is not a theory of knowledge or of truth, but of being
p.13 realism is not a theory of knowledge or of truth, but of being... Accordingly, a realist position
in the philosophy of science will be a theory about the nature of the being, not the knowledge, of the objects investigated
by science... the epistemic fallacy... that statements about being can always be analysed in terms of statements
about our knowledge (of being), that it is sufficient for philosophy to 'treat only the network, and not what the network
describes'.
p.41-42 Scientific work requires a break from reverie, the dreamlike character of everyday experience that forms the
stuff of art and poetry. Science is the domain of reason; art that of imagination... art and science have
a common origin... in the projective or creative activity of mind... Reason and imagination constitute, then, the
two aspects of mind.
p.67 esse est percipi [to be is to be perceived]
p.67 it is the nature of the object that determines the form of its science.
p.82 Society... can only be known, not shown, to exist... society not only cannot be empirically identified independently of its effects, but it does not exist independently of them either.
p.126 [Marx] 'All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.'