|
p.2 The emerging science of complex systems extends the tradition of general systems theory [von Bertalanffy, 1973; Boulding, 1956], which sought to unify science by uncovering the principles common to the holistic organization of all systems, from molecules and cells to minds and societies. However, the classical systems approach had two major shortcomings: the systems it studied were considered as (1) well-defined, static structures, (2) which are objectively given. These assumptions simply do not work for complex adaptive systems, such as societies, minds, or markets [Holland, 1996; Axelrod & Cohen, 1999]. In these systems, structures tend to be fuzzy, variable and to an important degree subjective [Gershenson & Heylighen, 2004; Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson, 2007]: different observers will typically distinguish or emphasize different components, boundaries or relationships.
p.2 Self-organization is the spontaneous process through which systems emerge and evolve, becoming ever more complex. more adaptive, and more synergetic [Heylighen, 2002].
p.3 The second shortcoming of classical systems theory, its assumption of objectivity, is overcome by noting that knowledge cannot be developed through passive observation of what "objectively" exists, but only through active construction combining a variety of subjective experiences. This leads us into the domain of cognitive science [Thagard, 1996], which until recently was also stifled by a too reductionist and static perspective.
p.3 The integration of these three perspectives - cognition, complex systems, and self-organizing evolution - points us to a wholly new philosophy of nature, mind and society. It sees the essential building blocks of the universe as actions and interactions, rather than as pieces of matter or energy. Their most important product is intelligent organization, which can be found at all levels, from molecules to global society. For us, this deep metaphysical perspective is at the same time a starting point for concrete, scientific research with plenty of practical applications: we develop and test our fundamental theories by applying them directly to concrete problems.
p.3-4 The problems that presently confront individuals, organizations and society at large all concern complex, evolving systems, such as the global ecosystem, society, the economy, and our own internal system of thoughts and emotions... Coping with these problems requires a set of new methods that take complexity and change as their starting points [Battram, 1996; Axelrod & Cohen, 1999].
p.4 Unlike other high-level, abstract approaches, our concepts directly address real-world problems and the tools to tackle them. Indeed, we see evolution as a giant problem-solving process in which systems are constantly trying to adapt to new circumstances, or improve their handling of existing situations [Heylighen, 2007c]. Cognition is merely an interiorization of this on-going process of trial-and-error and a registration of shortcuts that have proven to be useful for re-application later [Campbell, 1974]. Complexity is both a feature of the problems that need to be solved, and of the solutions that are most robust in handling multifarious and ever-changing demands [Axelrod & Cohen, 1999]
p.4 I will in particular show how an ontology based on action avoids the problems arising from the opposition that is traditionally conceived between mind and matter (dualism), and between subject and object (first-person vs. third-person perspectives).
p.7-8 These concepts start from the notion of action as the most primitive element or unit of reality. An action is an elementary process or, more simply, a change: a transition from an initial state of affairs (cause) to a subsequent one (effect). However, our conceptual framework avoids reducing such a dynamic “action” to the static concept of “state” by defining a state itself as the collection of actions that are possible in that state [cf. Turchin, 1993]. Thus, states are defined by actions, while actions are defined in terms of states. This is a recursive or bootstrapping definition that allows us to avoid postulating absolutist foundations [Heylighen, 1990, 2001]. An agent can then be defined as an aspect or part of a state that is necessary for the action to occur, but that persists during the subsequent change. Thus, an agent can be seen as a cause or producer of actions that does not vanish after the action... objects... are then merely types of agents.
[JLJ - I think in terms of a predicament as the fundamental element of social reality - it is a state which confronts/threatens a social agent and produces stress, possibly requiring action by the agent to relieve/reduce the stress. This agent has usually chosen to be in this predicament (over others) and has activities underway which he/she is executing in order to monitor/manage this stress, which he/she has developed through experience and over time. The predicament itself generates "possibilities" in the mind of the agent (through the mechanism of experience) as the starting point for cognitive efforts, which continue in time with either a reflex action or the agent asking itself how much it should care about each "possibility" so generated. This process of question and answer becomes the internal conversation - a practical (yet effectively subconscious) cognitive tool which generates (and imaginatively tests) sketch-like "ideas" for determining how to "go on" within the predicament. Without a predicament of some kind, an agent would have no basis for "deciding" what to do, nor would any "decision" make sense. Yes action is important, but I would argue, need not be foundational for an ontology. Exactly how do you act, I ask such action-ists, without considering ideas for how to go on, from within the predicament, followed by considering how much one should care about the ideas generated? Ideas for how to go on can be generated by simply counting and categorizing to determine what is relevant and what is not. Exactly how do you act, without first performing a judgment?]
p.8 This action philosophy may be situated within the broad tradition of process metaphysics, which considers change ("becoming") as more fundamental than static existence ("being") [Heylighen, 1990b; Prigogine, 1980].
p.8 Since an action normally is followed by - or elicits - subsequent actions, actions are intrinsically connected, forming a complex network of causes and effects. [JLJ - Yes, but we likely have been in a similar predicament before, and likely have a model which we can use to guess cause and effect relationships.]
p.8 Moreover, an action is normally always a response or "re-action" to the particular state of affairs or condition that functions as the action's cause. This implies that agents are intrinsically sensitive to outside conditions: they sense or "perceive" specific conditions in their environment, acting differently under different conditions. [JLJ - Once again, I call this situation a predicament]
p.9 The sciences of mind... typically start from the notion of an intelligent agent who has beliefs about the state in which s/he lives, desires about what that state ideally ought to be, and intentions, in the sense of actions that the agent intends to execute in order to bring the present state closer to the desired state. This perspective may be called the intentional stance [Dennett, 1989]. It assumes that the behavior of an agent can best be predicted by starting from the agent’s preference or goal, and the agent’s belief about its present conditions. Preferences and beliefs together allow you to infer the agent’s intentions, and therefore its actions.
p.9 The intentional stance works better for complex systems with a lot of uncertainty about further events... the precise sequence of actions (i.e. the trajectory that the agent follows through its space of states) is in practice impossible to predict. However, the general outcome may well be predictable, in the sense that the agent eventually will move closer to its goal, by counteracting any unexpected disturbances that make it deviate from its preferences. [JLJ - much like a football coach running a scrimmage between the starting and second team, we might estimate that in typical conditions against a strong opponent, that we have enough capacity to counter whatever we confront, advancing the ball, and eventually scoring more points. We cannot predict the exact sequence of events, but have seen enough diagnostic evidence that advancement will likely happen.]
p.9 Our action ontology starts from the intentional stance, because it is intrinsically more flexible than the causal stance, and can be applied in more complex circumstances.
p.12 the action is defined simply by the change it produces. [JLJ - change yes, but change in the predicament]
p.12 As the theory of enactive cognition [Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1992; Thompson, 2005] has argued, all perception is a form of action... for us to become aware of a phenomenon, either the phenomenon needs to change in some way, entailing an action on the part of the phenomenon, or we need to change something in the way we observe the phenomenon (e.g. by turning our head towards it, or scanning it with our eyes), entailing an action on the part of the subject. We may conclude that the most fundamental requirement for something to become an experience, i.e. to reach the awareness of a subject that is sufficiently evolved to have a nervous system, is that it is includes an action. [JLJ - or that it includes an action suspended. The predicament may require that we hold off on an action, or construct detailed plans, so that our actions later in time are more effective.]
p.14 To clarify the overall strategy, two things should be noted: 1) our philosophy emphasizes the power of self-organization or evolution, i.e. mechanisms that spontaneously, without outside intervention, tend to increase effectiveness; 2) we see evolution as a process that is in general slow, difficult and sometimes painful, as it relies on trial-and-error. This implies many errors, detours and setbacks. The end result of these processes is a form of organization that cuts short across these detours, so that errors do not need to be repeated.
p.15 When this philosophy is applied to human agents... the support structure we are aiming for may be called a mobilization system.
p.15 A mobilization system would combat this confused and unproductive way of acting by redirecting effort in the most efficient way at the most important issues. This requires the following steps:
- helping people to reach consensus about the specific goals that they consider most important. This can be done in part by seeking inspiration about fundamental values in the evolutionary worldview [e.g. Heylighen & Bernheim, 2000], in part by creating effective discussion systems that help a group to come to a well-reasoned consensus. Examples of such systems are being developed on the web [Klein, 2007; Malone & Klein, 2007].
- motivating and stimulating people to work towards the goals that have thus been agreed upon. Here, a very useful paradigm is the concept of “flow” [Csikszentmihalyi, 1990], which specifies the conditions under which people work in the most focused and motivated manner. These conditions are:
- clear goals: there should be minimal ambiguity about what to do next;
- immediate feedback: any action should be followed by an easily interpretable result, so that you either get a confirmation that you are on the right track, or a warning that you need to correct your course;
- challenges in balance with skills: tasks should be neither too difficult nor too easy for the people entrusted to perform them, in order to avoid either stress or boredom.
Additionally, there exists a wide range of techniques from psychology, behavioral economics and memetics that help us to formulate goals and tasks in a way that is maximally motivating, persuasive and easy to follow [Heath & Heath, 2007; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; Heylighen, 2009]
- coordinating and aggregating the individual contributions so as to ensure maximum collective results. This can be built on the mechanisms of stigmergy and self-organization mentioned before [Heylighen, 2007a; Parunak, 2006].
|
