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xiii The mission of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is to clarify what the conception of knowledge involves, how it is applied, and to explain why it has the features it does. And the idea of knowledge at issue here must, in the first instance at least, be construed in its modest sense to include also belief, conjecture, and the like.
xvi Knowledge development is a practice that we humans pursue because we have a need for its products. Life is full of questions that must be answered.
xvii Knowledge development is itself a practice and various practical processes and perspectives are correspondingly useful - or even necessary - to the way in which we go about constituting and validating knowledge. Expounding such a praxis-oriented approach to knowledge development is one of the prime tasks of this book.
p.4 knowledge calls for having a true belief that is appropriately justified.
p.54 It has come to be increasingly apparent in recent years that knowledge is cognitive capital... The need for knowledge is part and parcel of our nature. A deep-rooted demand for information and understanding presses in on us, and we have little choice but to satisfy it.
p.55 This discomfort of unknowing is a natural component of human sensibility.
p.55 The practical benefits of knowledge... relate to its role in guiding the processes by which we satisfy our (noncognitive) needs and wants. The satisfaction of our needs...... all require information... We can, do, and must put knowledge to work to facilitate the attainment of our goals, guiding our actions and activities in this world into productive and rewarding lines. And this is where the practical payoff of knowledge comes into play.
p.65 Belief justification is a complex idea subject to a considerable variety of distinctions and elaborations. But for present purposes the crucial distinction is that between:
- strong epistemic justification, that is, justification for accepting the belief as definitely true, for seeing it as meriting outright acceptance.
- weak epistemic justification, that is, justification for according the belief some credit, for seeing it as a plausible prospect.
With strong justification we regard the issue of acceptability as settled, with weak justification we regard it as yet substantially open, viewing whatever commitment we have to the belief as tentative, provisional, and defeasible.
p.66 The step from a sensory experience... to an objective factual claim... is operationally direct but epistemically mediated. And it is mediated not by an inference but by a policy, namely the policy of trusting one's own senses. This policy itself... emerges in the school of praxis from the consideration that a long course of experience has taught us that our senses generally guide us aright - that the indications of visual experience... generally provide reliable information that can be implemented in practice.
p.78 The move from plausibility to warranted acceptance ("justified belief") is automatic in those cases where nihil obstat - that is, whenever there are no case-specific counterindications.
p.81 A presumption is something distinctive that is characteristically its own within the cognitive domain. What is at issue here is not knowledge, nor probability, nor postulation, nor assumption, but something else quite different and destructive, namely a provisional gap-filler for an informational void... A presumption is a thesis that is provisionally appropriate - [one] which can be maintained pro tem, viewed as acceptable until or unless sufficiently weighty counterindications arise to displace it. On this basis, a presumption is a contention that remains in place until something better comes along.
p.82 Much of what we take ourselves to know is actually presumptive knowledge: claims to knowledge that may in the end have to be withdrawn.
p.82 What is at issue with the guided endorsement of a claim p as plausible is simply the contention that "p is presumably true." And what this means is that we will endorse and employ p insofar as we can do so without encountering problems but are prepared to abandon it should problems arise. In effect we are not dedicated partisans of such a claim but merely its fair-weather friends.
p.82 The sort of tentative plausibility at issue with presumptions is preevidential in its bearing. As far as evidentiation goes, plausibility awaits further developments. Plausibilities are accordingly something of a practical epistemic device. We use them where this can render effective service for purposes of inquiry. But we are careful to refrain from committing ourselves to them unqualifiedly and come what may.
p.83 Where our sources of information conflict - where they point to aporetic and paradoxical conclusions - we can no longer accept their deliverances at face value, but must somehow intervene to straighten things out. And here plausibility has to be our guide, subject to the idea that the most plausible prospect has a favorable presumption on its side.
p.83 Presumption represents a way of filling in - at least pro tem - the gaps that may otherwise confront us at any stage of information... A presumption indicates that in the absence of specific counterindications we are to accept how things "as a rule" are taken as standing.
p.84 Presumptions are, as it were, in tentative and provisional possession of the cognitive terrain, holding their place until displaced by something more evidentially substantial... the standing of a presumption is usually tentative and provisional, not absolute and final... Absent competition, it stays in place.. A presumptive answer is one that enables us to make do until that point (if ever) when something better comes along.
p.84
The effect of a presumption is to impute to certain facts or groups of facts prima facie significance or operation, and thus, in legal proceedings, to throw upon the party against whom it works the duty of bringing forward evidence to meet it. Accordingly, the subject of presumption is intimately connected with the subject of burden of proof, and the same legal rule may be expressed in different forms, either as throwing the advantage of a presumption on one side, or as throwing the burden of proof on the other.
p.86 The rational legitimization of a presumptively justified belief lies in the consideration that some generic mode of "suitably favorable indication" speaks on [its] behalf while no as-yet available counterindication speaks against it.
p.86-87 With presumption we take to be so what we could not otherwise derive... presumptively justified beliefs are the raw materials of cognition. They represent contentions that - in the absence of preestablished counterindications - are acceptable to us "until further notice," thus permitting us to make a start in the venture of cognitive justification without the benefit of prejustified materials. They are defeasible alright, vulnerable to being overturned, but only by something else yet more secure some other preestablished conflicting consideration. They are entitled to remain in place until displaced by something better. Accordingly, their impetus averts the dire consequences that would ensue [if] any and every cogent process of rational deliberation required inputs which themselves had to be authenticated by a prior process of rational deliberation - in which case the whole process could never get under way.
p.89 Postulates... Their legitimization lies in what they enable us to do.
p.93 The reality of it is that we cannot pursue the cognitive project - the quest for information about the world - without granting certain initial presumptions.
p.94 If we systematically refuse, always and everywhere, to accept seeming evidence as real evidence - at least provisionally, until the time comes when it is discredited as such - then we can get nowhere in the domain of practical cognition... When the skeptic rejects any and all presumptions, he automatically blocks any prospect of reasoning with him within the standard framework of discussion about the empirical facts of the world. The machinery of presumption is part and parcel of the mechanisms of cognitive rationality; abandoning it aborts the entire project at the very outset.
p.95 Presumptions arise in contexts where we have questions and need answers. And when sufficient evidence for a conclusive answer is lacking, we must, in the circumstances, settle for a more or less plausible one... Presumption is a thought instrumentality that so functions as to make it possible for us to do the best we can in circumstances where something must be done. And so presumption affords yet another instance where practical principles play a leading role on the stage of our cognitive and communicative practice. For presumption is, in the end, a practical device whose rationale of validation lies on the order of pragmatic considerations.
p.96 the validity of a presumption emerges ex post facto through the utility (both cognitive and practical) of the results it yields... Legitimation is thus available, albeit only through experiential retrovalidation, retrospective validation in the light of eventual experience. It is a matter of learning that a certain issue is more effective in meeting the needs of the situation than its available alternatives. Initially we look to promise and potential but in the end it is applicative efficacy that counts.
p.96 Presumptions are the instrument through which we achieve a favorable balance of trade in the complex trade-offs between ignorance of fact and mistake of belief - between unknowing and error.
p.97 All in all, presumption favors the usual and the natural - its tendency is one of convenience and ease of operation in cognitive affairs. For presumption is a matter of cognitive economy - of following "the path of least resistance" to an acceptable conclusion.
p.98 Presumption is a matter of cognitive economy... it is clearly the sensible way to begin... What is fundamental here is the principle of letting appearance be our guide to reality... The justifactory rationale for a policy of presumption lies in the human need for information... This role of presumption is absolutely crucial for cognitive rationality... Presumptions determine our "starter-set" of initial commitments, enabling us to make a start on whose basis further "inferential" reasoning may proceed... the mechanism of a presumption affords a most useful cognitive and communicative resource... Presumptions arise in contexts where we have questions and need answers. And when sufficient evidence for a conclusive answer is lacking, we must, in the circumstances, settle for a more or less plausible one.
p.98-99 Presumption is a thought instrumentality that so functions as to make it possible for us to do the best we can in circumstances where something must be done... Presumption, in sum, is an ultimately pragmatic resource... What justifies a presumption initially is a need: that is, the fact that we require an information gap to be filled and that the presumption accomplishes this for us.
p.99 the concession of presumptive status to our presystematic indications of credibility is the most fundamental principle of cognitive rationality. The details of presumption management are clearly negotiable in the light of eventual experience - and improvable over the course of time. But without a programmatic policy for presumption cognitive rationality cannot get under way at all.
p.99 For present purposes, then, the salient point is that presumption provides the basis for letting appearance be our guide to reality - of accepting the evidence as evidence of actual fact, by taking its indications as decisive until such time as suitably weighty counterindications come to countervail against them. What is at issue here is part of the operational code of agents who transact their cognitive business rationally.
p.99-100 when we indeed need or want here-and-now to resolve issues and fill informative gaps then those presumptions represent the most promising ways of doing so, affording us those means to accomplish our goals which - as best we can tell - offer the best prospect of success.
p.106 To be sure, the risk of deception and error is present throughout our inquiries: our cognitive instruments, like all other instruments, are never fail-proof.
p.107 We realize full well that such generalizations do not hold, however nice it would be if they did. Nevertheless we accept the theses at issue as principles of presumption. We follow the metarule: In the absence of concrete indications to the contrary, proceed as though such principles were true. Such principles of presumption characterize the way in which rational agents transact their cognitive business. Yet we adopt such practices not because we can somehow establish their validity, but because the cost-benefit advantage of adopting them is so substantial. [JLJ - one slight issue here: richly detailed cues are present in the environment which are brought to our attention by our ever-scheming brain, which lead us to modify our presumptions]
p.107 The justification of these presumptions is not the factual one of the substantive generalization, In proceeding in this way, you will come at correct information and will not fall into error. Rather, it is methodological justification. In proceeding in this way, you will efficiently foster the interests of the cognitive enterprise; the gains and benefits will, on the whole, outweigh the losses and costs.
p.110 As these deliberations indicate, our cognitive practices of trust and presumption are undergirded by a justificatory rationale whose nature is fundamentally economic. For what is at issue throughout is a system of procedure that assures for each participant the prospect of realizing the greatest benefit for the least cost.
p.157 The circumstances of human life are such that, like it or not, we need knowledge to guide our actions and to satisfy our curiosity. Without knowledge-productive inquiry we cannot resolve the cognitive and practical problems that confront a rational creature in making its way in this world.
p.177 But what is it that validates acting under the aegis of rationality and the objectivity that goes with it?
p.178 Why do we follow the... recommendations of [JLJ - experts]...? Because we know them to be correct - or at any rate highly likely to be true? Not at all! ...Rather, we accept them as guides only because we see them as more promising than any of the identifiable alternatives that we are in a position to envision. We accept them because they afford us the greatest available subjective probability of success - discernibly the best bet. We do not proceed with unalloyed confidence, but rather with the resigned recognition that we can do no better at the moment.
p.178-179 It is thus actually rational to do the apparently rational thing, provided that those appearances reflect the exercise of due care. [JLJ - not in the circumstance of warfare or game-playing, where an opponent may plan accordingly. Best to be considered unpredictable and force your opponent to waste resources defending against a wide variety of possibilities.]
p.179 In pursuing our goals, we do well to emulate the drowning man in clutching at the best available prospect, recognizing that even the most rationally laid scheme can misfire. [JLJ - in pursuing our goals, we do well to never be in a situation where we need to emulate a drowning man... Rescher's concept of "rationality" fails in a number of circumstances that call for patient maneuver with an adversary, such as the jockeying of corporate managers for promotion, the investment of money in a financial system, the selection of a college major, etc. Exactly how does one behave "rationally" in directing occupying forces in a foreign country? How does one "rationally" convince a telemarketer, or a spammer, to stop annoying you? Exactly how does a country "rationally" go about repaying 18.9 trillion dollars of debt? Please list the specific steps...]
p.181 Rational belief, action, and evaluation are possible only in situations where there are cogent grounds... for what one does. And the cogency of grounds is a matter of objective standards: cogency is not something variable and idiosyncratic... For a belief, action, or evaluation to qualify as rational, the agent must (in theory at least) be in a position to "give an account" of it on whose basis others can see that "it is only right and proper" for him to resolve the issue in that way.
p.189 The rational thing to do in resolving an issue is to make the best use of all the (relevant) information at our disposal... The rationality of our beliefs, actions, and evaluations is clearly a matter of the information that we can secure... Rationality... is an art of the possible - a matter of doing the best that is possible in the overall circumstances in which the agent functions - cognitive circumstances included... In this world we are constrained to decide, to operate, to plan, and to act in the light of incomplete information. When we [JLJ - do these things], we have no clear idea what eventual consequences will ensue... It lies in the inevitable nature of things that we must exercise our rationality amidst conditions of imperfect information... if rationality is to be something that we can actually implement then it has to be something whose demands we can meet in subideal conditions, conditions of incomplete information as we (inevitably) confront them.
p.189 The problem, then, is that rationality is "information-sensitive": exactly what qualifies as the most rational resolution of a particular problem of belief, action, or evaluation depends on the precise content of our data about the situation at issue.
p.190 We thus confront the "predicament of reason" generated by the confluence of the two considerations, that the rationality of a problem-resolution is "information-sensitive," and that in the real world our information is always incomplete. [JLJ - but you don't have to be rational - you just have to execute a scheme that works, in order to 'go on'. Rationality is only one scheme of many, and only gets you so far.]
p.191 The most we can ever do is to act in the light of the available information, which is generally incomplete.
p.202 we certainly and inevitably are at the center of our thought world. Our inquiries have to be conducted within our frame of reference. We have to pose our questions in line with our ideas, to frame our perplexities by means of our concepts, to consider our issues in our terminology... A condition of "questioner's prerogative" prevails - it is the person who puts the issue on the table who sets the frame of reference for determining what that issue involves - it is, after all, his question.
p.203 To qualify those of an alien culture as fully rational we must maintain both [JLJ - formatting added for emphasis]
- that they are conducting their inquiries intelligently by their own rules and also
- that in our sight these rules make good rational sense given their situation.
p.215 In science, as in war, the battles of the present cannot be fought effectively with the armaments of the past.
p.216 The history of science is a history of episodes of leaping to the wrong conclusions.
p.216 Progress in natural science is a matter of dialogue or debate between theoreticians and experimentalists. The experimentalists probe nature to see its reactions, to seek out phenomena. And the theoreticians take the resultant data and weave a theoretical fabric about them. Seeking to devise a framework of rational understanding, they construct their explanatory models to accommodate the findings that the experimentalists put at their disposal.
p.217 What we can detect, or find, in nature is always something that depends on the mechanisms by which we search.
p.219 In factual inquiry into the ways of the world we can do no better than to pose questions and canvass the currently visible alternatives. But the questions we can pose are limited by our conceptual horizons.
p.219-220 Ongoing scientific progress is not simply a matter of increasing accuracy by extending the numbers at issue in our otherwise stable descriptions of nature out to a few more decimal places. Significant scientific progress is genuinely revolutionary in involving a fundamental change of mind about how things happen in the world. Progress of this caliber is generally a matter... of changing the very framework itself.
p.221 The fallibility and corrigibility of our science means it cannot be viewed as providing definitive (let alone absolutely true) answers to its questions. We have no alternative but to see our science as both incomplete and incorrect in some (otherwise unidentifiable) respects... What we proudly vaunt as "scientific knowledge" is a tissue of hypotheses - of tentatively adopted contentions, many or most of which we will ultimately come to regard as quite untenable and in need of serious revision or perhaps even rejection.
p.221 If there is one thing we can learn from the history of science, it is that the scientific theorizing of one day is looked on by that of the next as flawed and deficient... And if we adopt... the modest view that we ourselves and our contemporaries do not occupy a privileged position in this respect, then we have no reasonable alternative but to suppose that much or all of what we ourselves vaunt as "scientific knowledge" is itself presumably wrong.
p.223 The complete realization of the aims of science is something that will ever remain in the realm of aspiration and not that of achievement.
p.235 We make do with the simple, but only up to the point when the demands of adequacy force additional complications on us.
p.240 En route to knowledge we must begin with information.
p.243 Knowledge is distinguished from mere information as such by its significance. In fact: Knowledge is simply particularly significant information - information whose significance exceeds some threshold level [JLJ - yes, but information useful to us in order to "go on."]
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