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p.2 Classical pragmatism as envisioned by C. S. Peirce was designed to provide a standard of objectivity, a test of the appropriateness of our factual beliefs. Its motivating rationale lay in the question: How are we to tell that our beliefs about the world... are objectively true and indeed... that they are actually meaningful in characterizing reality in the way that we intend?
p.2 knowledge as we have it is the product of an activity - that of inquiry and instigation.
[JLJ - investigation?]
p.3 pragmatism, as it originally took shape in Peirce's thought... The leading idea was that those principles which prove to be most successful in the course of utilization and application are (for that very reason) to be taken to be optimal.
p.15 Perhaps, then, pragmatism's truths are no more than Nietzschean "errors that we can get by with in this life." After all, we do sometimes find ourselves in the happy position that it can readily occur that all goes well in circumstances where we are far off the mark - where success in applications prevails despite our mistakes.
[JLJ - Perhaps we obsess with the true because - once we have it - we can use it as a guide to action. Why not just develop a practical guide to action, and not worry about any kind of truth tie-in? The manager of a store develops a business plan and a scheme that ought to work, in getting customers to come in a buy things with a demand level that allows a reasonable profit margin. He/she does not consult 'truths' in developing this business plan, but merely uses schemes or 'tricks' that 'usually work' from experience or maybe business school case studies. 'Truth' as such does not necessarily put food on the table - more likely would be the successful execution of practical, ethical 'tricks' or 'schemes' that 'often work.']
p.21 We live in a world where we have to make choices among alternatives.
[JLJ - Yes, but we should do so with a plan in mind - a clever, strategic plan - and one which is subtly different from the plan of our competitors, who are after the same things we are.]
p.24 Almost everything that we do has an aim or end. Even play, idleness, and tomfoolery have a purpose - to divert, to provide rest and recreation, to kill time... Pragmatism's concern for functional efficacy, for success in the realization of ends and purposes, is an inescapable determinative standard for an intelligent being's way of making its way in the world... Pragmatism is thus a multipurpose resource. Its approach to validation can of course be implemented in pretty much any purposive setting.
[JLJ - ...unless of course your purpose is to win a competition of sorts, in which case we must become strategic with our use of time and resources, and have a scheme of some kind.]
p.31 We humans are so situated that from our vantage point... various factors can and should be seen as goods - as aspects or components of what is in itself a quintessentially good end in its relation to us. Without achieving such goods, we cannot thrive as human beings - we cannot achieve the condition of well-being that Aristotle called "flourishing."
[JLJ - Perhaps when playing a complex game of strategy, what we need is for our diagnostic tests to show our position to be solid under best play by the opponent, and for it likely that opportunities in our favor will emerge down the road.]
p.35 Like various beliefs, various evaluations are palpably crazy.
[JLJ - Perhaps evaluation is properly examined in the only context it makes sense to do so: as part of a scheme for deciding how to 'go on.' The scheme calls for the evaluation, perhaps even specifies the technique for doing so, and maybe even the pre-decided follow-up actions to be taken, should the evaluation result be below a certain threshold, or instead, above. One could compare two cars in a parking lot, perhaps saying to oneself, 'I think that car there is shinier than that dull car over there,' to which someone else could counter, 'So what?' and to whatever we then answer, 'Yeah, so?" could be then asked. Evaluations are properly conducted with respect to an asked or unasked 'So what?' - they must matter to some degree, or one must have a choice riding on the answer. In a world without organization, in a world without decisions having to be made about how to 'go on,' - would evaluations have any kind of purpose?]
p.37 The capacity for intelligent choice makes us humans into rational agents, but it is only through our having appropriate values that the prospect of intelligent choice becomes open for us. The human situation being what it is, existential circumstances spread a vast range of possibilities our before us. At many junctures, life confronts us with alternative directions in which to proceed. And only through the evaluation of such alternatives can we effect a sensible (rationally appropriate and acceptable) choice among them. On this basis, values are instrumentalities that serve to make the satisfactory conduct of life possible.
p.37 values... are by nature functional instrumentalities since their mission is to canalize our action via our rational choices. They have objective impact, relating not to what we do prefer but to what we can and should appropriately deem preferable - that is, worthy of preference.
p.38 our values themselves... pivot not on mere wants and the vagaries of arbitrary choice in fortuitous preference, but on our best interests and real needs - on what is necessary to or advantageous for a person's well-being.
p.39 Evaluation is not at odds with reason but is a crucial component of its work... Evaluation... lies at the very heart and core of rationality. For, rationality is a matter of best serving our overall interests. The person who expends more effort in the pursuit of ends than they are worth is not just being wasteful but foolish, which is to say irrational.
[JLJ - Yes, but from the highest level, no matter what goal you pursue, there is always the thought of, "and this too shall pass," which makes the 'goal' itself kind of fleeting. How exactly is one to operate, when all things shall pass? My concept of being as (in part) a reveling in the present puts the pursuit of 'goals' in proper perspective - pursue yes, but live for today as well.]
p.40 the crucial question of evaluative rationality is not that of what we prefer, but that of what is in our best interests... what is good for us in the sense of fostering the realization of our needs.
p.43 Instrumental artifacts in matters of procedure - our beliefs, practices, and methods - shape our view of reality, so that our world-picture is itself an artifact, the product of inquiry and intellectual construction.
p.68 Intelligence arises through evolutionary processes because it represents one effective means of survival.
p.69 The knowledge that orients our activities in this world is itself the most practical of things
[JLJ - ...unless, like an advertisement, infomercial, or paid review for an amazon product, the 'knowledge' in question is placed for the purpose of steering your interests, where such 'knowledge' becomes less practical and more 'tainted.']
p.72 An evolutionary process must as such involve mechanisms of mutation and of selection. Mutation is needed to arrive at a plurality of (potentially competing) alternatives. Selection then enters in to provide for the survival of the somehow "fittest" alternative.
[JLJ - Alternatively, we can think in terms of evolutionary experimentation. If one experiments with variations in the way a process produces a living individual - by chance a certain slight variation might produce a survival or reproductive advantage. 'Mutation' is perhaps too harsh a term for a change in a successful process that just happens to become - after a harsh testing in the crucible of the life world - even more successful.]
p.76 Pragmatism is an approach to philosophical deliberations which - in appropriate circumstances - endorses "what works out successfully."
p.97 One of the fundamental claims of epistemology is that increased confidence in the correctness of our estimates can always be purchased at the price of decreased accuracy... With any sort of estimate, there is always a characteristic trade-off relationship between the evidential security of the estimate on the one hand (determinable on the basis of its probability or degree of acceptability), and its contentual definiteness (exactness, detail, precision, etc.) on the other.
p.100 In ordinary life, we content ourselves with what is so roughly and normally.
[JLJ - ...only because this 'trick' usually 'works' - our practical schemes for going on usually require as input no more than 'what is so roughly and normally,' and because we must make intuitive leaps at all times and in all circumstances in order to 'go on.']
p.100 all across the board, from matters of high generality to detailed matters of particular procedure, our policies regarding rational inquiry and information management are decided by practical considerations of purposive efficiency.
p.120 It is thus important, even when we recognize the utility of a trial-and-error technique, that this be thought of not as a blind groping among all conceivable alternatives but as a carefully guided search among the really promising alternatives.
p.133 Synopsis
- Pragmatism has its own characteristic approach to the classic problem of justifying induction.
- It views induction in the light of purposive methodology aimed at securing general information about the world's workings.
- And in this light it sees the step from the past applicability of generalizations to their future efficacy not as an inference at all but as a practical resort.
- The validity of this practice proceeds in the order of practical rather than theoretical reason, and thereby validates a procedural presumption rather than a factual conclusion.
- This shift of perspective obviates various traditional objections.
- For at bottom the validation of a procedural modus operandi is something very different from the establishment of factual conjecture.
p.133 The present chapter will consider a justification of induction articulated along strictly pragmatic lines. Be it noted that "induction" is here to be construed generically to embrace any systemic rational process for the validation of an empirical generalization.
p.134 instantial evidence cannot provide a rational warrant for accepting an empirical generalization. In this frame of reference, the basic problem is seen to be that of justifying claims about the future... in terms of facts about the past-cum-present
p.135 It is undeniably possible to look upon an induction as an argument: a process of drawing a general conclusion of inherently future applicability from evidence regarding the past... induction bases future-directed claims on past-directed evidence. But this is in fact irrelevant from the purposive aspect: the drawing of future-related claims from past-directed evidence may well describe the procedure of the enterprise, but is irrelevant to its goals.
p.135 The mode of justification appropriate to anything methodological... is the inherent question "Does it work - that is, does it attain its intended purposes?"
[JLJ - Yes, but "Does it work?" is itself too general a statement - does it work in general, or does it work against all competing schemes that aim to make it NOT work? One can prepare a high-school football team for an upcoming game using a variety of techniques, including practicing plays the opponent might use, using "mock" offenses and defenses that mimic the opponent, obtaining a level of physical fitness, etc. This "works" in general, but does not guarantee anything other than being "ready in best effort" for the upcoming game, where the opponent is likely using the same techniques. "Does it work?" must be qualified with specifically which situations are being investigated. A furniture salesman might practice sales or "closing" techniques which "work" against all customers, but if your customer cleverly avoids the showroom and orders online or from another store, the game has now changed and "Does it work?" must now be made appropriate for the larger game being played. When we ponder then play a move in a complex game of strategy, perhaps all we can achieve in our practical analysis efforts is to be 'ready in best effort', against whatever emerges down the line, based on practical yet time-limited diagnostic tests - which we intelligently construct in order to estimate this best-readiness.]
p.138 a practice is rationally warranted when it can be shown it may work, and there is no reason to think that an alternative method affords a better promise of success.
[JLJ - Yes Nicholas, but in the world of business people can talk a good game, and often there are several ways to proceed, each with their own risks and rewards. Certain things in practice can be debated endlessly, especially where there is limited 'data' upon which to make decisions. Many ideas 'may work,' it may take pilot programs and expensive consultants to gain necessary insight into the nature of the market and the consumers that drive it.]
p.139 On the methodological perspective, the pivotal issue is not the factual one of establishing an empirical generalization, but rather that of legitimating an operational program of action. The objective at this level of discussion is not establishing the truth of a generalization but validating the rationality of a practice
p.141 When we continue to use a method that succeeds, we implement a certain practical precept of action. Its legitimation does not reside in the fact that adherence to this precept cannot possibly fail us. Rather, our justification inheres in the fact that this step is rational because it's the best we can do under the circumstances... The rationality of the practical sphere is such that given a record of past success on the part of a method, the natural presumption is now in its favor. The crucial point is that the "it works" at issue in the practical precept is not "it always does work" (as a thesis) but derives from a dialectic of rationality that "it works" = insofar as the only evidence we can hope to gather to show, i.e., as far as our relevant data can possibly reveal.
[JLJ - Please explain, Mr. Rescher, how such incomprehensible actions in the battle of Quebec (1759) were the outcome of a rational practice. In business, the military, and in games of strategy, we simply ponder and eventually use tricks that work, which we select at the spur of the moment, when we decide how to 'go on,' since we have to decide at every waking moment exactly and precisely how to 'go on.' The British leader Wolfe could only write the following text: "I had the honour to inform you today that it is my duty to attack the French army. To the best of my knowledge and ability, I have fixed upon that spot (JLJ - the 'spot' happening to be L'Anse-au-Foulon, a cove situated west of the city, three kilometres upstream from Cap Diamant. It lies at the bottom of a 53-metre (174 ft) high cliff leading to the plateau above, and was protected by a battery of guns. It is not known why Wolfe selected Foulon, as the original landing site was to be further up the river) where we can act with most force and are most likely to succeed. If I am mistaken I am sorry for it and must be answerable to His Majesty and the public for the consequences." This hardly makes his actions rational, they were in retrospect a maneuver of circumstance when pressed by time for action, and represent nothing more than a military opinion, which was selected for action, based on intelligence, training and guesswork. Wolfe commented to his personal staff that, of his three brigadiers (supporting officers of lower rank), "two of them were Cowards and one a Villain". Wolfe - possibly dying from tuberculosis and even likely pondering a forced the return to England for medical reasons - simply bet the future of the British Empire in America on a scheme (which he kept to himself until the last possible moment) hatched from reconnaisance work and chance knowledge obtained from a deserter of a passing French resupply effort that night, which could be used as a cover for a surprise landing. In summary, there is no practice here of methods that succeed, only a clever scheming, ultimately only a decision made on how to 'go on.' The angered French, determined to revenge their loss of New France, supported the Americans in 1778 in their 'revolution,' and possibly changed the outcome of that war. If there was anything rational to these actions, perhaps Mr. Rescher, you can point out where I went wrong.]
p.143 Fundamentally, the issue is thus not at all one of validating an inference from past to future, but rather of validating a practice for establishing a generalization - a practice that places the locus of evidence for generalizations into the orbit of case-in-hand.
[JLJ - Yes, and the human mind operates by categorizing in order to follow a scheme for 'going on'. We leap to inferences often, but only where our experience indicates that it is safe and practical to do so. We generalize by asking, 'What type of an xxxx do we have here?' because our scheme for going on will direct us to take action a for case A and action b for case B.]
p.144-145 In the final analysis, the validation of our inductive practices is seen to lie not in their demonstrative success in furnishing truths (which, since general truths are at issue, they could not in principle do), but in their providing the instruments by which we can effectively manage our practical affairs and successfully find our way about within the realm of nature.
p.147 As with any tool or instrument, the question of evaluation takes the form of a pragmatic assessment: Does it work? Does it produce the desired results? Is it successful in practice? The central issue is a matter of "survival of the fittest" with fitness assessed in terms of the practical objectives of the rational enterprise... The pivotal issue is that of working out best.
But what does "best" mean here? ...The governing standards of the Western tradition of human rationality are presented by the goals of explanation, prediction, and control... I have taken the position here that this standard is provided by considerations of practice and is inherent in the use to which conceptual schemes are put in the conduct of our affairs. In the Western intellectual tradition, the ultimate standards of rationality are defined by a very basic concept of knowledge-wed-to-practice, and their ultimate validation lies in the combination of theoretical and practical success: i.e., success of theory in the effective guidance of action.
p.149 With respect to methodology, at any rate, the pragmatists were surely in the right - there is certainly no better way of justifying a method than by establishing that "it works" with respect to the specific tasks held in view.
p.171 The rational conjecture at issue is not to be a matter of mere guesswork, but one of responsible estimation in a strict sense of the term. It is not just an estimate of the true answer that we want, but an estimate that is sensible and defensible: tenable, in short.
[JLJ - Rescher keeps missing my main point - that what we truly desire is a practical scheme that works, that lets us/helps us 'decide' incrementally how to 'go on.' This scheme would call for such 'responsible estimation' and would even suggest how and in what way we should do it. Once armed with such a scheme, we merely have to execute it - provided that it is mature enough to tell us exactly what to do in each specific case we encounter - that our method of categorization-for-action is sensitive and complete, and the suggested actions are appropriate, realizable and ultimately rewarding. More importantly, as Schutz pointed out, such a scheme must have both an 'I can do it!' and an 'I can do it again!' quality to it.]
p.172 We can and do aim at the truth in our inquiries even in circumstances where we cannot make foolproof pretentions to its attainment, and where we have no alternative but to settle for the best available estimate of the truth of the matter - that estimate for which the best case can be made out according to the appropriate standards of rational cogency. And systematization in the context of the available background information is nothing other than the process of making out this rationally best case.
p.209 the experts... offer us conflicting judgments and discordant solutions... this occurs not because the experts are incompetent but because the problems are intractable. They are of such complexity that scientific analysis and expert deliberations simply cannot settle matters.
p.209 The trouble with complexity is the difficulty it creates for decision making by rational calculation... There are simply too many operative factors and too many convoluted interrelationships for the issue to be resolved by rational calculation... The profuse details and their elaborate interrelationships prevent rational calculation from affording a workable means of resolution... The root reason for the long-term impredictability of significant social developments is not far to seek. For one thing, chance and chaos come into it: the course of events over the longer term in matters of social interest depend too much on subtle interactions which, while virtually indiscernible at present and negligible in the short term, can make an enormous difference to what happen over the long term.
[JLJ - All the more reason to use heuristics to reduce the level of complexity to more manageable levels, via categorization-for-action assessments. The world might be complex, Nicholas, but humans are armed to the teeth with weapons such as rules of thumb, practical procedures, youtube videos as "how tos", "leading indicators," etc. Take your whining about the complexity of the world elsewhere. I am busy reducing it to acceptable levels and progressing towards the goals I want to achieve.]
p.210 genuinely self-developing systems contribute formatively to their own development over time... Such systems... inevitably have aspects that are unpredictable because there are always some situations to which they make an ad hoc response and about which they simply "don't make up their mind until they get there," as it were. Complexity is the inseparable accompaniment of modernity.
p.211 computer-automated problem solving is one of the wonders of the age. Computers fly planes, land rocket modules on the moon, win chess competitions, develop mathematical proofs.
[JLJ - Yes, but they also make mistakes in all of the above when the programming is not sufficiently thorough and when the testing is not complete.]
p.212 We frequently find that in such matters of public policy decision even the most well-intentioned of measures result in unforeseen and unfavorable consequences... in complex modern society there is often no way to get a rational grip on the consequences of public policy measures and employ "scientific intelligence" to foretell the consequences. There are no calculable solutions here... Rational calculation and scientific analysis leaves us in the lurch. The best that we can can do is to feel our way cautiously step by step - to experiment, to try plausible measures on a small scale and see what happens, and to let experience be our guide.
p.214 there are no foolproof arrangements... Pragmatism pivots on the issue of applicable efficacy and efficiency, but amidst the complexity of real-world processes and interactions, it is often too difficult or impracticable to say with warranted confidence what the efficacy of certain measures is going to be.
p.225 Only through reference to the real world as a common object and shared focus of our diverse and imperfect epistemic strivings are we able to effect communicative contact with one another.
p.233 With presumption we take to be so what we could not otherwise derive... presumptively justified beliefs are the raw materials of cognition. They represent contentions that - in the absence of preestablished counterindications - are acceptable to us "until further notice," thus permitting us to make a start in the venture of cognitive justification without the benefit of pre-justified materials... They are entitled to remain in place until displaced by something better.
[JLJ - Alternatively, a presumption represents something that we have "pre-decided" to be the case - we have thought the matter through carefully, and decided ahead of time that if we see simple obvious things appropriately placed in the environment, such as what appears to be a cat on a mat, then - the current predicament being what it is - we probably should just assume for now that there is a cat on the mat. We can verify it later if we like, or are suspicious. We can also pre-decide that in certain situations, things are probably not as they seem to be. On a recent trip to London in a touristy area I spotted a team of con-men and -women playing a 'cup and ball game', trying to get people to wager 'pretend money' on being able to find a ball under a set of 3 cups after simple movements that were easy to unravel. The lady playing the game (who was part of the team) kept 'winning' and it is safe to assume that things here are not as they seem - it is likely the 'bait' stage of a simple con game, and to be avoided.]
p.239 Like the mountain climber or the dope addict, the true artist does what he does because he must.
[JLJ - I would say the true artist gets up each morning and rededicates him/herself to his/her passion, or he/she eventually and gradually loses interest and ends up trying other things.]
p.255-257 One of the classic objections to pragmatism is that the position is too indefinite - the pragmatists never really made up their minds as to just what it is that they were proposing to maintain... the indefiniteness objection to pragmatism... fails to acknowledge and heed the distinction between a specific doctrine and a generic program. Like most other significant philosophical isms... pragmatism is not a specific theory or doctrine, but a general line of approach, a program in short. As such the position has many forms of implementation and development... to count oneself as a pragmatist is merely to stand committed to one specific sector of the broader spectrum.
[JLJ - This is why my philosophy calls for the scheme for going on to sit atop any concerns with the practical, and with pragmatism. Our scheme for going on should call for pragmatism - when it makes sense to be pragmatic - when it is wise to do so. Life is too short to be practical, at all times and at all places. Be practical yes, when wisdom calls for practicality as a means for going on in our current predicament, but also find ways to revel in the present. Pragmatism does not rise to the level of - and essentially replace - profound wisdom, or even dictate precise steps in a way of living.]
p.263 any sensible pragmatism will orient itself to what people-at-large actually need and what people-in-general appropriately value.
[JLJ - Oh, so you are implying that there is a pragmatic pragmatism - as opposed to the other kinds....]
p.289 humanity's condition... part of this nature is the urge to know, to comprehend the what and how and why of things. But here we can only go so far - we cannot see beyond the horizon, the limit determined for us by our mode of emplacement in nature's scheme of things.
[JLJ - This does not mean that we are powerless when confronting the future, we can assume a posture towards it where we are generally ready for whatever it produces, and we can adapt to whatever we are surprised by.]
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