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xix In this book... I defend a doctrine sometimes called "naive realism," which holds that perception gives us direct awareness of the external world and that it enables us to know (some of) what that world is like.
[JLJ - Curiously, it does not truly matter exactly what the world is like - close enough is usually good enough to decide or even to improvise how to 'go on' within it. Perception is kind of useless unless it is intelligently combined with attention to the details that matter, within our current predicament, and with an imagined synthesis of what is missing, including the driving forces, in that part of the world that we do not directly perceive. It is within this synthesized combination of the real and the unreal but likely that we spend our conscious time, and which practically enables/allows us to 'go on' within our current predicament. To say that we 'know' is nothing more than a social broadcast that we are (possibly, but not necessarily) prepared to act, based on an experienced confidence that a certain X is truly or practically a case of Y.]
I. Indroduction: The Problem of Perceptual Knowledge
p.1 all of the objects you are now seeing are images existing in your mind - which you are in the habit of mistaking for real, physical objects.
[JLJ - ...so? If you accept the fact that the purpose of the mind is not only to perceive the real but to improvise how to go on, from within the real - whatever that is - the above makes more sense.]
p.3 Direct realists maintain... that we are directly aware of real physical objects in perception and that this explains how we know about the nature of those objects... In subsequent chapters, I will defend direct realism against all comers.
[JLJ - Once again, the real does not tell you how to 'go on,' from within the real. The real and the imagined are both inputs to the improvisational process of the mind that produces, out of nothing, essentially what is a directional arrow which we subsequently follow, in order to 'go on,' and keep going on, within our current predicament.]
II. The Lure of Radical Skepticism
p.9 In general, conclusions are only as good as the premises they are based on.
p.13 Most of the things we think we know, including everything we think we know about the physical world, we learn through sensory perception... A lot of what we know of the physical world is the result of scientific theorizing or inference, but those theories and inferences are ultimately based on observations.
p.14 If the thing you are seeing is not a physical object, the next natural candidate is that it is a mental image (what else could it plausibly be?). These mental images are traditionally called "sense data," so that is what I will call them here.
p.22 Justification from the first-person perspective is what matters to us. The reason is that we have only our own perspective from which to decide what to believe. We never have the omniscient point of view
III. Easy Answers to Skepticism
p.38 knowledge is hierarchical, in that some things we know depend (in a logical, or justificatory sense) on others. For instance, I may know that my car has a full tank of gas, because I see the fuel gauge pointing to "F."
[JLJ - Wouldn't it just be better to say, that we are prepared to act as if our car has a full tank of gas, since the gauge is on "F", or that most likely, the car has a full tank of gas, baring any unlikely malfunction of the gauge, or a clever trick by friends, etc.? It seems to me that whenever we say we know something, we ought to be able to recast that thought in a way that doesn't involve using the word 'know,' and instead uses a word that involves an act...]
IV. A Version of Direct Realism
p.51 This chapter and the next form the core of my positive theory of perceptual knowledge. They explain exactly what form of direct realism I am defending. My direct realism embodies two main theses: first, the thesis that perception is direct awareness of external reality; second, the thesis that we have noninferential knowledge of the external world as a result of perception.
[JLJ - Yes, but evolution has so attuned our perception of the real word to perceive what we need to know in order to survive. A subtle 'how much should I care about that?' is asked to most everything we perceive, and if dwelling for any more than an instant is not truly necessary for survival, we likely continue our pre-planned or scanning activity and build a strategic situational awareness.]
p.51 What is awareness? ...In my usage, awareness is always awareness of something.
[JLJ - Survival requires that we categorize the world around us into objects which we can then use to predict beghavior, based on subtle cues and larger scale pattern matching. Evolution has seen to it that successful life forms are provided with practically useful sensors and next, informed classifications, which help predict behavior and otherwise allow one to improvise how to 'go on', at every waking moment. As far as 'awareness is always awareness of something,' we can be aware of the absence of something, such as the absence of traffic on the opposite lane of a divided highway, suggesting perhaps that the opposite lane of the road is blocked ahead. There can be an absence of sound if a choir misses a cue to begin singing, or an absence of dogs barking. ]
p.52 The kind of mental state involved in awareness I call an apprehension.
p.53 Apprehensions are a particular species of representation... Apprehensions are mental representations - they exist in the mind, unlike pictures and statements, which exist in the publicly observable, physical world... apprehensions represent their contents as actualized.
p.54 Apprehensions have the function of representing the world as it actually is... In sum, we can define an apprehension as an assertive mental representation. Beliefs are a kind of apprehension, as are the experiences we have when perceiving things.
[JLJ - Yes, but only because the sensor that we possess and been so attuned to do so. We have no apprehensions of radio waves carrying information or music, but we can build devices to do so. Our apprehensions must first be received through sensors and refined through attention-grabbing classification systems that are working and operational.]
p.57 Now we are in a position, finally, to understand the first part of my direct realist theory, which we had left at an intuitive level in chapter I: the thesis that perception is direct awareness of the external world. This means that in perception, we are aware of (some parts or aspects of) the external world, and this awareness is not based on the awareness of anything else.
[JLJ - ...yet awareness itself will not tell you how to 'go on' within which you are aware.]
p.57 when you perceive an object, three things happen:
- There is a purely internal mental state called a "perceptual experience" or "sensory experience."
- There is something in the external world that at least roughly satisfies the content of that experience. This thing is called the "object of perception." ...
- There is a causal relation between the experience and the object, that is, the object is causing you to have the experience.
p.58 Perceptual experiences (also called "sensory experiences") are defined as the purely internal, mental components of perception.
p.60 the second condition in my analysis of perception... requires that the content of the perceptual experience be at least approximately satisfied.
p.65 some sort of causal connection between the object and one's experience is necessary for perceiving an object.
p.65 Perceptual experiences are the purely internal states that are involved in all perception.
p.66 Perceptual experiences typically have three aspects:
- their sensory qualia,
- their representational content, and
- their forcefulness.
p.66 A quale (plural: "qualia") is a kind of property of an experience. The quale of an experience is what the experience is like, from the subject's point of view; in other words, what it is like for the person who is having the experience.
p.71 It seems that the qualia of our perceptual experiences function to simultaneously give us information about the world and give us emotional reactions or desires.
p.73-74 if we do not attribute representational content to perceptual experiences, it becomes not only impossible to justify the beliefs we form about the external world, but impossible even to account for why we form those beliefs.
p.74 a perceptual experience has content... this content is propositional... it is something that is either true or false - a perceptual experience represents something to be the case.
[JLJ - I would argue that this may be true, but that it is not necessarily informative to know that it is the case that an unidentifiable object is moving in the shadows at some distance away, which might in fact just be the rustling of leaves. If a sound is heard just above the threshold of the background noise, is it in fact the case that we have heard something at all? When extracting signal from noise, all bets are off concerning what is to be the case.]
p.79 Forcefulness... is the fact that, in the experience, it seems to one that something satisfying the content of the experience actually exists, here and now.
p.81 In my view, perception is essentially the direct awareness of external particulars.
[JLJ - Perception is also evolution's solution to the practical internalizing of the external, so we can sense the driving forces of our predicament and 'go on' within them.]
p.81 The fundamental mistake that seems to make indirect realism plausible... is a confusion between an object of awareness and a vehicle of awareness. An object of awareness is that of which one is aware. A vehicle of awarness is that by which one is aware of it.
p.81 Our awareness of external things consists of our having apprehensions that are appropriately related to those things; this does not mean we are aware of those apprehensions.
p.82 What I am claiming... is that our awareness of external things does not depend upon awareness of perceptual experiences, nor of any other mental phenomena.
p.84 the dual role of "appearances": they are both representations and things represented, both the mental states by which we are aware of things and the things of which we are aware.
[JLJ - It is truly to hard to distance ourselves from the representations we see and our almost automatic classification of these representations into objects. The mind operates kind of on autopilot as it tries to make sense of what we see and to cover up or make us unaware of the process it uses to do so, as the classification process happens or executes in real time. It is truly as if these objects are there in front of us, period. An alternate or more sophisticated interpretation would be that we are experiencing in our conscious mind a profound 'trick that works', both in 1. producing the classification results of perception, and 2. in the hiding of the details of the mechanism by which the apprehension 'trick' is performed.]
V. A Version of Foundationalism
p.93 Knowledge is traditionally defined, approximately, as justified true belief.
[JLJ - Knowledge is also information deemed to be timely, relevant and actionable, and therefore useful, since we must improvise how to 'go on' at every waking moment, and must grasp at something.]
p.94 my proposed definition of knowledge... awareness in the form of beliefs
p.96 My position, then, is that our perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences on which they are based.
[JLJ - As humans in a constant predicament, we are making decisions at all times, 24/7/365, on what we believe is real, based on our experiences and reasonable leaps of intuition, in order to 'go on.' We simply cannot ponder things forever or be skeptical of everything. A clock is ticking and things are changing and time is passing and tomorrow will soon be here. We have to/ought to take 'short cuts' in whatever we do, but wisely we combine this with a reasonable amount of paranoia that things are not as they seem - ultimately we have to make leaps of faith and so create our world - we believe - and make decisions on what is real and what is not, in order to 'go on,' within our current predicament, or forever lose the opportunities of the moment or the immediate future that may otherwise disappear forever.]
p.97 to say "The number 7 is red" would be a category error, since numbers cannot be colored; only physical objects and light can be colored.
[JLJ - My niece Carolyn experiences synesthesia, where she has described to me the colors that numbers represent to her. See wikipedia entry on Synesthesia. So as far as "The number 7 is red" being a "category error", speak for yourself.]
p.98-99 My theory is a version of foundationalism. Foundationalism says that there are certain beliefs, the so-called "foundational beliefs," which we are justified in holding and which do not depend on any other beliefs for their justification. Perceptual beliefs, in my view, are foundational. Notice that the definition of foundational beliefs does not say that they do not depend on anything else for their justification; it says they do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. In my view, perceptual beliefs certainly do depend on something else for their justification: namely, perceptual experiences.
[JLJ - Notice that Huemer's foundational 'perceptual experiences' are a kind of 'trick that works,' which is the center of my own philosophy that the mind is a collector, ponderer and executor of tricks that work - especially social ones copied from others - and which expertly catalogs, stores for future use, and brings to our conscious attention the trick or scheme that is likely to work, at the exact time that it can be used, within our current predicament, and exactly when we are pondering how to 'go on.' If we base our beliefs on a foundation of 'tricks that work,' we can execute the 'trick,' and provided that the trick is moral, ethical and practical, it just might 'work' in our present predicament. Walk in to any business - such as a car dealer - and look around - you will see everywhere experienced tricks that work, and in the process of being executed, for separating you from your money. I would further modify or broaden Huemer's thesis to say that one can base a belief on the foundation of a refined 'trick that works,' such as evolution-refined perception and the general-purpose utility that perceptual awareness gives us for 'going on' in our predicament. Yes, since perception is a useful 'trick that works', that ought to work, we can base our beliefs on that. Perhaps artificial intelligence can likewise use as a foundation 'synthetic' perception and classification systems/techniques, once they have been refined to the level of a 'trick that works,' and so therefore represent when executed a trick that 'ought' to work, and further where there is little reason to believe they won't work.]
p.99 Phenomenal Conservatism... If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that P.
[JLJ - Yes, and if time runs out, or we are in a predicament of sorts and need to make a quick assessment of things, then our first-order guess - in the absence of any evidence of a trick or misperception - might just have to be accepted as an indicator of what is real or possible, and in order to 'go on.']
p.102 Foundational beliefs are defined to be beliefs that do not depend upon other beliefs for their justification
p.103 Why should we accept my proposed principle of foundational justification? I claim that PC is self-evident, once it is seen in its proper light.
[JLJ - Yawn... is is 2019, 18 years after this book has been written and there has been no grand surge of interest in 'PC.' Strange, considering that 'PC' is 'self evident.' So I would say swing and a miss, Huemer. You need to refine your argument (or I would even add, provide one) to make what is apparently 'self evident' more evident.]
p.104 A rational person can be mistaken about what will satisfy his goals, in which case he will do the thing that it appears to him will satisfy his goals rather than the thing that actually will.
[JLJ - ...which is why we cannot put all our eggs in the 'rationality' basket. Sorry, Nicholas Rescher. Certain occupations such as investing and business and warfare are confronted with appearances which may be deceiving. In these cases, we must be strategic and operate with fallback positions. There is nothing guaranteed, ever, so to operate as such is simply foolish. It is rational to proceed towards a goal with realistic expectations and with an arsenal of experienced 'tricks that work,' and to operate always from practical or seasoned methods which can flexibly change when the driving forces change, or when the unexpected happens.]
p.105 Consider... the argument you have just read [JLJ - in support of the author's principle of Phenomenal Conservatism]. No doubt some philosophers will accept it, while others will not. Which ones will accept it? The ones to whom it seems correct, of course. Even if you do not accept it, you still will be thinking in accordance with the rules of phenomenal conservatism. The difference will merely be that to you, it does not seem correct. There is no (rational) escape from the reliance on how things strike you.
[JLJ - A very clever way to 'argue'. If you reject my argument, you do so using the very principle involved which I am trying to get you to accept. The proper response to this for argument's sake is, "By claiming that it is 'self evident' you simply have not offered any kind of argument at all." Huemer's argument that his critics will either accept or reject his argument is flawed - if it is correct they will instead do what I have done - modify it slightly and take credit for the modification. In complex matters, such as buying a home, deciding to have surgery, buying a new or used car, deciding to sue a neighbor who has negligently allowed a contractor to damage your air conditioner, the matter in front of us is too complicated to analyze correctly using just our own perceptions, which are good but not refined to the level where they can appreciate important yet hidden details. In these cases, we might consider wisely replacing our initial opinions by those of an expert, such as Consumer Reports when buying a car, or a legal expert, and act accordingly. You cannot argue your way around the fact that the situation facing you in your predicament might be complex to the point that it is unclear how to proceed, even when armed with the opinions of multiple experts. Averaging expert opinions or constructing a system where experts 'vote' does not guarantee that the results of the arrived at decision in this new 'perception' will be rational.]
p.107 the rule of phenomenal conservatism underlies... our practice of argumentation
p.107 I think the principle of phenomenal conservatism underlies judgement in general. I think that reflection will reveal that all judgement, whether inferential or not, is a process in which one accepts a proposition on the basis of how things seem to oneself.
[JLJ - ...and for that reason is perhaps useful for game theory. The calculations we perform on the machine represent first an artificial perception - one the machine makes but does not understand, and then subsequently makes judgements based on these perceptions, which it likewise does not understand, and finally takes actions based on these judgements, which as before it still does not understand. The 'artificial perceptions' are perhaps refined through competition and ultimately represent 'what works' in practice. Ultimately the machine makes moves in a game, driven by clever perceptions and judgements reduced to the level of simple counting. However, such perceptions on 'how things seem' are usually formed by us using 'tricks that work', or that we perceive will work, in arriving at an answer. We say to ourselves, 'I know how much it will cost to replace my roof' because one believes in a formula published online which tells you how to construct such an estimate yourself, using the surface area of your roof, a cost multiplier based on your zip code, and a complexity factor which takes into account the height above ground and the steepness or gabled nature of the roof. We know or judge essentially, because we decide to trust experienced 'tricks that work', which produce answers when executed or useful results as we 'go on.' IMHO, judgement should be looked at as its part in a scheme to go on which calls for a judgement, and often the method to be used. ]
p.114 phenomenal conservatism... implies that justification is relative to an individual.
[JLJ - Much as how a member of the Supreme Court issues a position in a contested case and gives a justification for it. It is and remains the opinion of just one unelected person who survived a political process to get seated on the Supreme Court.]
p.114 it is reasonable, other things being equal, to believe things are as they appear.
[JLJ - ...yet, what if the 'things' in question are a group of normal-looking people who are in fact con-artists out to scam you out of your money? It is reasonable to assume only that the individual you are interacting with is in fact using 'tricks that work', of some unknown level of sophistication, in order to advance his or her own agenda. These 'tricks' might not be more than polite social gestures and smiles, aiming to put one at ease, but they might also be part of an elaborate scam to get you to give them money. Every day I get a phone call in Chinese which says, in effect, that I have a problem of some kind, a document needs my signature, and that I need to call a certian number in order to fix it. I get this call everyday, for several months. It is an obvious scam, but I would not be getting the call if it did not work on at least some individuals. Lately it has been occasionally blocked by my phone company, but the trickster, whoever they are, keeps modifying the call message to try to avoid it being blocked. On the other hand, certain things by their very nature do not try to trick you - for example, something with the appearance of a tree is likely a tree and not a tree-facade. A tricky trickster will go to great lengths to 'appear' to be a non-trickster. One must, in the end, use trickier or essentially more practical 'tricks that work' to defend oneself against commonplace 'tricks that work.']
p.115 believing only what is justified for you is doing the best you can to get to the truth.
[JLJ - When we use 'tricks that work' in order to 'go on,' we are not aiming at any kind of truth, we merely are managing our predicament. We do not necessarily believe that a 'trick that works', will work, we merely grasp at it because we have to grasp at something, and it might offer to us the best prospects, all things considered, at the present moment. If this trick does not work after using it for a while, we can always try another trick from our bag of tricks. Ask any detective, the truth often lies hidden, and doing the best you can to get to the truth might involve using tricks that work.]
VI. Objections to Direct Realism
p.123 A relational property is a property that depends on the relationship between two or more things. An intrinsic property is a property of an object that does not depend on the object's relation to anything else
VII. An Objection to Indirect Realism: The Problem of Spatial Properties
VIII. The Direct Realist's Answer to Skepticism
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