p.5 Commanders must approach operational problems from a holistic
systems perspective. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 defines a system as "a functionally related group of elements forming
a complex whole."
p.6 A microchip may have billions of internal circuits
and therefore great structural complexity, but its responses to a wide range of inputs are entirely predictable. It
is therefore interactively simple.
p.6 Interactive complexity makes a system more challenging
and unpredictable than structural complexity. These systems are non linear because they are not proportional, replicable,
or additive, and the link between cause and effect is ambiguous. They are inherently unstable, irregular, and inconsistent.
The most complex systems are those that are both structurally and interactively complex. However, even a structurally simple
system can be interactively complex and therefore unpredictable.
p.6 Reductionism and analysis are not as useful with interactively
complex systems because they lose sight of the dynamics between the components. The study of interactively complex
systems must be systemic rather than reductionist, and qualitative rather than quantitative, and must use different
heuristic approaches rather than analytical problem solving.
p.7 The speed with which even irregular forces learn and adapt
adds a temporal dimension to complexity. The ability to learn and adapt while fighting marks future adversaries
and the societies from which they come as complex adaptive systems.
p.8 Complexity is significant to commanders as a characteristic of operational
problems. An operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is
and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it.
Note that not all discrepancies require action, and these are more accurately called "concerns."
p.9 Ill-structured problems are the most interactively complex,
non-linear, and chaotic - and therefore the most challenging. Unlike well- or medium-structured problems, professionals
will disagree about how to solve this type of problem, what should be the end state, and whether the desired end state is
even achievable. At the root of this lack of professional consensus is the difficulty in agreeing on the structure
of the problem. Unlike medium structured problems, it is not clear what action to take, because the nature of the
problem itself is not clear.
p.10 As John Schmitt notes, "Understanding a wicked problem is not
a matter of capturing reality sufficiently correctly, but of constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in
dealing with the reality."
p.10-11 Understanding the problem and conceiving a solution are identical
and simultaneous cognitive processes... Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel...
Since each wicked problem is a one-of-a-kind situation, it requires a custom solution rather than a standard solution modified
to fit circumstances... Solutions to ill-structured problems are better-or-worse, not right-or wrong... Ill-structured
problems are interactively complex... Every solution to an ill-structured problem is a ‘one-shot operation.’
... There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill structured problem... Ill-structured
problems have no ‘stopping rule
p.12 if the problem is unstructured (professionals cannot agree
on how to solve the problem)... then it is crucial to begin by starting to identify and understand the operational
problem systemically. This is one of the functions of operational art.
p.15 Synthesis: The combining of the constituent elements
of separate material or abstract entities into a single or unified entity. Note that synthesis is the opposite of
analysis. To understand a complex adaptive system, one must first synthesize a base of knowledge from an examination
of the components of the system and their various relationships. The system as a whole determines how the component
parts behave.
p.16 the commander’s appreciation and the campaign design - are the
major components of a campaign plan and are the expression of operational art. They establish the framework, or structure,
necessary for detailed implementation planning.
p.19 The complexity of the situation and the duration of a campaign
make learning and adapting essential for achieving operational goals. Campaigns confront ill-structured problems
that defy complete understanding and thorough knowledge. Therefore, campaigning commanders must continually act
in order to learn. Just as important, they must create a system for learning as they act.
p.20 Appreciation is the act of estimating the qualities
of things and giving them their proper value. It is essentially an understanding of the nature or meaning or quality or magnitude
of the situation before you. For the purposes of military operations, an "appreciation" allows the commander
to design, plan, execute, and - most importantly - adapt his actions within the operational environment, through learning
about the nature and context of the problem as the campaign unfolds. Achieving understanding requires two activities:
framing the problem and mission analysis.
p.24 Describe the systemic nature of the problem to be solved.
This description includes the nature of the adversaries, friendly forces, and the environment in which the campaign will occur.
This step includes identifying the broad constellation of the constituents, and the relationships between them, within
which the problem can be scoped, and its logical limits defined.
p.25 How are the constituent parts of the problem related
and influenced in terms of capabilities, interests, and intent, from the perspective of... information? ...How
do these systems regulate themselves? What keeps them stable? ...How do these systems sustain themselves? ...Which
of these systemic components contributes to the effective generation, projection, and use of power in opposition to our interests?
...[Describe] the tensions in these relationships and identify opportunities for exploitation, positively
or negatively, during the conduct of the campaign... What are the possible "futures" that could unfold based on current
understanding?
p.27 [Describe] the systemic conditions that the command must realize
to achieve the strategic aims... The description of the systemic conditions should also describe the establishment
of any intermediate conditions the commander may feel necessary to support the creation of the desired end state.
p.28 What do we not know (things we must learn)
or what must we confirm to operate effectively over time?
p.31 What are the information requirements the commander must establish
to support his ability to determine when to reframe? These information requirements describe how information relative
to the adversaries, forces and the environment, alone or in combination, would indicate that the current problem frame should
be revised.
