p.5 War can only be understood holistically.
p.5 [Clausewitz quoted] But in war more than in any other
subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the
whole must always be thought of together.
p.5 The core problem for those who are charged with the strategic
function of conducting defense planning for national security is the need to prepare prudently for a future
about which almost everything in general is known, but nothing is known in reliable detail.
p.5 Obviously, the further away from today one peers and tries
to predict, the foggier the course of future events becomes. Crystal balls that work reliably are hard to find
p.6 ignorant though they are, defense planners are obliged
to make guesses about the future.
So, how does one attempt to improve guesswork for the future concerning war,
warfare, and strategy? The most basic answer is that one can only educate in the hope that judgment will be improved so that
good, as opposed to poor, strategic choices will be made... one cannot know what is unknowable...develop policy-makers...
planners... so that they are intellectually equipped to find good enough solutions to the problems that emerge or even erupt
unpredictably years from now. And, one has to emphasize, develop and maintain capabilities sufficiently adaptable
to cope with a range of security challenges, since particular threats and opportunities cannot be anticipated with high confidence.
p.7 There is only a single general theory of war
p.7 Throughout history belligerents have functioned strategically,
striving to achieve desired ends, by suitable ways using available means.
p.7-8 The general theory of war tries to advise on what
to look for; it cannot tell what will be found in a particular case. This is not a fault of general theory, rather
it is the nature of the exercise and the boundary of general theoretical assistance.
p.8 The general theory of strategy so educates strategists
that they are intellectually enabled to invent, design, and execute historically specific strategies that may succeed.
p.8-9 Again citing Clausewitz, the general theory of strategy does
not specify what to do, but it does advise on how to think about what to do. Education in strategy is a conceptual enabler
p.9 so too is strategy both general in nature and variable from case
to case. Because general theory explains the whole enduring nature of a subject, it is both always authoritative and
requires translation to fit within the particular context.
p.9 Strategy is very difficult for many reasons, one of which is that
it is... the conversion of military effort into political reward.
p.9 The guiding principle for defense planning is "minimum regrets."
...The gold standard for good enough defense planning is to get the biggest decisions correct enough so that one’s
successors will lament "if only..." solely with regard to past errors that are distinctly survivable. The defense
planner has to balance the commitment of resources to provide military capabilities that he knows are needed today,
with buying resources for the future as insurance against more or less distant and uncertain perils.
p.10 One needs to buy a military force with the attributes of adaptability,
flexibility, agility, and fungibility [JLJ - the property of a good or a commodity whose individual units are capable of mutual substitution].
When your successors discover that what they have at hand is not a close fit with what optimally they require, they should
be able to work around the difficulty by finding compensation in other, albeit suboptimal, capabilities; looking hard for
strategy and tactics that privilege what happens to be available; and begging, borrowing, and buying what is needed from abroad.
p.10 there is a general theory of war and a general theory of strategy
that are eternally and universally valid. On the other hand, they only have authority as teaching tools to enable highly variable
translation for dealing with specific, changing, historical circumstances. There is a fixed stock, or arsenal, of
strategic ideas that one can think of as tools in one’s conceptual toolkit for use in today’s unique strategic
contexts.
p.11 the carousel of concepts circulates both good ideas and bad ones.
Unfortunately, what once was a good idea in a particular past context may well be a bad idea if applied today in a
new environment.
p.12 Sensible combatants always look for a winning edge that
can mask and offset their deficiencies.
p.12-13 War/warfare is a duel and a dynamic, unique, and unpredictable
product of interaction between friendly and unfriendly forces, together with the workings of friction and chance.
