p.110 In marching, according to Guibert's conception, each division constitutes
a column. These columns, in separating on the march, move more rapidly, cover a wider theater, and force the enemy to turn
in a desired direction; for battle they concentrate, never having lost the higher unity that makes them a single army... Battle
becomes more flexible than before... Guibert credits Frederick [the Great] with having used such a system at Hohenfriedberg
p.131 Napoleon believed that the best method of reaching whatever political goal he sought was to
reduce his opponent's power of resistance to the greatest extent possible.
p.146 [Jomini insisted] on the validity of the same basic ideas, first set down in 1803:
That strategy is the key to warfare;
That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and
That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker
enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.
p.165 Central to Jomini's argument that there are immutable "principles" of war... is his emphasis on "lines
of operations."
p.167 But even the [Jomini] term "accidental lines of operations" contains a vital point: in warfare the
unexpected must be expected - rapidly changing circumstances might require a new line of operations.
p.168 In Jomini's judgment... most commanders made the wrong choices because they did not understand the
principles of strategy. Those principles can be summarized in the fewest words as bringing superior force to bear on a point
where the enemy is both weaker and liable to crippling damage.
