iii Dr. Colin Gray... contends that the time-tested idea of decisive
victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world.
To do so correctly can provide the foundation for an effective strategy. To fail to do so
could be the first step toward strategic defeat.
v-vi It is suggested that the concept of decisive victory
needs to be supplemented by two ancillary concepts, strategic success and strategic advantage... Strategic success or advantage
may serve the goals of policy quite well enough.
p.5 [The United States] is the victim both of its recent military successes
and of its own growing conviction that in practice the age-old lore of strategy can be short-circuited by high technology.
p.12 Although the concept of decisive victory in principle is distinguishable
from strategic success or strategic advantage, in practice either of the two more modest achievements can be positively decisive...
Strategic success or strategic advantage, accomplishments that fall notably short of the forcible disarmament
of the enemy, may well qualify for the label of decisive victory.
p.13 Strategy is, or should be, a purpose-built bridge linking military
power to political goals.
p.20-21 There is an approach to war that maximizes the prospect
of the achievement of decisive victory... That approach is best expressed in just five propositions
p.21 1. Better armies tend to win... armies
who understand the nature of war expect to have to adapt in realtime to circumstances that could not have been forecast with
precision long in advance... Because surprise is always possible, even probable, an important quality in a better
army is its ability to find a way to win, its capability to adjust to unexpected events when plans are rendered
obsolete by the independent will of the foe. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once observed, the principal
value of military planning is not to produce ahead of time the perfect plan, but rather to train planners who can adjust and
adapt to changing circumstances as they emerge.
p.23-24 2. No magic formula
for victory... The quest for the key to certain victory can lead strategists astray... Because, to
repeat, all wars are duels, eventually technological formulae (indeed, any formula) for decisive victory will fail.
The failure will be the result of tactical ineffectiveness in specific circumstances (e.g., in an urban setting), or operational
and strategic negation by an enemy who behaves as Edward Luttwak predicts in his masterwork on strategy. The paradoxical logic of conflict states that what works today will not work tomorrow, because
it worked today.
p.25-27 3. Technology is not a panacea...
Technology is only one of strategy's dimensions, and it is by no means the most important. The Fulleresque belief that relative
technological prowess is the prime determinant of strategic success has a substantial problem with the historical record in
all periods... Bombardment, no matter how precise, is not synonymous with war as a whole... What matters most is how weapons
are used, and by whom... The tools of war are important, but typically they are not the drivers to victory... technological
prowess will tend to equalize among polities over time
p.27-29 4. The complexity of strategy
and war is the mother of invention. Strategy and war have to be approached holistically, all of their
dimensions, or elements, are always in play, though not always of equal importance... Because strategic effectiveness
is the product of behavior across all of strategy's dimensions, ...enemies will strive to find and exploit areas of relative
strength for the levelling, or better, of the playing field... [A belligerent] is likely to have to confront a genuinely smart
enemy who understands the full range of grand strategy... All episodes of conflict are struggles between belligerents
who seek to substitute strength for weakness in those dimensions where they are at a disadvantage.
p.29-31 5. Know your enemies...
Really good armies are flexible and adaptable to a wide variety of combat conditions... Any formula for military success invites
potential enemies to emulate, to evade, and to offset.
p.34 Decisive victory needs to be supplemented in American public discourse
with the less imperial notions of strategic advantage and strategic success.
