p.68 the habit of viewing a social structure as a network of (generally)
asymmetrical relationships can help to clarify some of the ambiguities that are commonly found in statements of power relationships.
p.69 Direct measurements of influence are obtained when we can observe
the ratio of change in behavior of influencee to change in behavior of influencer.
p.77-78 The definition of the key terms - "influence" and "power" - is the first step towards an answer.
The position taken here is that the phenomenon we wish to measure is an asymmetrical relation between the behavior of two
persons [JLJ - possibly entities, or pieces in a game]. We wish to observe how a change in the behavior
of one (the influencer) alters the behavior of the other (the influencee).
p.90 When we have written down, as best we can, the equations of a dynamic
system, our troubles have only begun.
p.196 A theory of administration or of organization cannot exist without a theory of rational choice.
p.204 The usual procedure for introducing uncertainty into the theory of
choice is to assume that knowledge about future values of one or more variables is given in the form of a probability distribution.
p.204 a house thermostat... regulates the house temperature not by predicting but by taking relatively
prompt corrective action to eliminate deviations between the actual temperature and the desired temperature.
p.205 the key to an effective solution appeared to lie in substituting the
goal of satisficing, of finding a good enough move, for the goal of minimaxing, of finding the best move.
p.262 if an organism is confronted with the problem of behaving approximately
rationally, or adaptively, in a particular environment, the kinds of simplifications that are suitable may depend not only
on the characteristics - sensory, neural, and other - of the organism, but equally upon the structure of the environment.
Hence, we might hope to discover, by a careful examination of some of the fundamental structural characteristics of the environment,
some further clues as to the nature of the approximating mechanisms used in decision making.
p.269-270 A more interesting possibility arises if the food points [JLJ
- Simon is considering the concept of rational behavior for a simple organism that must explore to find and consume food to
survive] are not distributed completely at random, and if there are clues that indicate whether a particular intermediate
point is rich or poor in paths leading to food points... A different kind of clue might operate in the following fashion.
Each choice point has a distinguishable characteristic that is associated with the probability of encountering a food point
if a path is selected at random leading out of this choice point. The organism can then select at each move the choice point
with the highest probability... the organism may be led into "regions" where the probability of goal attainment is
high relative to other regions... A concrete example of such behavior in humans is the "position play" characteristic of the
first phase of a chess game... Certain positions are adjudged richer in attacking and defensive possibilities than others,
but the original choice may involve no definite plan for the subsequent action after the "good" position has been reached.
p.270 Next, we turn to the problem of choice that arises when
those regions of the behavior space that are rich in points satisfying one need... are poor in points satisfying another need...
we postulated a priority mechanism that amounted to a mechanism for computing relative need intensity
and for responding to the more intense need. [JLJ - seems to be the source of Bossel's orientor idea]
p.272 Provided that the needs of the organism can be specified at any given time in terms of the aspiration
levels for the various kinds of... behavior, the model can be applied.
p.273 We have seen that an organism in an environment with these characteristics requires only very
simple perceptual and choice mechanisms to satisfy its several needs and to assure a high probability of its survival
over extended periods of time. In particular, no "utility function" needs to be postulated for the organism,
nor does it require any elaborate procedure for calculating marginal rates of substitution among different wants. [JLJ - this
framework is useful for game theory]
