Marine Corps Operating Concepts - Third Edition (2010)

Foreword Old ideas can take on an entirely new life when placed with a new context - and if there is one constant reflected in our view of the future, it is that there is no longer a single context but many... Whether the ideas in these pages are proven or disproven is not the point – the act of thoughtful engagement in response to them is what matters. As steel sharpens steel, ideas can – and should – do the same.

p.2 What assured littoral access and responding to crisis have in common is that they require forces that are strategically mobile, operationally flexible, and tactically proficient.

p.4 A natural by-product of our trans-domain perspective is our adaptability to changing operational conditions. Such changes usually involve a high degree of uncertainty and often occur during the opening phases of a campaign and at other times when unanticipated or ambiguous conditions emerge

p.6 The Marine Corps is organized, trained, and equipped to operate at and from the sea as part of the naval team to "engage, respond, and project."

p.8 Responsiveness- Forward postured sea-based forces provide a flexible response to a range of crises and contingencies, ever-ready to accomplish emerging missions singly or to facilitate the introduction of additional... resources.

p.11 This third edition of the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) provides a conceptual guide for current and future force development and experimentation. The ideas put forth in this volume are meant to inspire discussion, debate, and innovation during the capability identification and solution development process. It is built around the premise that sea-based Marines must be organized, trained, and equipped to "engage, respond, and project."

p.17 Maneuver warfare seeks not only to capture militarily significant objectives and destroy the enemy force and material, but to simultaneously "shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." The maneuverist strives to take the initiative

p.20 Our object is to “shatter enemy cohesion” through surprise, speed and violence, and strengthen and insulate our own cohesion from enemy action

p.23 Superiority is achieved by exploiting subordinate initiative to control tempo, dictate terms of engagement and realize incremental advantage across a wide array of activities and functions that cumulatively lead to a deteriorating enemy situation and cause loss of coherence and cohesion that can lead to disproportionate result.

p.23 War Compels Adaptive Learning. The inherent uncertainty of war, combined with our adversary’s reaction to our initiative and simultaneous actions to disguise his capabilities and intentions, make war risky, unpredictable and highly susceptible to chance... there is a need to develop and select leaders who know how to learn, are used to making mistakes and are capable of generating new opportunities amid setbacks

p.25 advantage can be gained through relentless efforts to generate, recognize and exploit opportunity in a timely manner. Risk calculation and acceptance is a complex problem that confronts commanders in both the intellectual and moral dimensions. Risk cannot be eliminated, nor in pursuit of the utopian battlespace should we seek to do so.

p.32-33 Fundamentals of EMO [Enhanced Marine Air Ground Task Force Operations]

• Learning Organization- Learning Organization defined: an organization that acquires knowledge and innovates fast enough to survive and thrive in a rapidly changing environment. Learning organizations (1) create a culture that encourages and supports continuous learning, critical thinking, and risk taking with new ideas, (2) allow mistakes, and value employee contributions, (3) learn from experience and experiment, and (4) disseminate new knowledge throughout the organization for incorporation into day-to-day activities.

• Risk Acceptance- Embracing a prudent amount of risk allows a commander to take advantage of enemy gaps, to place his unit in an advantageous position on both human and physical terrain. Taking a risk offers the possibilities of both great victory and great defeat; it does not require the abandonment of all security – it is simply calculating an action or series of actions against the possibility for tactical, operational or strategic outcomes and embracing the chance of loss and failure, in an effort to achieve advantage over the enemy.

• Context- The understanding of the Information Operations (IO) plan, intelligence collection and dissemination, the human terrain, the strategic and operational goals, and the constraints and restraints placed upon the force flows up and down the chain of command. Throughout a campaign the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] must understand the environment they work in; one which may evolve over time. The enhanced MAGTF must have the tools and training that allow them to rapidly share necessary information throughout operations.

• Tempo- The MAGTF must control the tempo of operation understanding the need for tactical patience and when to increase the rate of decision and action to force the enemy to react to us – out maneuvering him across physical, human and cyber terrain. The empowerment of junior leaders inherently enables and reinforces rapid decision making—collectively due to the multitudes of individual decisions being made concurrently at the tactical level at any given time; and individually due to the willingness of junior leaders to make a decision they know is theirs to make. This idea, reinforced through application creates an operational tempo most adversaries will be unable to match.

• Elasticity- The MAGTF requires a capability to change its size, shape, or distribution as far as required by METT-T [Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops & Time Available] and aggregate to take advantage of mass when the opportunity or necessity arises—expanding the range of tactical options. We must be able to operate from dispersed to concentrated throughout the battlefield regardless of terrain, distance and complexity, in operations that span the ROMO [Range of Military Operations]. This demands an increased ability to work in some of the most austere and complex of environments; this requires increased capability for mobility, communication and sustainment. This also places new demands and increased responsibility on small unit leaders. Elasticity requires empowerment at the lowest level— empowerment earned by trust and demonstrated self-sufficiency.

p.36 The system must be resilient

p.37 The ability to move throughout the battlespace allows the commander to disperse forces and yet retain the ability to concentrate them when the situation dictates.

p.38 The nature of war requires that Marines... operate and adapt to any condition... we must take advantage of speed relative to our enemy - to mass and disperse as the opportunity arises.

p.41 The resulting benefit of the aforementioned enhancements... will be a more responsive, networked, flexible [organization] regardless of the... situation presented by future operations.

p.42 As the GCE [Ground Combat Element] becomes more fluid and flexible the LCE [Logistics Combat Element] must adapt to it - and keep step with changing pace of the GCE. It must predict the needs of the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] and prepare to support any unit - regardless of mission.

p.42-43 The need to maneuver across multiple types of terrain at a pace faster than the enemy; and maintain the ability to concentrate forces to mass when the opportunity presents itself is vital and should drive any enhancements.

p.54 The presence of forward naval forces provides American policymakers with an expansive range of options to influence events and project power in peacetime, crisis, and war.

p.77 The key phrase that distinguishes a crisis from other types of military operations is “develops rapidly,” meaning that a given situation occurred unexpectedly or with minimal warning.

p.80 Naval forces are inherently flexible and mobile but we must validate our current positioning and structure to ensure we are optimally organized and positioned to proactively influence events forward while retaining the ability to globally respond to the unforeseen.

p.81 Successful crisis response is dependent on three fundamental attributes— speed, flexibility, and operational effectiveness... The speed at which capable forces can be deployed to the scene of a crisis is often vitally important. The more quickly forces can deploy to stabilize a situation, the greater will be the likelihood of eventual success and the less may be the eventual cost. What matters, however, is not just how quickly the first forces can deploy; it is the speed at which capable, sustainable forces can deploy.

p.90 Power projection is defined as “the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.” ...

A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability...

p.95 In addition to being able to “kick open the door” when required, the mobility and global reach of sea power allows forward postured, seabased forces to conduct routine engagement activities and respond to episodic crises

p.99 The establishment of local sea control, which permits the use of the sea as maneuver space, is the essential pre-condition for successful power projection.

p.100 Littoral maneuver is the ability to transition ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore in order to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. It may be employed: directly against an objective, including inland objectives, to accomplish the mission singly; to seize infrastructure or lodgments which will enable the arrival of follow-on forces; or to pose a continuous coastal threat which causes an adversary to dissipate his forces. Littoral maneuver is enabled by the ability of naval forces to establish moving umbrellas of domain superiority around the various distributed elements of the landing force.

p.112 Regardless of the actors involved, war is fundamentally a struggle between "…hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself upon the other."

p.117 Understand the complex dynamics of the threat, including the wider environment. This includes understanding the causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, methods/approaches, external support, and wider environment.

p.117 Influence human will through the discriminate application of power

p.120 Combat operations involve the purposeful application of violence, or the threat of violence, to establish dominance over an adversary or create favorable conditions within an operating environment.

p.122 Effective tactical intelligence is essential to successfully countering irregular threats.

p.123 The tempo of adaptation is a crucial success factor in countering irregular threats; quality tactical intelligence promotes the ability to adapt faster and more effectively than the adversary.

p.124 Normally, units that have proven the most effective in fighting an insurgency have focused on achieving "brilliance in the basics."

p.124 A key component of achieving and maintaining stability is the governing authority’s ability to ensure basic human needs are met... Early in an intervention, an assessment will be required to determine needs and develop a coordinated approach for meeting them. Leaders must be sensitive to how these needs may change over time, perhaps quite rapidly.

p.142 Maneuver Warfare, no matter how expertly executed, can be equated to a game of two-dimensional chess in which one competitor tries to defeat another.