p.7 Learners must start from beliefs that are accepted or at least familiar
p.33 In a practical science so much depends upon particular circumstances that only general rules
can be given.
p.55 one can wish for results which one could not possibly bring about oneself... but nobody
chooses things like that - only what he thinks could be achieved by his own efforts.
Again, wish is more concerned with the end, and choice with the means: e.g. we wish to be healthy, but choose things that
will make us healthy... in general choice seems to be concerned with acts that lie in our own power.
p.56 when we choose, it is to take or avoid something good or bad
p.56 what is chosen is voluntary... choice implies a rational principle, and thought.
p.57 What we deliberate about is practical measures that lie in our power
p.58 Thus the field of deliberation is 'that which happens for the most part, where
the result is obscure and the right course not clearly defined'
p.58 We deliberate not about ends but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether
to cure his patient... nor does anyone else deliberate about the end at which he is aiming. They first set some end before
themselves, and then proceed to consider how and by what means it can be attained.
p.63 Nobody blames those who are naturally ugly, but we do blame those who become so through lack of exercise
and care for their appearance. [JLJ ! ]
p.150 it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good
and advantageous for himself... prudence cannot be science or art; not science because what can be
done is a variable [It may be done in different ways, or not done at all], and not art because action and production
are generically different.
p.154 prudence is concerned with... things about which deliberation is possible; for we hold that it
is the function of the prudent man to deliberate well
p.154 prudence is not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, because
it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances... prudence is practical
p.155 People do in fact seek their own good, and think that they are right to act in this
way. It is from this belief that the notion has arisen that such people are prudent.
p.156 error in deliberation is with reference either to the general principle or to the particular fact
p.156 It is obvious that prudence is not scientific knowledge, because it apprehends the last step, as we
have said, since the thing to be done is of this nature... prudence apprehends the ultimate particular, which cannot be apprehended
by scientific knowledge, but only by perception
p.159 understanding is concerned... with matters that may cause perplexity and call for deliberation. Hence
its sphere is the same as that of prudence; but understanding and prudence are not the same, because prudence
is imperative (since its end is what one should or should not do), and understanding only makes judgments.
