p.304 In this essay, we (1) generate and explicate a "language-action" paradigm,
(2) offer an extended example of its explanatory potential, and (3) set forth several important implications for theory and
research in communication.
p.304 Influenced by some of the techniques of analytic philosophy, our
paradigm consists of three hierarchically structured constructs. Our most general term, context,
specifies the criteria for interpreting both the meaningfulness and propriety of any communicative event. Episodes
are fundamental communicative sequences of action which are understandable only in terms of the contexts in which they occur.
Finally, symbolic acts are the most elemental communicative constituents from which actors generate
episodes.
p.306 institutional constraint is brought to fruition through the
encounter... During the encounter, actors will survey the probable rules of propriety and - in principle - exclude
the least likely candidates.
p.306 Episodes The pivotal concept for understanding
communication is a rule-conforming sequence of symbolic acts generated by two or more actors who are collectively oriented
toward emergent goals.
p.311 Expressive force is an asituational function such as... threatening...
consequential force, which is the effect the act has on another actor
p.311 A communicative understanding of symbolic acts demands an explanation
of how such acts function in an episodic context. When placed in the context of an episode, symbolic acts acquire a fourth
feature - namely, episodic force. Episodic force completes the explanation of symbolic acts by specifying
the communicative function of acts within the overall sequential structure of an episode.
p.312 We can specify more clearly how episodic force links symbolic
acts to episodes. The consequential force of any symbolic act occurring in an episode follows logically from the episodic
force of that act.
p.312 We have now presented a three part paradigm for explaining
communication as language-action. We began by discussing contexts which functioned as vehicles for explanation. Contexts
are composed of forms of life which define general criteria for meaningfulness and encounters which coorient actors
and activate specific rules of propriety. We then argued that communication becomes manifest as episodes - strategically
generated sequences of communicative action whose goals and form are conjointly created by two or more actors. Finally,
symbolic acts are presented as the most elemental utterances from which actors direct episodes. Symbolic acts manifest
propositional, expressive, and consequential force and acquire communicative meaning through episodic force.
p.319 since the pattern of any episode is a sequence of logically related
symbolic acts, specific formalization of that patterning seems to be another problem for language-action research. Our structural
imperatives, for example, while providing a first approximation of episodic patterning, need refinement and specificity.
p.320 How then is human behavior generated, particularly
behavior that can be given meaning as social action? ...We all know that in fact what happens in certain paradigm
cases is something like this: people consider various alternative actions and examine their consequences by an imaginative
rehearsal of episodes. In light of this rehearsal and their intuitions about the propriety of each form the
episode might take, a particular social action is chosen. The effects of the action are carefully monitored, and
rapid modifications of the plan are usually made as the action of the episode unfolds.
p.320 If social action is taken to be an interpretive process, such explanations cannot
be reconstructed meaningfully in deductive form but rather must be viewed as imputations of purposes and circumstances
to actors that render their actions intelligible to the observer.
p.320 For if communication is essentially normative action, then any complete explanation of
such action must include at least a prudential assessment of an actor's choices. And that critical assessment
will depend on the scholar/critic's own norms. Put somewhat differently, the language-action perspective enables the
theorist to discuss values and the contingency of moral choice within the usual context of description and explanation.
