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The Nature of a Paradigm (Masterman, 1970)
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In: I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (pp.59-89). London: Cambridge University Press
 
JLJ - [artefact] some may prefer the alternative spelling of artifact

p.59 philosophically speaking, a paradigm is an artefact which can be used as a puzzle-solving device... A paradigm has got to be a concrete 'picture' used analogically; because it has got to be a 'way of seeing'.
 
p.60 Kuhn - at last - has noticed this central fact about all real science (basic research, applied, technological, are all alike here), namely that it is normally a habit-governed, puzzle-solving activity, not a fundamentally upheaving or falsifying activity
 
p.60 the one thing working scientists are not going to do is to change their ways of thinking, in doing science
 
p.66 Seen sociologically (as opposed to being seen philosophically) a paradigm is a set of scientific habits. By following these, successful problem-solving can go on
 
p.67 his construct-paradigm is less than a theory, since it can be something as little theoretic as a single piece of apparatus: i.e. anything which can cause actual puzzle-solving to occur.
 
p.68 philosophically speaking, a paradigm is an artefact which can be used as a puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world-view
 
p.70 If we ask, however, what a paradigm does, it becomes clear at once (assuming always the existence of normal science) that the construct sense of 'paradigm', and not the metaphysical sense or metaparadigm, is the fundamental one. For only with an artefact can you solve puzzles.
 
p.70 The normal scientist is a puzzle-solving addict (p.37); it is in this puzzle-solving - not just vague 'problem-solving', but puzzle-solving - that normal science prototypically consists. And a puzzle is always an artefact. It is all very well to say that the paradigm 'supplies tools' (pp. 37 and 76) or, vaguely, that it makes problem-solving possible.
 
p.75 it is always some construct-using, puzzle-solving trick which starts off normal science.
 
p.76 Having done what can be done to establish non-sociologically a Kuhnian paradigm as a genuinely insightful puzzle-solving trick or device, let us now both examine further the nature of the device, and also, if possible, the nature of the insight.
 
p.76 a puzzle-solving paradigm... has... got to be a concrete 'way of seeing'.
 
p.77 It is, in fact, actual artefacts used analogically which Kuhn is after... it has got to be an organized puzzle-solving gestalt which is itself a 'picture' of something, A, if it is then to be applied, non-obviously, to provide a new 'way of seeing' something else, B.
 
p.79 I wish to say that a paradigm draws a 'crude analogy'; and further to define a crude analogy as an analogy which has the following logical characteristics:
(a) a crude analogy is finite in extensibility
(b) it is incomparable with any other crude analogy
(c) it is extensible only by an inferential process of 'replication', which can be examined by using the computer-programming technique of 'inexact matching'
 
p.81 The heart of the problem is that of envisaging a crude analogy stated in ambiguous words as an artefact; pictures and wire models can be fitted in with comparative ease, after this first central problem has been faced... the scientist working in a new science is constructing and extending a crude analogy by using speech, with or without the help of mechanical apparatus or of mathematics. And if he is in fact doing this, then the fact that he is doing so - this skeleton - has got to come out of the philosophical-logical cupboard.
 
p.82-83 the way in which [Kuhn] describes a paradigm breaking down, by the emergence within it of anomaly... His essential point is that an anomaly is an untruth, or a should-be-soluble-but-is-insoluble problem... which is thrown up by the paradigm itself being pushed too far... if the paradigm is to be conceived as a crude analogy... attempts will inevitably be made to adjust the analogy; in the more complex, mathematicized situation, attempts are made either to derestrict or complicate the mathematics, to produce variants of the theory, or to dig out the theory's fundamental assumptions, to try to make the analogy fit again. Anomaly deepens into crisis when these attempts fail... until the very fundamentals of the paradigm are thrown into question; or, some rank outsiders with a quite different viewpoint and rudimentary new technique succeed in solving with ease the main problem which was causing all the trouble, so that the whole present paradigm, together with all its commitments, derivations, and assumptions, is made to look dreamlike.
 
p.83 Putting it more generally, it is not only the case that a fully extended paradigm, or theory, reaches a point where further extensions of it produce diminishing returns. The situation is worse. The paradigm itself goes bad on you, if it is stretched too far, producing conceptual inconsistency, absurdity, misexpectation, disorder, complexity and confusion
 
p.84 normal science consists of puzzle-solving

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