p.2 The problem which a nervous system wherever found may be said more or less perfectly to solve may be
stated thus: Given a set of mechanical conditions, to devise an apparatus which shall receive, register, and react upon
these conditions severally, in such a way that, while adapting itself progressively to greater complexity of condition, it
at the same time realizes in itself a higher integration of the same conditions.
p.3-4 How can I analyze mental processes? Analyze the nervous system, is at least a partial answer:
an answer which is true to some extent whatever theory we ultimately hold of the nature of mind.
p.29 Automatic action may be said to represent the goal and ideal of our nervous development considered
as a mechanism. Its action is self-stimulated
p.30 A nervous circuit is reflex when its motor reaction upon a particular kind of stimulus is
single, definite, constant, and does not involve volition in its execution. In more general terms, a reaction is reflex
whenever we are certain beforehand that it will take the form of a particular well-defined muscular movement, and
will do its work without any interference or mandate from ourselves.
p.30 reflex reactions are most perfect and pure when consciousness in the form of attention is not directed
to the movements.
p.63 The attention always establishes relations. This relational process is the foundation of knowledge
and gives us, whenever it occurs, the apperceptive consciousness.
p.63-64 Voluntary consciousness... exhibits, first, deliberation...
This feeling of deliberation leads on to another element of sensibility, namely, the feeling of decision or consent...
And further, we find another possible element, apparently distinct from the preceding, the feeling of effort...
Any analysis of volition must, at least, take account of these three distinguishable aspects of sensibility.
p.300 Diseases of the nervous system find their diagnosis in their effects upon the muscular apparatus
p.325 The basis of desire, like that of appetite, is a functional need: this state of need
or lack is in itself painful, and its gratification pleasurable.
p.352-353 all volition results from a more or less complex aggregation of motives;
and, second, that this aggregation of motives exhausts the possible alternatives of present action... If you remove
a man's motives you remove the man
p.353-354 It is also plain that a motive is nothing in itself. It is only a name
for a partial expression of the nature of an agent... as elements of a common life, all are involved in the gratification
of each... they are all vital elements in the functional synthesis of a living consciousness.
p.357 Every one of the motives is controlling in the same sense, i.e., of entering essentially in
the result. The only advantage [the controlling motive] has over other motives if that it becomes the final channel
of expression in conduct
p.357 deliberation... Its duration depends upon the complexity of the considerations which arise,
the evenness of their motive influence, and the absence of pressing urgency of choice.
p.363 Effort to accomplish an intellectual task is characterized by the marks already found attaching to
muscular effort.
p.364 what is the law of the development of a man's endowment in relation to his environment? Two great
principles already arrived at find further application here, i.e., the principles of adaptation and habituation.
p.367-368 The attention, we know, intensifies a mental state. It is possible simply by dwelling
upon a consideration to increase its importance to us, to give it prepondering influence in our deliberation, and, finally,
to convince ourselves of its supreme desirableness. It looks... at least like the initiation of new intensity in
old motives, This effect is further exaggerated by the fading out of other motives in consequence of the withdrawal of the
attention from them in favor of the "star actor."
p.368 By a sudden stimulus from without, the attention is shifted, leaves the chain of
deliberation, dwells upon an alternative before subordinate, and so changes the throw of volition.
p.368 It seems possible to divide all cases of such apparent initiation of motive intensity into two classes;
one, the cases of involuntary attention mentioned, and the other, cases of deliberation.
p.369 By attention, deliberation takes place, and choice is the outcome of this deliberation.
p.373 The motives are partial expressions, the volition is a total expression of the same existence.
p.377 The more legitimate effects of voluntary attention are the muscular contractions and inhibitions
which follow it... As to the experimental endeavor, there is no reason that it should not be to some degree successful.
p.381 we reach the ideas of self-agency... through efforts of our own against resistances.
Just as space and time are revealed as intuitions through intellectual synthesis, and just as ideals are felt apprehensions
of truths which lie beyond intellectual construction, so in volition we must recognize a regulative principle of agency,
or power, which is the essence of experiences characterized by the term "will."
