p.802 performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power
granted to language to determine what is real... performativity is actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind
that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve.
p.812 Thingification—the turning of relations into “things,”
“entities,” “relata”— infects much of the way we understand the world and our relationship to
it.
p.814 This causal relationship between the apparatuses of bodily production
and the phenomena produced is one of “agential intra-action.”
p.815 according to Bohr, the primary epistemological unit is not
independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but rather
phenomena...
phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.”
p.815 The notion of intra-action
(in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata)
represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties
of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular embodied concepts become meaningful.
p.817 Phenomena are produced through agential intra-actions of multiple
apparatuses of bodily production... Reality is not composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but “things”-in-phenomena
p.818 In summary, the universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming.
The primary ontological units are not “things” but phenomena—dynamic topological reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations.
p.822 matter is substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing,
but a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilizing and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity.
p.823 Material conditions matter, not because they “support”
particular discourses that are the actual generative factors in the formation of bodies but rather because matter
comes to matter through the iterative intraactivity of the world in its becoming.
p.823 All bodies, not merely “human” bodies, come to matter
through the world’s iterative intra-activity—its performativity.
p.824 a material dynamics of intra-activity: material apparatuses produce
material phenomena through specific causal intra-actions, where “material” is always already material-discursive—that
is what it means to matter.
p.826 intra-actions are constraining but not determining.
That is, intra-activity is neither a matter of strict determinism nor unconstrained freedom. The future is radically open
at every turn.
