Social Ontology: The Problem and Steps toward a Solution, John
R. Searle, p.1-30
p.13 So let us suppose that we have established that collective intentionality
is a fundamental and irreducible fact of human and some animal psychology.
Joint Action: The Individual Strikes Back, Seumas Miller, p.73-92
p.73 Joint actions are actions involving a number of agents performing interdependent actions in order to
realise some common goals.
p.76 the individual action of any given agent is only part of the means by which the end is realised.
p.87 Since each relies on the action of the other, there is interdependence of action. However, interdependence
of action does not entail the existence of a collective end
p.89 A 'doing' is something that is done by something, however, there is no implication
of an agent possessed of a mind. For example, the hurricane did something (in this sense); it destroyed
the building.
The Varieties of Normativity: An Essay on Social Ontology, Leo Zaibert and Barry Smith, p.157-174
p.170 Forming intentions is itself optional, but once they are formed, the commitments
which follow from them do not arise in virtue of constitutive rules imposed, as it were, from without; they arise
solely in virtue of the intrinsic nature of the intentions themselves.
