Copyright (c) 2012 John L. Jerz

Language of Thought Revisited (Fodor, 2008, 2010)
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Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought.

So the latest on the Language of Thought hypothesis, from its progenitor, promises to be a landmark in the study of the mind. LOT 2 offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of Fodor's distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. Fodor shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is Fodor's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.

LOT 2 sees Fodor advance undaunted towards the ultimate goal of a theory of the cognitive mind, and in particular a theory of the intentionality of cognition. No one who works on the mind can ignore Fodor's views, expressed in the coruscating and provocative style which has delighted and disconcerted countless readers over the years.
 
JLJ - Fodor at his finest. Fodor even invents a critic which he names SNARK who makes snide comments and challenges what Fodor says. Perhaps Fodor is attempting too much here. You have to really want to understand what Fodor throws at you in order to read this advanced work... chances are you will say "yeah... sure" and find someone else who will do a better job explaining their concepts. A mind misunderstanding mind is a terrible thing to waste.

p.8 What minds do is think about things. [JLJ - no, what minds do is think about prioritized sets of problems - things are just the pieces of the problems. The mind is a swiss army knife, neatly folded, which is prepared to deploy and attempt to solve any kind of problem whatsoever. Sometimes it deploys on its own, sometimes you get to deploy it, sometimes it malfunctions. When your house is on fire, your mind does not contemplate the universe. I'm starting to get the hang of this psychology thing. You just find something that someone has said, and then disagree with it. After picking a fight with that guy, you then go and find something someone else has said, and disagree with that, then continue (infinitely).]
 
p.13 You can't think up a plan unless you can think about how the world would be if the plan succeeds. [JLJ - The plan can be to simply get into the future, where the future is unknowable. Your plan would then be for adaptive capacity - the future will emerge, and then you adapt to it using the adaptive capacity you have carefully accumulated and developed. "How the world would be" is guesswork and is likely wrong. Your "plan" should be to prepare yourself for whatever emerges - including the likely failure of the plan itself.]
 
p.23 I am already quite confused enough to be getting on with. [JLJ - and you're the one writing the book? Where does that place your readers?]
 
p.25 If RTM [representational theory of mind] is correct, then concepts are:
  • constituents of beliefs
  • the units of semantic evaluation
  • a locus of causal interactions among mental representations
  • formulas in Mentalese.
p.81 the very most you can claim to have is a batch of tricks, all more or less ad hoc
 
p.87 In the long run, computational psychology is a sort of trick that Turing invented to make it seem that there are senses and that they cause things
 
p.143 The trick, in naturalizing reference, is to hold onto the mind-world correlations while quantifying over whatever it is that sustains them.
 
p.148-149 How is it that so many of our concepts fit the world? [JLJ - because the purpose of the mind is to understand and potentially solve any problem that might arise. Concepts that fit the world are available for potential problem solving purposes.]
 
p.149 So, then, why do so many of our concepts have instances? [JLJ - because in order to solve a problem it must become real or instantiated at some part of its solution. The pieces which make up problem solving must have some portion or some link to a part that is instantiated, because we ultimately must make our solution real.]
 
p.153 Assuming that forming a stereotype is typically a stage in concept acquisition might do the trick

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