German lesson: f�r diejenigen,
die durch ihre deutschen Klasse geschlafen
das Vertretene - entity represented
eindeutig - univocal
Mehrdeutigkeit - equivocality [JLJ - ambiguity]
Mittelgegenstande - means-objects
Zielgegenstande - ends
Reize als Anzeichen - stimulus cues or signs
Gegenstande - not complete environmental objects or bodies in their concrete
totalities, but single object-characters abstracted from such total bodies [JLJ - characteristics or properties]
Gegenstand - property
p.43-44 Each of us has come to envisage psychology as primarily concerned
with the methods of response of the organism to two characteristic features of the environment. The first of these
features lies in the fact that the environment is a causal texture (Kausalgefuge) in which different
events are regularly dependent upon each other. And because of the presence of such causal couplings (Kausalkoppelungen),
actually existing in their environments, organisms come to accept one event as a local representative (Stellvertreter)
for another event. It is by the use of such acceptances or assertions of local representatives that organisms come to
steer their ways through that complex network of events, stimuli and happenings, which surrounds them. By means of such local
representation (Stellvertretung) the organism comes to operate in the presence of the local representative in a manner
more or less appropriate to the fact of a more distant object or situation, i.e. the entity represented (das Vertretene).
p.44 The second feature of the environment to which the organism
also adjusts is the fact that such causal connections are probably always to some degree equivocal (mehrdeutig).
Types of local representatives are, that is, not connected in simple one-one, univocal (eindeutig) fashion, with
the types of entities represented. Any one type of local representative is found to be causally connected with differing
frequencies with more than one kind of entity represented and vice-versa. And it is indeed, we would assert, this
very equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit) in the causal "representation"-strands in the environment which lend to the psychological
activities of organisms many of their most outstanding characteristics.
p.46 it is to be pointed out that because of the equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit)
that always to some degree obtains in both such steps, i.e., in the relations between cues and means-Gegenstande
and in those between the latter and goals, the organism is led in both instances to the assertion of "hypotheses." That is,
whether in the process of selecting the correct means-object (Gegenstand-complex) to reach a given
goal or in that of selecting the correct cue-Gegenstande for perceptually identifying a means-Gegenstand,
the organism is forced to venture an hypothesis. [JLJ - because of uncertainty in selecting a method to reach
a goal or in the meaning of cues present in an environment full of interacting objects, we are forced to make a
hypothesis as to the best way to proceed or "go on".]
p.46 In each such case the organism behaves "as though." That is, he ventures
an hypothesis. He may be right; but he may also be wrong.
p.47 An hypothesis "asserts" that a given "a" is the local representative
of a given "b."
p.53 The manipulanda of an object are, so-to-speak, its
essential, behavioral core. They are the properties which make possible and support such and such actual behavioral
manipulations.
p.53 The utilitanda [means-relations] of a behavior-object
lie, so-to-speak, on that side of it which points towards further means-objects or towards an ultimate goal. They
are the ways in which the object, given the manipulanda, or its manipulanda and discriminanda combined, can
be useful as a means for getting to further objects and goals. [JLJ - pieces in a game can constrain other pieces,
and be constrained by them.]
p.55 The whole uncertainty of knowledge and behavior arises just out of
such equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit) in the causal surroundings.
p.67 To sum up for this section, we would emphasize then that, in
addition to its task of choosing correct means-objects, the organism has also that of developing an adequate reception system
which will tend to select reliable cues, rather than ambiguous, non-significant or misleading ones. And its task
is to do this even when all the different kinds of cues are present and competing with one another.
p.68 any given type of cue has (given the causal structure of the environment)
specific, respective, probabilities of having been caused by such and such a [Property] or of having been caused by such
and such other [Properties].
The organism's task is thus, as we have seen, always that
of picking out the means-objects and the cues which have the high probability-lines (in the given case) of
leading to the required goals and to the appropriate means-[Properties].
p.68 an organism usually tends to bring with it to any given new
environment a set of already prepared hypotheses... it will bring with it expectations, based on
heredity and early experience that certain types of means-object tend most frequently to serve as causes (routes)
to positive goals and that other types tend most frequently as routes to negative goals.
p.71 To sum up, we may say in general that in the selection both
of the means-objects which have high probabilities and of the cues which have high probabilities the organism responds in
the form of hypotheses. These hypotheses it brings with it from innate endowment and from previous experience. These
hypotheses tend to be correct for "normal" average environments. When, however, the probabilities in the particular
environment are not those of a "normal" or average environment, then the organism, if it is not to go under, must acquire
new hypotheses... Learning, whether in the perceptual system or in the means-end system, is
just such an acquiring of new hypotheses.
p.72 Thus the wholly successful organism would be one which brings, innately,
normal averagely "good" means-end hypotheses and normal averagely "reliable" perceptual hypotheses; but which can
immediately modify these innate hypotheses to suit the special conditions of a special environment; which can note
and include in its cue-system and in its means-end-system the presence of the further identifying features of these special
environments. But further, such an organism must also, if it is to be completely successful, be equally able at once
to drop out such new hypotheses when the special features as to cue or means are no longer present.
p.73 we would like to throw out here, as a final word, the suggestion that
all the problems of psychology—not only those of visual perception and of learning—but all the
more general problems of instinct, insight, learning, intelligence, motivation, personality and emotion all
center around this one general feature of the given organism's abilities and tendencies for adjusting to these actual causal
textures,—these actual probabilities as to causal couplings.
p.73-76 In conclusion, we would summarize as follows:
1. The environment of an organism has the character of a complex
causal texture (Kausalgefuge) in which certain objects may function as the local representatives
(die Stellvertreter) of other objects; these latter to be known as the entities
represented (die Vertretenen).
2. This function of local representation has, however, two subvarieties.
(a) On the one hand, objects or situations may function
as local representatives of others in that they provide (with the cooperation of the organism) means-objects (Mittelgegenstande)
to the others; these latter to be known as the goals (Zielgegenstdnde).
(b) On the other hand, objects or
events may also function as local representatives for others in that, being themselves caused by such other objects or events,
they serve as cues (Anzeichen) for the latter. These latter in their turn would then be known
as the Gegenstdnde relative to such cues.
3. The simplest paradigm involving these two kinds of local representation
will be one in which an organism is presented with a single behavior-object (hantierbarer Korper). This
behavior-object is to be conceived as lying "in between" the need-goal side (Bedarf-Erfolg-Seite) and the reception-reaction-side
of the organism. And, as so lying, it may function causally in two ways:
(a) This object can (with the cooperation of the organism)
function as the means-object for the reaching of some goal.
(b) This object can also send out causal trains which
may be picked up as cues by the reception-reaction-side of the organism. These cues will then function to represent the Gegenstande
which make up the object.
4. These resulting cues, considered as a reactional event, may be
said anticipatively to "lasso" (lasso-principle, i.e., sign-gestalt) the present
causal complex on the basis of past causal complexes. In other words, such cue-Gegenstande will be responded to as
presenting then and there an actual instance of the given type of means-Gegenstand and as also presenting (transitively) through
this means-Gegenstand the possibility of such and such a final goal-Gegenstand.
5. But such a paradigm with only one behavior-object between goal and cues
is for some types of situation too simple and for others too complex.
(a) In many actual situations there may
be more than one successive means-object and more than one successive cue object. But such cases, although the picture
must be complicated to allow for them, do not introduce anything new in principle.
(b) It also appears that such a single intervening
behavior-object (Gegenstand-complex) may have three, somewhat independently variable and distinguishable, aspects. These are
to be designated as its discriminanda, its manipulanda and its utilitanda. These further complicate the
picture but they do not demand anything fundamentally new in principle.
(c) Finally, there are other types of situation, obtaining
for very young or for very primitive organisms, in which there are no distinct intervening Gegenstande, as such, between cues
and goals. The whole picture must in such cases be conceived as telescoped.
6. It appears now, further, that the causal couplings between goal
and means or between the latter and cue (or between different aspects within any one of these) are seldom,
if ever, univocal (eindeutig). For it appears that any given type of goal will be
capable of being causally reached by more than one type of means-object. And, vice-versa, any given type of means-object
will be capable of leading to more than one type of goal. Similarly, any given type of means-object can cause more than one
kind of sensory cue and any one type of cue can be caused by more than one type of means-object.
7. Such equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit)
brings it about that the organism has to venture hypotheses as to what the given means-object will "most probably"
lead to in the way of goals or as to what type of means-Gegenstand the given cues have with "most probability" been caused
by. (Such hypotheses are always capable of purely objective definition.)
8. Further analyses of the actual types of probability-relation which
may obtain suggest preliminary, and it would seem experimentally fruitful, classifications of means-objects into the four
types: good, ambivalent, indifferent and bad (gutes, ambivalentes, indifferentes and schlechtes Mittel) and of cues
into the four types: reliable, ambiguous, non-significant and misleading (verlassliches, zweideutiges, bedeutungsarmes
and irrefuhrendes Anzeichen).
9. It appears that the organism's task in any given case is to correct
whatever hypotheses it brings with it to fit the real probabilities of the actually presented set-up.
10. The organism brings hypotheses based on innate endowment and previous
experience which tend to be suitable to the probability-relations of "normal" environments. But in any actual given environment
these "normal" probability-relations may not hold.
11. If, therefore, it is to be successful, the organism must eventually
develop both cue-systems and means-object systems which are, at one and the same time, both wide and inclusive and yet full
of very fine discriminations.
12. Finally, it appears that the study of the organism's abilities and propensities
in the development and operation of such cue-systems and mean-end systems and resultant hypotheses involves not only the problems
of perception and of means-end learning, but also those of instinct, memory, insight, intellect, emotion—in short, perhaps,
all the problems of psychology.
