p.2 Clausewitz is essential for our education, but
as he insisted, though his general theory can help prepare us for the specific challenges we actually face, it can
never "construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield."
p.3 The French philosopher Raymond Aron made this point exactly, when
he wrote in 1968 that “Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each
moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose."
p.3 The idea that strategy has an essence is deeply attractive. It sounds
like something incredibly rare and valuable which could be bottled and sold. Perhaps, belatedly, I can make my fortune selling
Gray’s “essence of strategy." [JLJ Colin seems to have taken his own advice - see Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Gray, 2007) ]
p.4 A general theory of war and strategy, such
as that offered by Clausewitz and in different ways also by Sun-tzu and Thucydides, is a theory with universal applicability.
p.5 If one can think strategically, one has the basic intellectual
equipment needed in order to perform competently in either regular or irregular conflict. Needless to add, understanding
and performance are not synonymous.
p.10 So the clear message in this caveat, which we develop later,
is that the U.S. Army must transform itself to be more adaptable. It cannot apply a simple template
or rely on power-point wisdom that promises victory over irregulars in "five easy steps." [JLJ see Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Gray, 2002) where Gray declares "There is an approach to war that maximizes the prospect of the achievement of decisive victory...
That approach is best expressed in just five propositions... " ] Each historical case is different. It is only at
the level of strategy that one size fits all.
p.11-12 in wars of all kinds, warfare, bluntly stated, fighting,
occurs in the context of the whole war, and it needs to be conducted in such a way that it fits the character of the war and
thereby yields useful strategic effectiveness. When the key distinction and relationship between war and warfare
are not understood, the inevitable result is misdirected warfare, virtually no matter whether it is prosecuted efficiently.
p.13 It is the firm opinion of this author that, unless America “does
strategy,” which is to say relates military and other means to its political ends in a purposeful, realistic, and adaptable
way, improvements in military prowess ultimately must yield disappointing results.
p.13 The key to strategy, certainly to thinking strategically,
is the simple and rather off-putting question, “So what?” Strategists are not interested in the
actual conduct of regular or irregular war. Their concern is what that conduct means for the course and consequences of a
conflict. Tactical and operational excellence is always desirable, even if not always strictly necessary. Since, inter
alia [among other things], warfare is a competition in learning between imperfect military machines, fortunately one need
only be good enough. Tactical excellence is quality wasted if it is not employed purposefully to advance political goals.
p.14-15 First, following Carl von Clausewitz (who else), I must insist
that strategy is about the use made of force and the threat of force for the goals of policy... All [weapons
or modes of warfare] can have strategic effect. I freely admit that the vital concept of strategic effect
is as hard to assess as it is central to proper understanding of our subject.
Second, strategy is all about the relationship between means
and ends... Third, if the strict instrumentality of force is not to be neglected or forgotten, and this is
the most important ingredient in the essence of strategy, there has to be a constant dialogue between policymaker and
soldier. Policy is nonsense if the troops cannot do it “in the field.” ... Fourth and finally, in case the point
should fade from view under the pressure of military events, politics must rule. To quote another Clausewitzian maxim, “War
is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” The most essential of
the four ingredients that, when mixed, become the essence of strategy, is the instrumentality of the
threat or use of force. In practice, the pressures and demands of the actual waging of war have
a way of relegating policy purpose to the background. All too often, policy may seem to serve war, rather than war serve policy.
p.16 what is the legal currency for the measurement of strategic
effect? It is easily understandable, albeit unfortunate, why the mystery of strategic effect is apt to be solved
by soldiers and officials who seize upon whatever can be counted as they take the default choice of favoring attrition. Bodies,
pacified villages, reopened roads, declining incident rate, pick your preferences. Again, one must cite the strategist’s
question, “So what?” The strategist must know what military behavior means for the political purpose of the enterprise.
Body counts need to be interpreted for their strategic value. They cannot simply be declared triumphantly as tactical achievements
with self-evident meaning.
p.16 strategy is difficult to do as an orderly and well-integrated
exercise in the matching of means to ends because of the high inconvenience of the semi-independent behavior of an intelligent
enemy.
p.17 Things always go wrong. That is to be expected. A sound strategy is
one that is tolerant of some of history’s unpleasant surprises. Adaptability must be regarded as a cardinal military
virtue.
p.20-21 Intelligence is King. The key to operational advantage
in COIN [counter-insurgency] is timely, reliable intelligence... With superior intelligence, COIN wins.
p.23 Irregular warfare is, or at least should be, waged on both sides grand
strategically. All of the instruments of persuasion, coercion, and influence need to be employed.
p.24 COIN can succeed only when the military instrument
is employed as part of a team that is led by political judgment and places its highest priority on real-time intelligence
gathering
p.31 Strategy is, or should be, the bridge that connects military power
with policy.
p.31 It is prudent to take notice of these words of wisdom from Samuel Huntington:
"Military forces are... instruments of coercion to compel [an enemy] to alter his behavior."
p.36 the only sound plan for the future has to be one that is flexible and
adaptable.
p.50 I affirmed the merit of the hypothesis that strategy
does indeed have an essence. If there is a single idea which best captures that essence, it is instrumentality.
So long as one never forgets that strategy is about the consequences of the use of force and the threat of its use,
and not about such use itself, one will keep to the straight and narrow.
p.51 We can appreciate that tactical, even operational, excellence,
in the waging of irregular war, or indeed any kind of war, must be at a severe discount, a waste, if it is
not directed by a constant concern for its strategic effect upon the course of political events. The logic of strategy
is the same for wars of all kinds, even though the styles and tools of combat will differ.
